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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to demonstrate that, during the post war and early Cold War 
years, the US Federal government, and in particular the Executive branch, was 
inspired to increase the role which it played in the US Education system. It also 
seeks to chart the methods it utilised in order to do so. One inspiration was the 
desire to direct the US education system towards a curriculum which better 
benefitted the nation’s Cold War effort, including placing a greater emphasis 
upon scientific education and training, more tightly regulating the discussion 
over democratic vs. communist ideologies in the classroom and the pursuit of a 
greater equalisation in opportunity for African American students. Further 
inspiration was provided by both the widespread expansion of centralised 
government programs and the increased importance of education to social 
progress witnessed across the world after the Second World War, and both 
President Truman’s own personal commitment to the equalisation of education 
opportunity, and the Democratic Party’s pursuit of black votes during the Truman 
Administration. This thesis charts the Executive and Judicial branches’ 
innovative and unorthodox usage of the powers available to them in order to 
garner greater influence over the education system, and assesses the varying rates 
of success of these programmes in order to demonstrate the significant and 
irrevocable shift in the relationship between the US Federal government and the 
US education system which occurred during the early Cold War. 
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INTRODUCTION
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When the Enola Gay dropped a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima in August 1945 and 
made academics, not soldiers, the controlling influence over military might, the 
Federal government began to pay close attention the role which education would 
play in the future world order. The knowledge that, in the Pacific arena, the war 
had been won not by boots on the ground, but by researchers in a laboratory, gave 
new importance and relevance to the work of schools, colleges and universities 
across the USA. Wars could be won and lost on campus, and this newfound status 
fundamentally altered how the Federal government, and in particular the 
Executive branch, perceived the importance of the US education system. More 
importantly, this in turn also greatly impacted the interest which it showed in it. 
The subsequent breakdown in communication between President Truman 
and Josef Stalin and the rise of Communism in Eastern Europe shortly after the 
Japan bombings, gave immediacy to the interest shown by the government. There 
existed in the USA a longstanding fear of Communism, which had begun with the 
first Red Scare during the First World War. By the end of the war Stalin – head 
of the only nation capable of toppling America from its pedestal – had a fanatical 
hold on the Eastern Bloc, and the Soviet Union’s growing power caused this fear 
to grow exponentially in the USA. The Federal government feared Communism 
at every turn, from nuclear attack and infiltration by Communist spies to a 
diminished power overseas, and this climate inevitably filtered into both foreign 
and domestic government policy during the years after the Second World War.  
Fear of Communism led to the creation of a host of government 
programmes and measures, such as Truman’s Loyalty Program, which was 
established in 1947 and led to the subsequent rise of McCarthyism. These actions 
by the Federal government called into question the loyalty of the American 
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citizens whom it purported to be protecting. Left-leaning schoolteachers and 
professors did not escape the attention of anti-Communist witch hunts, and 
numerous careers were destroyed with little supporting evidence.1 The politics of 
the teachers was not the only area, however, in which the Federal government 
demonstrated interest in the US education system; who was being taught, what 
was being taught, and how it was being taught were perceived by the Federal 
government to be as relevant to the fate of US national security as who was 
teaching. This area, however, has received far less scholarly attention.  
The debate over how the education system could aid the government in 
this new era began as soon as the atomic age did, with the publication of Science: 
The Endless Frontier (1945), a report written by Vannevar Bush, the head of the 
Office of Scientific Research and Development during the First World War and a 
key player in the Manhattan Project. Bush’s report recommended the 
establishment of a National Science Foundation (NSF), an official body which 
would channel government funds into scientific research, in order to ensure that 
the USA remained a key player in the field of science.2 As tension between the 
USA and the Soviet Union escalated, Bush’s recommendations took on even 
greater significance, and the government’s interest in impacting the future 
direction of many aspects of the US education system – not just the scientific 
programmes – escalated.  
This movement was significant as, traditionally, the US Federal 
government has no constitutionally mandated authority to directly impact the US 
education system; it is a specifically State-by-State matter in the USA. With the 
outbreak of the Cold War, however, education became even more relevant to the 
protection of national security in the USA. The Cold War created new 
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battlegrounds; wars were not fought between the USA and the Soviet Union, but 
between proxy nations on proxy battlegrounds. Ballerinas, chess grand masters 
and Olympians became the new soldiers, and their stages became battlefields. 
Equally, US students, especially in the fields of science and technology, became 
not just relevant to the war effort, but central to it; they did not just innovate on 
behalf of the soldiers in the military, they were the soldiers, and their innovations 
– domestic and military – were their bullets. 
With the outbreak of the Cold War, ensuring the perpetuation of US 
citizens’ unshakeable commitment to democracy also took on a new importance, 
and further inspired the Federal government, and in particular the Executive 
branch, to consider expanding its role in the US education system. As the schools, 
colleges and universities educated the USA’s future citizens, they therefore 
represented the most effective way in which to ensure that the USA created the 
right kind of future citizens – ones with an unwavering faith to democracy over 
communism and an unshakeable faith in the supremacy of the USA. This aspect 
of school life, therefore, also became relevant to US national security, and 
therefore to the Federal government.  
Finally, the increasing global importance of education as both a concept 
and a pursuit after the Second World War also ensured that the USA’s schools 
were closely monitored by Third World nations. Many developing nations, 
especially former colonies, drew a direct link between excellent educational 
provision and economic and social progress. As many of these nations were also 
predominantly populated by black citizens, the USA’s provision of education for 
African Americans came to be of particular interest. The need for US schools, 
colleges and universities to demonstrate and uphold the USA’s democratic ideals 
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and extend the possibility of education to black students took on a new 
significance after the outbreak of the Cold War.  
The Cold War, however, was not the only event which caused the Executive 
branch of the Federal government’s to consider increasing its interest in the US 
education system after the Second World War. The death of FDR meant that Vice 
President Harry S. Truman became President just weeks before the end of the 
Second World War and Truman had a personal commitment to expanding 
educational opportunity for all US youths, which had been born out of his own 
personal experiences and opinions on the importance of education. In addition, 
the post war period saw a widespread global expansion in government 
involvement in societal issues. This movement garnered more success in the UK 
than in the US, but nevertheless it was still pursued by Truman throughout his 
Administrations.  
The Executive branch of the Federal government employed many and 
varied methods of circumventing its lack of constitutional right to support and 
guide the education system throughout the early years of the Cold War, as it had 
done throughout American history. Frederick M. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst’s The 
Political Dynamics of American Education (2005) – the most widely used text in 
the politics of education – identifies no fewer than six methods through which the 
Federal government has gained influence over the education system without the 
need for general Federal aid. Four of these methods – ‘moral suasion’; ‘discover 
knowledge and make it available’; ‘regulate’; and ‘provide services’ – were utilised 
by the Truman Administration in order to gain influence over education in the 
early years of the Cold War, before the Sputnik crisis made general Federal aid, 
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and the final methods, ‘differential funding’ and ‘general aid’, more viable options 
for the Federal government to explore.3   
The first method identified in Political Dynamics which the Federal 
government made use of during the Truman Administration is ‘moral suasion’, a 
tactic which utilises rhetoric in order to persuade educators and the general 
public to support a new direction for education without ever needing to resort to 
force or provide financial persuasion. More recently this tactic has been employed 
by President George H. W. Bush, in order to promote ‘character education’ – a 
practice through which teachers incorporate character-building workshops into 
their normal lessons – after a number of school shootings had occurred, and also 
by President George W. Bush in advocating the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) 
programme. In this instance, George W. Bush employed the ‘bully pulpit’, a 
subsection of the ‘moral suasion’ technique; Bush publicly castigated the 
programme’s critics, claiming that they were guilty of “giving in to the soft bigotry 
of low expectations for pupil achievement”.4 This labelled Bush’s opponents as 
anti-education, rather than merely anti-Federal involvement, thus vilifying them 
in the public eye despite their valid and constitutionally correct opposition to 
Bush’s plans.  
The ‘bully pulpit’ was often exploited by members of the Federal 
government in the early Cold War years in order to undermine critics of the 
Federal government’s education programmes, most often by invoking claims of 
anti-Americanism or pro-Communist sympathies. Especially in the age of 
McCarthyism, where being labelled as a Communist, or even merely not ‘pro-
American’ enough, could ruin one’s life as well as one’s career, the ‘bully pulpit’ 
was a particularly effective technique to silence critics of the Federal 
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government’s programmes. Most regularly ‘moral suasion’ was utilised to create 
support for or to quell opposition to the government’s programmes for ‘education 
for democracy’, but it proved to be such a powerful persuasive technique that 
‘moral suasion’, and especially the ‘bully pulpit’, were employed to control the 
reaction to almost all of the Federal government’s early Cold War ventures into 
the US education system. 
The second tactic identified in The Political Dynamics of American 
Education is to ‘discover knowledge and make it available’. The NSF is identified 
by The Political Dynamics of American Education as the primary example of the 
tactic ‘discover knowledge and make it available’, along with the National Center 
for Education Statistics.5 Despite being established to conduct basic research, 
securing national defence is explicitly outlined in the Foundation’s mission 
statement. During the Cold War, this tactic was not only utilised by the NSF, 
which was established in 1950 for this express purpose, but also the United States 
Office of Education (USOE). Both the USOE and the NSF worked with schools, 
universities and colleges, and received funding directly from the Federal 
government. As such, both the USOE and the NSF were able to direct teaching 
and research in the schools and colleges respectively, which in turn influenced 
teaching staff’s curriculum management and areas of expertise. This, of course, 
directly impacted the students, as well as their school and college experiences, 
and their own areas of expertise and the careers they had been prepared for upon 
graduation, which, for better or worse, affected the health of the nation.  
Finally, ‘regulate’ and ‘provide services’ have been utilised most often in 
order to improve equality of access to education. For example, President Nixon’s 
establishment of Title IX in 1972 protected equity in education for women, 
12 
 
especially in high school and college sports programmes.6 By establishing Title 
IX, President Nixon indirectly influenced the education system and the 
experiences which American pupils would have whilst enrolled, without actually 
directly involving himself in education policy or issues of States’ rights. During 
the early years of the Cold War the tactics ‘regulate’ and ‘provide services’ were 
used specifically to desegregate the education system. The Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) is an example of the Judicial 
branch’s use of regulation, and later advisers were provided to school districts 
who were undergoing the process of desegregation, in order to smooth out the 
procedure.  
The Federal government had one more method at its disposal during the 
early years of the Cold War: the need to protect national security. Despite the lack 
of armed combat for much of the Cold War, it was just that: a war. Any loss which 
the USA had to sustain in this battle could be perceived to negatively affect the 
USA’s national security. This, in turn, placed the American people and their way 
of life under threat. In this circumstance, the Federal government had a 
constitutional responsibility to protect the nation in any way it could. In wartime, 
special war measures are often introduced to achieve just this end – the 
protection of national security. The US military is the institution traditionally 
utilised to protect the nation, but in the Cold War, the fight was not simply a 
military one, but instead was both logistical and ideological, consisting of a 
struggle against Soviet technical advancement and a struggle for the hearts and 
minds of the American people and the battles were fought not by soldiers, but by 
schoolchildren and scientists based in academic institutions. As schoolchildren 
represented America’s best hope of protecting national security, this, the Federal 
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government could argue, brought them under the constitutionally mandated 
jurisdiction of the Federal government. 
Federal involvement in education in the fields of science, technology, 
engineering and maths was so successful during the Truman Administration that 
in an article printed in the February 1951 edition of School Life magazine, the 
Commissioner of Education actually pondered whether or not too much had been 
done and if it would lead to an educational imbalance; Commissioner McGrath 
contemplated that “there is growing concern among the nation’s educators and 
statesmen over the possibility that government action in one narrowly defined 
area may lead to an undue emphasis in the natural sciences”.7 The Federal 
government requested from the education system an amplified focus on 
education for democratic citizenship, a vast improvement in the standard and 
focus of science education and even easier access to higher education for 
marginalised youths, and the education system responded. 
Despite never having pursued a constitutional amendment which altered 
the terms of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution and allowed for a formal 
Federal role in the US education system, the Federal government was inspired by 
the political and social contexts of the post war and early Cold War period to 
attempt to increase its role within it. Eventually, this led to the establishment of 
a Department of Education and an unquestioned role for the Federal government 
to play in modern-day America. This thesis seeks to identify the moment at which 
the shift occurred from momentary, targeted intervention, as was the norm 
before the Second World War, to a full scale role for the Federal government in 
the education system, which slowly became the norm in the years which followed 
it.  
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This thesis will demonstrate the driving forces for intervention, and the 
powers that were utilised, largely by the Executive branch, in order to impact the 
issues identified, and assess the varying degrees of success which the Federal 
government achieved in its endeavour. Each chapter will assess the specific and 
unique conditions present in each circumstance which either allowed for or 
prevented Federal intervention into the US education system. In addition, the 
varying levels of success which the Executive branch achieved will be assessed, 
and the specific reasons for failure when it occurred – such as President Truman’s 
poor relationship with Congress or the blockades created by the Southern bloc – 
will be pinpointed and explored. Regardless of success, each attempt 
simultaneously broke down the barriers which prevented Federal intervention in 
the education system, eventually leading to a full scale role for the US Federal 
government in the US education system.  
This thesis specifically discusses the expansion of Federal influence over 
the US education system during the post war/early Cold War period, between the 
end of the Second World War in 1945 and the launch of the Sputnik satellite in 
1957. The reason for these defining parameters lies in the nature of education 
policy during this period. Before 1945, Federal interest in education policy either 
falls into the ‘pre-war’ bracket and bears little resemblance to post war policy due 
to the significant shift in the USA’s social and political structure that was caused 
by intervening events of the Second World War, or can be defined as a war 
measure and a part of FDR’s expanded war powers, which represents a very 
different form of Federal intervention than the kind discussed here. After the 
launch of Sputnik in 1957, the Federal involvement with education policy shifted 
again; the Sputnik crisis forced Federal involvement in the US education system 
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out into the open, and garnered widespread public support, thus stimulating the 
passage of the revolutionary National Defense Education Act (NDEA) in 1958. 
This Act cleared the way for the passage of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA) and the Higher Education Act (HEA) in 1965, which in turn 
solidified a Federal role within the US education system.  
The majority of the primary research for this thesis was conducted at the 
Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, the National Archives in College 
Park, Maryland and George Washington University’s Gelman Library in 
Washington DC. The Truman Library, of course, holds the papers of President 
Truman, and it is also home to the records of the President’s Commission on 
Higher Education and the President’s Committee on Civil Rights. Additionally, 
the Library houses the Papers of John D. Russell (Assistant Commissioner of 
Education, 1946 – 1952), Oscar R. Ewing (Head of the Federal Security 
Administration, 1947 – 1953, of which the USOE was briefly a part), and Earl J. 
McGrath (Second Cold War Commissioner of Education, 1949 – 1953), all of 
which have been valuable to me in understanding the role which the Federal 
government played, or attempted to play, in the education system during the Cold 
War.  
The National Archives at College Park hold the records of the United States 
Office of Education, which were vital to gain insight into the workings of such a 
pivotal department. Equally useful was the back catalogue of School Life 
magazine, the USOE’s own publication, which was significant in enabling me to 
understand and evaluate the information which was disseminated by the USOE 
during the Cold War. Finally the Gelman Library at George Washington 
University holds the records of the National Education Association (NEA) which 
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enabled me to gain an insight into the workings of the non-Federal educational 
world during this period. Without this resource I would not have been aware of 
how complicit the educational world was with the Federal government’s aims in 
its fight against Communism both within and outside of education. 
In addition, numerous contemporary education policy reports were 
utilised, such as the report of the President’s Commission on Higher Education, 
Higher Education for American Democracy (1948), as well as reports detailing 
contemporary reactions to its publication. These include Vannevar Bush’s report 
Science: The Endless Frontier (1945), John R. Steelman’s Science and Public 
Policy: A Report to the President (1947), M. H. Trytten’s Student Deferment in 
Selective Service: A Vital Factor in National Security (1952), the report of the 
White House Conference on Education (1955) and the report of the President’s 
Committee on Education Beyond the High School (1955), among many others. 
Both the workings and the findings of these many committees and commissions 
were central to unravelling the push towards the establishment of a Federal 
influence over the US education system during the post war/early Cold War 
period. 
 
A Selected Review of the Field 
My thesis intersects three research fields within American History, specifically 
education history, Cold War history and US Presidential history. All three fields 
have discussed the interaction between the Federal government and the US 
education system during the period with which this thesis is concerned, to varying 
degrees and from various approaches. This is most prevalent within education 
history, the field with which this thesis is most aligned. Within the fields of Cold 
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War and Presidential history, the Federal interaction with the education system 
has also been discussed, but to a far lesser degree. Where Cold War history is 
concerned, Federal interaction with the education system is discussed almost 
exclusively with regards to either the international situation, race issues or both. 
Within Presidential history, the economic aspects of Federal intervention are 
given the most focus. This thesis seeks to contribute to all three fields by 
considering Presidential interaction with the education system during the post 
war and early Cold War period outside of fiduciary influence.  
 
Education History 
There are three main schools of thought which are dominant in the fast-growing 
field of US education history. Reese and Rury have noted in Rethinking the 
History of American Education that the origins of educational history lie in the 
institutionalist-progressive approach – the concept that education is “an 
important adjunct of social reform and human progress”, a view which, they 
highlight, was shared by the Federal government and was a strong impetus in the 
creation of Federal education policy.8 Early US educational history was rooted in 
the concept that schools promoted mobility and forward thinking, which allowed 
society to move forward. Harry G. Good and James D. Teller’s seminal history of 
US education is written from this perspective, and discussed the development of 
the American education system, with special focus on the simultaneous 
development of educational theories. A History of American Education traces the 
many influences which impacted the development of the US education system, 
from European theories on education to political turbulence. Good and Teller 
asserted that  
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“America has created many good educational precedents in pursuing her 
dream of equal educational opportunity for all children, regardless of sex, 
race, national origin, economic level or social background. The common 
community school, the junior high school, the comprehensive high school, 
the junior college and the American university are all good precedents, to 
be improved certainly, but not to be destroyed by those who would impose 
upon youth what they think he should have rather than what his unique 
individuality requires”.9 
Good and Teller’s understanding of US education stems primarily from the 
perspective that education creates societal and individual progress, not 
stagnation, which is typical of the traditionalist institutionalist-progressive 
approach to the study of US education.  
This historiographical viewpoint was not challenged until the development 
of revisionist history in the 1970s, a movement which is generally agreed to have 
been spearheaded by Bernard Bailyn and the publication of his work Education 
and the Forming of American Society (1960).10  Historian Harold Silver asserted 
that this movement grew out of “the radicalization of American Politics and 
intellectual life in the 1960s”.11 Alongside Lawrence Cremin’s American 
Experience Trilogy, published between 1970 and 1990, and Carl F. Kaestle’s 
Pillars of the Republic, Common Schools and American Society, 1780-1860, 
(1983), Bailyn’s work spurred the revisionist movement within the field of 
education history. All three historians have been credited with overturning the 
‘myths’ perpetuated by earlier historians writing in the field of education history. 
Bailyn’s work, the earliest of the three, discusses the sociological influences 
upon the development of the American education system. A contemporary 
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reviewer asserted that, despite his original intentions, Bailyn was obliged to 
“challenge the presuppositions” prevalent within the field.12 Cremin’s trilogy 
discusses the development of the American education system from its earliest 
inception in 1607 up to 1980. Education historian Wayne J. Urban, when 
discussing the development of historiography within the field, has asserted that 
both Bailyn and Cremin “criticized the scholarly weaknesses of the early 
contributors”.13 Finally Carl F. Kaestle’s Pillars of the Republic has been 
described as a “careful, detailed and persuasive analysis of the development of 
the American common school” and a “masterful summing up of the state of 
[American] educational history”.14 Kaestle’s work also “debunk[ed] several 
debilitating myths”, including establishing that the origins of public schooling lay 
far earlier in American history than had previously been assumed.  
Bailyn’s challenge to revise the field of education history spurred Michael B. 
Katz to pen The Irony of Early School Reform (1968), the publication of which 
marked the beginning of the radical-revisionist approach. This school of thought 
built upon the work of Bailyn and his contemporaries to present a history of the 
US education system which was entirely at odds with the institutionalist-
progressive school. The radical-revisionist school views the work of educational 
institutions as more closely allied to “ideological domination and economic 
exploitation” than as modes of social progress; it argues that schools reinforce 
class distinctions and racial bias, rather than allowing for the elimination of both, 
as is argued by the institutionalist-progressive school.15 David Tyack has summed 
up the approach as one which argues that “it was foolish to suppose that schooling 
could correct the basic inequities of life”.16  
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This movement did not replace the traditionalist institutionalist-
progressive approach, but instead grew up alongside it. Noted US education 
historian Diane Ravitch continued to work within the institutionalist-progressive 
approach, for example, despite coming to the discipline after Bailyn’s challenge. 
Ravitch’s 1978 work Revisionists Revised challenged the uniformity and rigidity 
of the neo-conservative radical-revisionist approach and attempted to re-
establish the dominance of the liberalistic institutionalist-progressive school.17 
The third edition of Good and Teller’s A History of American Education, 
published in 1973 after the emergence of the radical-revisionist school, also re-
iterated the supremacy of the institutionalist-progressive approach. The authors 
highlighted in their preface that “like the first two editions, this edition treats 
[the] changes in American education as a phase of the rise and progress of 
American culture as a whole”.18 
Another school of thought has emerged more recently which combines both 
institutionalist-progressivism and radical-revisionism. The post-revisionist 
approach carved a middle ground between the earlier polarised schools of 
thought, adopting the position that the education system was neither wholly 
devoted to progress nor exploitation. Instead, post-revisionists view the schools, 
colleges and universities as a seedbed of external interests, sociological pressures 
and environmental factors. As Reese and Rury have stated, members of this 
school accept that educational institutions are “matters of interest to a variety of 
groups in American society”.19 The post-revisionist school has typically seen both 
value in and problems with the work of historians in both earlier schools of 
thought. Jeffrey Mirel’s The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System (1993) is 
one example of a text written from this post-revisionist perspective; Mirel tracked 
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the development of the school curriculum in Detroit between 1907 and 1981, and 
clearly demonstrated instances of both progress and stasis, and demonstrated the 
interest groups which impacted the changes.20  
John R. Thelin has also contributed a modern survey of the development of 
education beyond the high school from the perspective of the post-revisionist 
school of thought. Entitled A History of American Higher Education (2011), it 
was first published in 2004, with a second, updated edition following in 2011. 
Thelin discusses not only the progression of the higher education system from the 
establishment of Harvard College in 1636, through to 2010, but also the major 
problems faced by the higher education system at different points in its history. 
With regards to the period with which this thesis is concerned, Thelin asserted 
the post-revisionist position that “good fortune was so heady” following the close 
of the Second World War “that journalists and college administrators as well as 
historians have called this a ‘golden age’. Success, however, did not provide an 
exemption from campus problems, many of which were associated with growing 
pains”.21 Thelin highlighted the positives of the education system without 
ignoring the negatives. Some of the major themes of Thelin’s work include 
academic freedom won and lost; business, governmental and philanthropic 
interests and individual choice. Thelin also included in-depth discussions of 
school buildings and construction, college lifestyles and college students, among 
other topics.  
Finally, Thelin takes care to present a diverse and balanced account which 
includes discussion of minority education. The study of minorities within 
education and the provision of education for minorities has grown exponentially 
during the post-revisionist period, mirroring the general trend in history outside 
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of the field. Such discussions concerning the history of minority education have 
become a feature of modern education histories, especially in the 21st Century, as 
historians consider a wider populace in their studies of the development of 
education. Historian Paula Fass spurred further enquiry into education for less 
visible groups with her well-regarded study of minority education Outside In: 
Minorities and the Transformation of American Education (1989). Fass’s book 
focused on immigrant education, religious education, and education for blacks 
and women. More recently, education historians have been successful in creating 
a body of scholarship that focuses past the story of white male experiences and 
have elevated the understanding of African American education and education 
for women in particular above the status of footnotes in history.22 
This thesis is situated within the post-revisionist approach to the study of 
education history, and seeks to contribute to the scholarship in this school by 
firmly establishing the Federal government, especially the Executive branch of 
the Federal government, as an interest group which impacted the course of the 
US education system after the Second World War, whilst including an assessment 
of the phenomenon which goes beyond discussion of only white students.1 As the 
Cold War became visible on the horizon, the Executive branch, with support at 
times from both the Legislative and Judicial branches of the Federal government, 
attempted to establish a formal and long-term role within the education system. 
This was part of a larger programme of governmental expansion of power.  
                                                          
1 Due to the time and length constraints of this thesis, however, only African American students have been discussed. 
No discussion of education for women during this period has been included; Linda Eisenmann however has written a 
superb study of women in education during the period with which this thesis is concerned, Higher Education for 
Women in Postwar America, 1945-1965 (2006).  
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Whilst Federal intervention into the US education system has begun to 
receive more attention from the post-revisionist school, efforts have focused more 
often on larger initiatives such as the Serviceman’s Re-adjustment Act (GI Bill) 
(1944) and the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) (1958). My thesis seeks 
to contribute to the field by exploring the proceedings in between these two 
events, and demonstrating the impetus for the shift from momentary 
intervention, as demonstrated in the GI Bill, to a long-term role, as advocated by 
the NDEA. These developments further enabled an outside interest group – the 
Federal government – to impact the autonomy of the schools, colleges and 
universities and to control the direction in which learning was developed. This 
served to both engender external social progress and perpetuate social control 
from within the education system. This is not to say that Federal interests were 
the only influence upon the development of the US education system in the early 
years of the Cold War, but until now it is an influence which has remained largely 
unexplored, despite its relevance to the study of later developments which 
occurred within the Cold War US education system.  
 
Major Sub-fields in Education History 
Curriculum History 
Within the field of Education history, there are numerous major and minor sub-
fields, three of which will be discussed here. One major sub-field of education 
history is the study of the curriculum. This sub-field is focused on engaging with 
the very essence of education itself – what is actually taught in the classroom, and 
how new curriculum structures supersede earlier dominant structures. 
Curriculum history is primarily concerned with classroom dynamics and 
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curriculum theory and theorists. Outside interest groups’ impact upon the 
shaping of the curriculum is relevant and of interest in order to draw a line 
between current events or interested parties and developments within the 
classroom. Historian Herbert Kliebard has been central to the development of 
this sub-field, and his books represent some of the best examples of this type of 
scholarship.  
 The Struggle for the American Curriculum (1987) in particular represents 
a central text in this important sub-field. Kliebard traces the development of the 
American curriculum throughout the 20th century, and demonstrates how 
different schools of educational thought have shaped both what is taught in 
America, and how it is taught. The various pedagogical techniques that have fallen 
in and out of favour over the decades are explored, as are the reasons behind their 
rise and fall. His follow up collection, Forging the American Curriculum: Essays 
in Curriculum History (1992) delineated the major theoretical movements within 
curriculum history and disentangled the many threads of the burgeoning 
discipline in order to create a coherent basis for further enquiry.  
 Kliebard’s work also spurred a collection of essays to be published by a 
group of his former graduate students, Curriculum and Consequence: Herbert 
M. Kliebard and the Promise of Schooling (2002). This volume offered further 
exploration of the issues which he had identified in his own writing. The essays 
included are written from a more specifically post-revisionist perspective, and 
further Kliebard’s earlier work by attempting to ascribe relevance and importance 
to the interests and influence of curriculum theorists and demonstrating how the 
fluctuations in the curriculum can have long-term impacts upon the structure of 
society.23 Engendering Curriculum Theory (2011) by Petra Hendry is one of the 
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most recent examples of curriculum education history. Hendry was heavily 
influenced by Kliebard’s earlier work but, again writing from a 21st Century post-
revisionist perspective, has sought to extend and expand upon it by focusing 
specifically on women’s contribution to the establishment and implementation of 
curriculum theory.24  
Andrew Hartman, a current Education Historian whose work aligns more 
with the field of curriculum history than sociological education history, has 
recently published Education and the Cold War: The Battle for the American 
School (2008), which specifically focuses on the period with which this thesis is 
concerned. Hartman focuses his thesis on the relationship between the 
development of the Cold War and the development of the curriculum alongside 
it. Hartman skilfully delineates how the Cold War affected the educational 
policies, teachers and notions of academic freedom, eventually resulting in an 
education-wide shift to the right. Hartman specifically identifies that the 
education system was a factor in politics prior the launch of the Sputnik satellite, 
and highlights the fact that the Cold War battle for the American schools was 
“dramatized but not initiated by Sputnik”.25  
Hartman also includes discussion of the impact which the increased 
interest of the Executive branch of the Federal government in the education 
system had upon the curriculum. He notes that “rather than explore the strengths 
and weaknesses of political life in the United States”, the curriculum 
recommended by the USOE, under the direction of the Executive branch, instead 
“encouraged students to think of American democracy in a normative fashion and 
to define it solely in opposition to totalitarianism”.26 He also explores the ways in 
which the Life-Adjustment curriculum, popular in post war America, enabled the 
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easy dissemination of the Truman Administration’s plan to promote patriotism 
in the education system. The Life-Adjustment programme was more focused on 
creating good citizens than well-educated citizens, and was therefore an ideal 
catalyst for the Federal agenda.27  
Whilst curriculum history informs this thesis, it is not strictly relevant to 
it. This thesis seeks to delineate the specific motivations which affected the 
Federal government’s attempts to expand its role in the education system, and to 
identify the methods used to pursue these goals. Historians in this group such as 
Andrew Hartman support my work by demonstrating the impact which the 
government’s commitment to the programme of democracy education had in the 
classroom, thus re-enforcing the existence of Federal impact. Historian John G. 
Ramsay wrote of curriculum history that the discipline sacrificed “understanding 
of how ideas arose and became institutionalized” in favour of “an understanding 
of the enduring ailments of curricula theory”.28 Similarly, Hartman is more 
concerned with the outcome within the classroom, and therefore does not explore 
the reasons behind it. My work seeks to go some way to closing the loop.  
 
Sociological Education History  
Sociological education history is the most common sub-field of US education 
history, and seeks to explore the ways in which the US education system has 
advanced alongside American society throughout its history. This sub-field 
engages with the various political, military and social factors which have 
impacted upon the progression of US education over time in order to demonstrate 
its development and relevance to the wider study of US society. There are 
numerous excellent overviews of the development of the US education system 
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that have been written within this sub-field. The most comprehensive of the 
recent publications is Thelin’s A History of American Higher Education (2011); 
Christopher J. Lucas’s American Higher Education: A History (1994), however, 
offers a useful, if less diverse, exploration of US higher education. Additionally, 
Wayne J. Urban and Jennings L. Wagoner Jr. offer a brief but detailed and highly 
educational study in American Education: A History, 3rd Edition (2004) which 
makes for a great starting point to those who are new to the field. William H. 
Jeynes’ American Educational History: School, Society and the Common Good 
(2007) also offers an interesting perspective, and has attempted to classify the 
various interests which have shaped the US school system throughout history.   
This is the sub-field in which this thesis is situated, as it seeks to explore 
the impact which both the early Cold War foreign and domestic climates and the 
personal and political pressures felt by the early Cold War Presidents had upon 
the development of the US education system. Where the Federal government’s 
interest in and impact upon the US education system is discussed, education 
historians have generally tended to group themselves into two further sub-
groups: economic education history and political education history. Economic 
education history focuses on the financial contributions made by the Federal 
government to the US education system; political education history focuses on 
the creation and implementation of Federal education policy. This thesis falls 
under the ‘political’ subsection of sociological education history.  
Historian Willis Rudy has successfully straddled both sub-fields and 
produced a study which considered both fiduciary and non-fiduciary Federal 
involvement in the US education system in detail in Building America’s Schools 
and Colleges (2003). Rudy’s work is an overview which discusses the relationship 
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between the Federal government and the US education system throughout the 
entirety of American history. Rudy discusses every major political event and each 
significant instance of Federal intervention (or attempted intervention) in the 
education system, but does not discuss any such instance in detail as his intention 
is to demonstrate a pattern, not provide a comprehensive analysis. For this 
reason, Rudy’s book serves as an excellent starting point, but also offers many 
more avenues for further enquiry.  
The Political Dynamics of American Education, edited by Frederick M. 
Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, is an excellent contribution from the political arm of 
the sub-field. First published in 1982, but extensively revised since, the latest 
edition offers insight into the complicated system of governance and power which 
exists within the American education system. Whilst the book discusses far more 
than just the Federal involvement in the education system – including teachers’ 
unions, school boards and districts and micropolitics within schools – Wirt and 
Kirst take time to examine the evolution of Federal involvement, both financial 
and not, its impact and its future. Similarly to Rudy, as Political Dynamics 
surveys the entirety of American history, and includes other avenues of enquiry 
as well, no aspects of Federal involvement are discussed in detail. Both books 
raise more questions than they answer.  
This thesis builds upon these works by offering a more in-depth analysis 
of the themes and trends which are identified during one of the time periods 
which is explored. Wirt and Kirst’s exploration of Federal intervention is superb, 
but the history provided is not chronological (and their analysis benefits from this 
structure) therefore the themes identified are neither properly applied to the early 
Cold War period, nor are the specific and unique contextual factors of the early 
29 
 
Cold War period explored in any depth. This thesis seeks to fill this gap, whilst 
building on the excellent work carried out by Wirt and Kirst. Rudy has provided 
a clear identification of post war Federal action on education – focusing on 
fiduciary action – and has clearly demonstrated the link between this Federal 
intervention into the US education system and the national security crisis which 
was sweeping the nation.  
Rudy’s intention is to demonstrate a long-term trend for Federal 
involvement within the education system, notable because of its lack of 
constitutional power within this area. As such, his work on the early Cold War is 
brief at best, and lacking in vital detail and nuance at worst. This thesis seeks to 
further Rudy’s starting point by further exploring the involvement primarily of 
one branch of the Federal government in detail, in order to demonstrate the 
reasons why increased involvement was sought by the Federal government 
during this period, and carefully detailing how these intentions were pursued. By 
placing the events in context, an explanation beyond Rudy’s overly simple 
‘national security’ impetus has been demonstrated. National security issues were 
of course relevant, but not all-encompassing, as Rudy’s study of this period seems 
to suggest. 
With regards to the particular time period with which this thesis is 
concerned, historian Audra J. Wolfe has recently contributed Competing with the 
Soviets: Science, Technology and the State in Cold War America (2013). Wolfe’s 
research primarily discusses the relationship between the Federal government 
and the scientific community, but this also includes careful discussion of the 
relationship between the Federal government and the academic arm of the 
scientific community. Similarly to Hartman, Wolfe specifically assesses the 
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impact which the Cold War had upon this relationship, and the symbiotic 
connection between the two.29 Wolfe asserts that the early Cold War was “the time 
during which Federal support for science and technology was most strongly 
associated with military and defense needs”.30 Wolfe focuses primarily on science 
as a discipline rather than a school subject in her work, and this thesis furthers 
her scholarship as it demonstrates the impact which increased Federal interest in 
science both within and outside of schools, colleges and universities had upon 
science as a discipline, a major, and the scientists who studied it.  
My work adds to the discussion over the interaction between the education 
system and the post war/early Cold War period by exploring the number of ways 
in which the foreign and domestic situation affected the US education system 
during this period. Currently the available scholarship has failed to chart the Cold 
War’s importance in changing, rather than merely continuing, the tradition of 
Federal influence in this area. Whilst Federal influence has always been a feature 
of the US education system, prior to the Cold War, involvement had been largely 
indirect and short-term, as will be discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis. Many 
historians focus on the vital relevance of the GI Bill (1944) as an instance of post 
war Federal involvement (passed prior to the end of the war but as a post war 
measure), but without interaction with the nature of Federal involvement, the 
discussion of the relevance of the GI Bill is limited.  
The GI Bill is undoubtedly central when discussing the impact which the 
Federal government had on the education system, but is less important when 
seeking to identify the impetus for the shift from interim, emergency Federal 
involvement to full scale, full time Federal involvement, as is the case in modern 
day America. The GI Bill represented the ‘old style’ Federal involvement, as the 
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intention when passing the GI Bill was not to impact the education system 
specifically, but to prevent veterans from impacting upon the unemployment line. 
The President’s Commission on Higher Education, which occurred three years 
later, however, represented the ‘new style’ direct, long-term influence. The 
purpose of the Truman Commission was to allow the Federal government to 
directly impact the US education system and guide its progression and 
development, thus creating a blueprint for future interaction between the Federal 
government and the education system.  
This thesis will also go some way to addressing another gap in political 
education scholarship; until recently the majority of books within the sub-field of 
political education history focused on the impact which the launch of the Sputnik 
satellite had upon the US education system. This thesis will demonstrate that a 
concerted effort towards Federal intervention in fact began far earlier. 
Brainpower for the Cold War: The Sputnik Crisis and the National Defense 
Education Act of 1958 by Barbara Barksdale Clowse, published in 1981, is a 
comprehensive history of the weeks and months which followed the launch of 
Sputnik and the political and educational wrangling which resulted in the passage 
of the NDEA in 1958. Clowse presents an excellent, in-depth study of the 
legislative process and the growth in the Federal government’s involvement in the 
education system. Clowse does not, however, discuss the origins of the NDEA 
which predated the launch of Sputnik, despite acknowledging that they existed. 
Recent scholarship on Sputnik and the NDEA is headed by noted education 
historian Wayne J. Urban. Urban’s book, More than Science and Sputnik: The 
National Defense Education Act of 1958 (2010), builds directly upon Clowse’s 
work to expand understanding of the NDEA and its intended impact. Urban 
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himself describes his research as an “ideological history”; his intention was to 
demonstrate how the NDEA fits into the Federal government’s intended direction 
for the education system, and the extent to which this was achieved.31 Like 
Clowse, Urban discusses only the changes to the Federal/education relationship 
which occur after the launch of Sputnik. 
This is a common theme of post war education history – it is not contested 
between education historians that Federal intervention grew exponentially 
during the Cold War, but most ascribe the moment of intervention to the passage 
of the NDEA in 1958. This thesis seeks to highlight the importance of the many 
and varied attempts to gain influence over the education system in the years 
between the deployment of the atomic bomb and the launch of the Sputnik 
satellite. Among other initiatives which are explored in detail in this thesis, the 
President’s Commission on Higher Education, the Trytten Report and the 
establishment of the National Science Foundation are worthy of greater note than 
has previously been the case within the field of education history. Federal 
intervention in the US education system did not begin with the launch of the 
Sputnik satellite and the subsequent passage of the NDEA. For a decade 
beforehand, the Federal government had been steadily and, to a certain extent, 
stealthily increasing its involvement in the US education system. This was in 
order to ensure, among other pursuits, that the general education level of US 
society was raised through a programme of increased access, that science 
education remained on an equal footing with Soviet science programmes and that 
American schoolchildren were patriotic enough to study subjects for the good of 
their country instead of for their own personal interest.  
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One area in which political education history has been largely silent with 
regards to the early Cold War era is the sub-field of Presidential history. Whilst 
the relevance to the education system of the Federal government as an 
amorphous entity has been explored, specific vacillations caused by the specific 
characteristics of each President and their Administrations has had far less 
attention. The inverse is true of Presidential histories – whilst numerous excellent 
histories of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower exist, few discuss education 
policy, and where it is discussed, it is almost always in relation to something other 
than education: Truman’s relationship with Congress; Eisenhower’s approach to 
race politics; more recently, both Presidents’ approach to Cold War domestic 
policy. Each President’s specific approach to education policy and its effects has 
remained largely unexplored by both political education historians and historians 
of Truman and Eisenhower.  
There is a significant gap in education history scholarship that this thesis 
seeks to fill by considering all of the relevant factors – Truman’s relationship with 
Congress, both Presidents’ approach to race dynamics, the links between early 
Cold War foreign and domestic policy and, importantly, each President’s specific 
approach to education policy and the reasons behind this – simultaneously. In 
doing so this thesis will highlight the complexities of the Executive branch’s 
approach to education policy during the Truman and Eisenhower 
Administrations and demonstrate the definite pursuit of an expanded Federal 
role within the US education system. In addition, each Administration’s 
utilisation of the powers available to it in order to overcome the Federal 
government’s lack of constitutionally mandated authority to direct the US 
education system will be examined.  
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Histories of President Truman almost without exception note that Harry 
S. Truman was the last President to have ascended to the White House without 
having first been to college, and most attribute this to his father’s failed 
investments;32 studies of Truman era education policy often note that Truman 
was committed to expanding access to higher education for students who were 
prevented from attending.33 None, however, have discussed these two events 
concurrently, or attempted to suggest a relationship between the two. 
Furthermore, the significance of the loss of this personal impetus after 
Eisenhower took over the Oval Office is also worthy of note, but has also remained 
unexplored. Historians of the Truman era regularly note his penchant for an 
expanded governmental role, especially notable in his pursuit of the Fair Deal;34 
as has been demonstrated, education historians often note that Truman pursued 
Federal funding for education. Both pursuits were largely unsuccessful as both 
required Congressional commitment, yet neither field has as yet provided an in-
depth discussion of the ways in which Truman circumvented the need for 
Congressional approval in order to indirectly impact the US education system. 
 President Eisenhower’s interest in the US education system was limited 
to the sciences, and more specifically to how science education could be made to 
support US national security and defence. Yet in order to achieve this, he was 
required, similarly to Truman, to utilise powers that were available to him in 
order to overcome the fact that the Executive branch wielded no constitutional 
power over the education system. Eisenhower historians who discuss education, 
as well as education historians who discuss Eisenhower, however, tend to focus 
on the passage of Brown and the events at Little Rock. No in-depth studies of 
Eisenhower’s education policies outside of his approach to the desegregation of 
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the education system have yet been produced.35 This is of particular note, as 
Eisenhower is often regarded as a President who avoided the expansion of ‘big 
government’. This is certainly true of the majority of Eisenhower’s policies 
outside of education, but when Eisenhower’s Presidency is viewed from the 
perspective of education history, the image is more blurred.36 Due to the fact that 
historians focus most regularly on Eisenhower’s record on African American 
education, this has yet to be reflected in the scholarship. When only his race-
education policies are explored, his policy record supports this conclusion; 
however, when his science-education policies are explored, a different picture of 
Eisenhower’s willingness to expand the Federal role is drawn.  
This thesis’s focus on the relationship between the Cold War and the 
development of the US education system also aligns it with a wider field of study 
which analyses the ways in which Cold War policies both directly and indirectly 
influenced the domestic lives of American citizens, especially in the early years of 
the Cold War. In no area is this truer than the discussions over the intersections 
between the Cold War and race politics in America. This field was popularised by 
Mary L. Dudziak with the publication of her flagship work Cold War Civil Rights: 
Race and the Image of American Democracy (2000). There is no historical 
consensus over either President’s approach to the Civil Rights debate; more 
historians speak favourably of Truman than Eisenhower, but currently there is 
certainly no agreement – a topic which is given more attention in this thesis in 
Chapter Four. Both Presidents’ interactions with Brown v. Board of Education 
are often discussed as a specifically race-relations matter in political history 
however, rather than an educational concern, or since the publication of Cold 
War Civil Rights, with regard to the international situation. This is neither the 
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whole story of Brown, however, nor the whole story of the Truman 
Administration’s involvement in or commitment to African American education. 
Where only Brown is discussed, the story is incomplete and misleading.  
Understanding of the Federal role in the desegregation debate from the 
perspective of education history is vital to understanding more broadly the 
interaction of the Federal government, and in particular, the Executive branch 
with the civil rights debate during this era. In particular Mary L. Dudziak, a leader 
in this field, intersects with the field of education history in her seminal works, 
but offers no understanding of the wider interactions between the Federal 
government and the education system. Dudziak instead chooses to view these 
interactions as stand-alone, race-focused incidences, rather than as part of a 
wider and more systematic programme of Federal influence in education.37  
Exploration of the themes discussed in the report of the Truman 
Commission, Higher Education for American Democracy, for example, 
demonstrates that the pursuit of desegregation in the school system was indeed 
one aspect of a wider programme, rather than a specifically and singularly race-
driven issue. This is not to diminish the importance of race and the civil rights 
debate with regards to desegregation, which remains the driving factor. An 
education history perspective however offers another dimension to the triangular 
interactions between the Federal government, the civil rights debate and the 
education system. The desegregation of the schools and the general promotion of 
improved educational provision for African America students is one aspect of a 
larger pursuit of expanded Federal influence, and in the case of the Truman 
Administration, something which the Executive branch pursued, rather than 
were pushed into.  
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There is, however, one aspect of Federal involvement in the education 
system during the early years of the Cold War in particular that this thesis has not 
discussed in detail, and this is largely because it has already been written about 
at length in books which focused on other topics. The loyalty oaths and academic 
witch hunts which took place during the McCarthy era represent an important 
example of the increase in Federal control over the US education system during 
the Cold War, as it enabled the US Federal government to involve itself in hiring 
and firing practices at a number of academic and research institutions. As the 
McCarthy era has been extensively written about, however, so has this example 
of the Federal government’s involvement in the education system.38 As such, it 
will not be discussed further in this thesis.  
 
Longitudinal Education History 
Longitudinal education history is vital in assessing the real-world impact of 
education policy or curriculum changes. This type of history by definition cannot 
be conducted for decades after a particular policy or curriculum change has been 
implemented, as therefore longitudinal research which focuses on the time period 
this thesis is focused on is only starting to emerge. For example, the impact of the 
GI Bill could not be fully understood for many years after its passage; the true 
difference between a college educated veteran and a non-college educated 
veteran’s career paths could not be assessed until enough time had elapsed for 
each group to pursue a long-term career, so the true effects of their schooling 
could be measured.  
This is not a sub-field which this thesis has directly engaged in as this 
thesis seeks to demonstrate the motivations for and methods utilised in Federal 
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involvement, rather than the long-term effects. This type of study has recently 
engendered a significant amount of new scholarship which focuses on the long-
term success (or lack thereof) of Brown v. Board, however, and longitudinal 
studies in this area have influenced this thesis. Longitudinal studies of Brown can 
be radically different from policy-based perspectives as they takes into account 
the long-term impact of the ruling. Whereas policy-based studies often culminate 
with either the 1954 ruling or the 1965 Civil Rights Act, longitudinal studies are 
able to suggest that when the full sweep of history is taken into account, Brown 
was a failure, because it did not truly impact integration in reality in the same way 
that it did on paper. This approach has been labelled the ‘unfulfilled promises’ 
approach and emerged in 2004 as part of the commemoration of the fiftieth 
anniversary of Brown’s passage.39 These studies collectively argue that “if the 
promises of the Brown decision had been fulfilled, the income, wealth, 
employment, achievement, and other gaps between African Americans and 
whites would have been closed” in the intervening years between 1954 and the 
present day.40 This knowledge that Brown has remained largely ineffectual has 
necessarily informed this thesis’s understanding and interpretation of the event 
and the vacillations of its earlier history. 
 
Thesis Overview 
The first chapter of this thesis will delineate the history of the relationship 
between the US Federal government and the US education system with the aim 
of establishing a pattern of influence which stretches back across American 
history. The chapter first briefly assesses the development of the education 
system in America, beginning with the Colonial period and the Revolution, and 
39 
 
follows the progression of the relationship between the newly created US Federal 
government and the US education system through to the Civil War. The way in 
which the shifts in the government’s wants and needs impacted education in the 
USA in its formative years are delineated, and the establishment of West Point 
and the Morrill Land Grant Acts are given particular focus. In addition, the way 
in which the major political and social upheavals which took place throughout the 
first half of the last century, in particular the Great Depression and the Second 
World War, continued to affect and impact the US education system is also 
discussed. 
This chapter offers insight into the many methods that have been utilised 
by the Federal government in order to increase it’s to influence the US education 
system. It will demonstrate the many routes that have been made available to the 
Federal government to create openings through which they can influence the 
development and direction of education in the USA; the chapter examines 
financial manoeuvres, subterfuge, the creation and utilisation of government 
agencies with increased powers, the promotion of patriotism and, conversely, 
charges of subversion. All were used by the Federal government to promote or 
undermine programmes and institutions as they saw fit. Furthermore, the 
chapter discusses the opposition to each perceived infringement and the ways in 
which the Federal government chose to address, quash or ignore each charge, in 
order to demonstrate that, whilst Federal intervention into the US education 
system has never been ‘accepted’, this has never prevented the Federal 
government from implementing its plans whenever they were either needed or 
desired. 
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In closing this chapter offers a discussion of the particular set of 
circumstances which converged at the end of the Second World War to create a 
‘goldilocks’ environment which inspired the Federal government to pursue 
intervention in the US education system. The ascension of Harry S. Truman to 
President after the death of FDR, the close of the Second World War with the 
deployment of the atomic bomb – an educational, not military achievement – the 
global shift towards governmental expansion, the increased security risks to the 
USA with the outbreak of the Cold War and a greater worldwide focus on 
education all united and stimulated the pursuit of a greater role for the Federal 
government within the education system which continued to grow throughout the 
Cold War.  
The remainder of this thesis will specifically examine the dynamics of the 
early years of this involvement, and the ways in which the Federal government, 
and in particular the Executive branch of the Federal government, sought to 
involve itself in the US education system. The motivations for this increased role 
and methods used to pursue it are identified and explored in order to demonstrate 
a clear and intentional attempt to garner power over the education system in 
order to implement a range of new ideas and curriculums, and to protect US 
national security.   
Chapter Two of this thesis will discuss the particular ways in which 
President Truman utilised the powers available to the Executive branch in order 
to safeguard the perpetuation of a democratic outlook and ideology among the 
nation’s youth. The Executive branch’s utilisation of its power to create a 
Presidential Commission which focused on the Federal agenda for education 
policy is examined, alongside a discussion of the traditional role of presidential 
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commissions in Executive policy making and the way in which the President’s 
Commission on Higher Education both worked within and departed from this. In 
addition, a discussion of a similar, but non-Federal, education commission which 
was in session during the same time period is included, in order to demonstrate 
the specific relevance of the Federal influence over the President’s Commission 
on Higher Education and its findings.  
The impact which the Commission had upon the US education system and 
its focus on education for democracy will be discussed, both from short-term and 
long-term perspectives. Programmes such as the ‘Zeal for American Democracy’ 
programme will be examined as will far more long-ranging outcomes of the 
Commission’s findings. Finally, the opposition to the Commission’s 
recommendations will be discussed, both to highlight the surprising lack of 
organised and effective opposition to the expansion of the Federal role in the US 
education system and the lack of impact that the little opposition there was had.  
Chapter Three will discuss the Executive decision to intervene in the 
American education system in order to ensure that schools and colleges 
developed a greater commitment to education and output in science, technology, 
engineering and maths, both in the years following the Second World War and in 
the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of the Korean War. the Federal 
government utilised its power to place controls on the military draft and in turn 
exerted increased control over the number of students who matriculated, majored 
and graduated with degrees in the nationally useful subjects. This thesis examines 
the expansion of scientific disciplines within schools, colleges and universities, 
and the ways in which the Federal government initiated, encouraged and directed 
this growth.  
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The chapter first discusses the reasons why the Federal government chose 
to influence the education system to place a greater focus on the scientific 
disciplines, including a discussion of the incentives inherent in expanding the 
number of trained scientists in the USA. This expansion not only allowed the USA 
to create more and better weapons with which to protect national security, but 
also improved the living standards of average Americans through a diverse range 
of scientific advancements, from medical breakthroughs to more efficient 
dishwashers. This focus on scientific research and implementation also gave the 
USA an advantage in the Cold War as the increase in the number of graduating 
scientists, engineers and mathematicians in the USA and the benefits their 
research brought to the USA and the world was counted as a win in itself, as it 
demonstrated that the USA was the superior nation.  
The main focus of Chapter Three centres on the methods which the Federal 
government utilised to implement its plans. In particular, the development of 
research universities, and the Federal aid offered to institutions of higher 
education in return for conducting government research in war related fields, is 
explored. This aid allowed the Federal government to indirectly control the type 
and amount of research conducted on specific campuses, and to direct its 
progression, without ever directly confronting the issue of ‘Federal aid to 
education’. In particular, this chapter includes a discussion of the Federal 
programme of Selective Service during the Cold War, and the decision to exempt 
college students, especially those enrolled in scientific disciplines, from the draft. 
Finally, the implications of the Federal government’s efforts to increase its control 
over this aspect of the education system are discussed.  
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Finally, Chapter Four of this thesis will discuss the motivations behind the 
Executive branch’s commitment to the elimination of discrimination and 
segregation in education during the early years of the Cold War. Specifically, this 
chapter will discuss the reasons behind the Executive and, at times, the Judicial 
branch’s commitment to equalising educational opportunity during the early 
Cold War period. This chapter seeks to build on Mary L. Dudziak’s interrogation 
of this area to demonstrate the ways in which these branches of the Federal 
government strove to improve education for African Americans in order to 
improve both the USA’s image overseas – as noted by Dudziak – and its pool of 
trained manpower at home, both in order to aid the nation in its Cold War effort. 
The relevance of the increase in the manpower pool to the success or failure of 
the Federal government’s intentions is also discussed, highlighting the 
limitations of Dudziak’s analysis of this interaction.  
In addition, this thesis will demonstrate that, where the dynamics of race 
and education during the early years of the Cold War are concerned, Derrick A. 
Bell Jr.’s Interest-Convergence theory still takes precedence over Dudziak’s Cold 
War imperative theory. Where the improvement of African American education 
did not resonate with the nation’s needs in the Cold War, and especially when it 
directly opposed it, the Federal government was not successful in expanding 
educational opportunities for African Americans when it wanted to. Race-
equality was not important enough to the USA’s Cold War effort to persuade the 
Federal government to commit to it when it did not suit the government’s wider 
policy goals. Educational advancement for African Americans during the Cold 
War only occurred when such progress also directly contributed to the Federal 
government’s Cold War effort – and when it did not, the Federal government 
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actively worked against such advancement. As such, the prevalence of Bell’s 
Interest-Convergence theory is re-asserted.  
The Conclusion to this thesis will close the thesis with an overview of the 
ways in which this early and widespread Federal involvement in education ‘for 
the duration’ evolved into the normalisation of Federal involvement in US 
education and even the establishment of a US Department of Education, 
something that had been carefully avoided previously throughout American 
history. Special attention is paid in the Conclusion to the first three decades after 
the passage of the NDEA in  1957. More research has been conducted into 
evaluating the impact of the Federal/education relationship during these years, 
as opposed to the 1990s and the 21st century. This is due to the simple fact that 
not enough time has yet passed to properly evaluate the impact that the recent 
interactions between the Federal government and the education system have had 
(and will have) upon the system itself.  
This thesis does not represent a complete history of Federal intervention, 
or attempted intervention, into the education system during the Cold War era; 
such a thing would have required far more time and pages. It is instead intended 
to demonstrate both the pattern of behaviour, and the inspiration behind it, 
which resulted in a permanent shift in the Federal government’s relationship with 
the US education system. This thesis seeks to offer further clarification of the 
intervening events which have allowed for the current relationship between the 
US education system and the Federal government, thereby demonstrating a 
contrast to the history set out in Chapter One of this thesis and highlighting the 
importance of the ‘goldilocks’ conditions of the early years of the Cold War in 
engendering this change. 
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Both the length and severity of the Cold War meant that Federal 
involvement in US education, which had always been accepted ‘for the duration’ 
in times of need, began to become instead the modus operandi. It therefore 
continued long after the initial issues – the need for democracy education and 
science education, and the implementation of desegregation programmes – had 
fallen out of the public eye. Today, the Federal government play a central role in 
the US education system despite having no constitutional authority to do so, and 
the instigation of this development in the formation of US education policy can 
be traced back to the early years of the Cold War.  
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INDIVIDUAL 
OR NATION? 
 
Federal Involvement in the US 
Education System throughout 
History 
 
“There is no better example of the influence of politics upon culture than that 
presented by a historical perspective of the ideas which have developed our 
great educational system”.41  
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The Federal government has played a part in shaping the US education system 
from the earliest days of the Republic. At moments when it has felt intervention 
was required in order to benefit or safeguard the nation, the Federal government 
has intervened in the US education system to ensure that America’s schools, 
colleges and universities were teaching what needed to be taught, and producing 
citizens whom the US could entrust its future to. Historian Willis Rudy has 
asserted in his work Building America’s Schools and Colleges: The Federal 
Contribution (2003) that “when fundamental challenges threatened the country, 
the government customarily sought to meet the situation by centralizing power 
under national authority. Such activism very often included Federal efforts to 
mobilize vital educational resources”.42 Historians Carl F. Kaestle and Marshall 
S. Smith have corroborated this stance in their article “The Federal Role in 
Elementary and Secondary Education, 1940 – 1980”. They asserted that the 
increasing role of the Federal government in the US education system was a result 
of “urgent social goals, superior revenue raising power, an impulse to equalize 
resources and opportunity and the seemingly irreversible drift to centralized 
administration in a technological, bureaucratic society”.43 Despite the terms set 
out in the Tenth Amendment, the Federal government has always been a silent 
partner in the education system whenever it has chosen to be so.  
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, adopted in 1791, 
states that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the 
people”.44 In essence, this Amendment established that unless the Constitution 
specifically stated that a certain power was the domain of the Federal 
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government, or that said power specifically did not belong to the States, then the 
power lay in the domain of the individual States. The power to intervene in the 
running of the education system is not delegated to the Federal government in 
the Constitution of the USA, and as such, the US education system has always 
been the responsibility of State governments, and remains so today. The Federal 
government has no direct power over the education system and as such can play 
no overt part in it.  
Crucially, however, the Tenth Amendment does not include the word 
‘expressly’ – “powers not expressly delegated to the United States...” – despite the 
fact that its inclusion was discussed.45 This means that the Tenth Amendment 
does not prevent the Federal government from involving itself in State affairs 
through implied powers through the ‘Necessary and Proper’ clause in Article One, 
Section Eight, Clause 18 of the Constitution. The Clause states that “Congress 
shall have power ... to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this 
Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Office thereof”.46 Without the word ‘expressly’, this clause supersedes the Tenth 
Amendment.  
Two other clauses also allow the Federal government to override the Tenth 
Amendment in order to protect and defend the national security of the USA and 
ensure a republican form of government remains in power. Article 1, Section 8, 
Clause 1 of the Constitution requires the Federal government to provide for the 
common defence of the USA; Article 4, Section 4 requires it to guarantee a 
republican form of government to every State in the Union. When the education 
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system is required to support the national defence of the nation, it falls under the 
jurisdiction of the Federal government because the Federal government is 
responsible for the nation’s defence. Whilst the Constitution does not expressly 
give the Federal government power over the schools in a time of national 
emergency, this can be inferred from these two subsections.   
Many other avenues have also been utilised in order to enable the Federal 
government to support and influence schools, colleges and universities across the 
USA. According to Harry G. Good and James D. Teller, authors of A History of 
American Education (1973), these avenues have included “the First Amendment, 
dealing with religion and with freedom of communication; the Fourteenth 
Amendment with its ‘due process’ clause; the power to maintain a postal system 
and to promote science and the useful arts; the powers assigned to the Supreme 
Court or developed by it; the general welfare clause (I, 8) and the taxing power”.47 
Moreover, a method which has always been open to the Federal government is 
the promise of Federal aid for education in return for certain favours – usually 
the promotion of a certain field of study. Many routes have been explored in order 
to enable the Federal government both to mould the institutions and the 
curriculum to suit the changing needs of the nation and to glean from the 
education system the future Americans that were needed or desired. Throughout 
American history the Federal government has used these loopholes to defend 
countless attempts to influence the US education system. As such, Federal 
involvement in American education has long been in practice in the USA. 
The opposition to Federal involvement in American education has also 
been powerful throughout American history, and over the years opponents have 
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emerged from many quarters. Federal aid to education has proved to be the most 
contentious issue. Whilst financial aid has always been needed by American 
education (the education system has never been flush with funds), financial aid 
from Federal quarters was continually resisted for fear that the money would alter 
the balance of power in the education system in favour of the government over 
the institutions or the States. Opposition is usually asserted from either a ‘States’ 
rights’ or ‘academic freedom’ platform, with arguments formed around the 
perspective that the Federal government cannot be trusted to provide funds to 
the education system without wanting something in return.  
This position has more often than not been cited as a smokescreen for the 
real purpose of opposition however, and these underlying reasons have varied 
over the years. They include, but are not limited to, concerns that Federal funding 
will be limited to State schools and will therefore negatively impact private 
schools or religious schools, especially Catholic schools; that Federal aid will 
include church schools, and will therefore undermine the separation between 
church and state; that Federal funding must be distributed equally between black 
and white schools or, after 1954, only to integrated schools; that the proposal for 
funding does not enforce the law, whether that be separate-but-equal or the 
Brown decision, by not insisting that funds be distributed equally; that aid will 
be limited to States whose education boards are struggling financially; and that 
aid will not be distributed according to need.48 As the decision of whether to allow 
Federal intervention in education lay with the States, each State considered, first 
and foremost, how much its own education system would benefit. As each State 
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had varying wants and needs, this had a great deal of impact on the establishment 
of a programme of Federal aid to education. 
In some instances, however, Federal funding for education was resisted by 
educators for the reason they cite: the fear that Federal control of education 
would overrule academic freedom or State control, and create an education 
system designed to serve the needs of the nation as a whole rather than the needs 
of the individual student. It has been feared that students would be required to 
study subjects and train for jobs which were necessary to the nation, rather than 
studying subjects they enjoyed or were interested in and training for the jobs they 
wanted to do. This fear has not always been confined to a fear of Federal funding 
for education; any form of Federal involvement has been greeted with a similar 
level of apprehension. The establishment of a Department of Education by 
President Andrew Johnson in 1867 was viewed with suspicion by members of 
both Congress and academia even though it offered no financial aid, as they 
feared that a formal Federal agency for education would try to supersede the 
authority of State governments to control their educational institutions. 
Representative Frederick Pike of Maine voiced his reservations at the time by 
stating that “the schoolhouses of the country will go under the control of general 
government. Churches, I suppose, are to follow next. So, taking the railroads, 
telegraphs, schoolhouses and churches, it would leave us little but our local 
taxation and our local pauperism”.49 What has, throughout American history, 
manifested itself as a fear of Federal involvement in education, has always in 
reality been a fear of centralised control of education.  
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This chapter critically assesses the ways in which the Federal government 
used the powers available to it in order to circumvent the Tenth Amendment 
whenever intervention in the US education system was deemed to be necessary 
to its running of the nation. This chapter begins with a brief discussion of some 
major instances of Federal involvement within the education system between the 
early years of the Colonies up to the beginning of the Cold War, with particular 
focus on how these were achieved. The driving forces behind the attempts at 
involvement made by the Federal government will also be considered in order to 
examine why certain Federal proposals were successful and others were not. In 
particular, the establishment of a National University, the focus on African 
American education after the Civil War, and the Morrill Land Grant Acts will be 
discussed. 
The link between Federal involvement and the need for national defence 
will receive special attention, as will the fact that the Federal government 
repeatedly achieved its own ends despite opposition. This chapter will examine 
the way in which the Federal government’s ongoing involvement in the education 
system established a culture of Federal intervention which the government was 
able to build upon during the early years of the Cold War. The specific nature of 
its involvement after the Second World War will be examined in later chapters. 
This chapter will establish a correlation between the national situation and the 
Federal government’s desire to involve itself in the education system, and 
demonstrate a pattern of behaviour which will highlight the fact that, if the 
Federal government desired to intervene over the education system, it usually 
found a method through which it could achieve this end. 
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Finally, this chapter will demonstrate the reasons why Federal 
intervention into the education system was pursued more earnestly and fervently 
during the early years of the Cold War. This will be achieved through an 
exploration of the convergence of a number of factors which, together, created an 
ideal ‘goldilocks’ climate for Federal intervention to flourish in the US in a way it 
previously had not. These factors include the sudden and extreme increase in the 
perceived importance of the education system to national security due to the 
success that the atomic bomb had in securing victory for the Allies in the Second 
World War; President Truman’s own personal commitment to education as an 
institution and a tool which shaped society; and the global trend towards 
extended involvement of national governments in the day to day lives of citizens, 
demonstrated by the creation of the Welfare State in Britain, Truman’s own 
pursuit of expanded Federal powers in other areas such as race relations and 
socialised medical care, and a global focus on the link between education and 
social progress after the Second World War.2  
 
The American Revolution 
The slow development of a Federal government of any significant size in the USA 
meant that the early emergence of education was, by default, free from Federal 
interference. The British government demonstrated no interest in the few country 
schools and private universities in this far off colony, especially as any children 
‘of consequence’ were sent to England to be educated.50 For those left behind, 
                                                          
2 This final contributing factor will be discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, however, due to its specific impact on 
the discussion of educational provision for African American students. 
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education, if undertaken at all, usually consisted of only a few years of study and 
took place in small independent schools, family-run schools or with private 
tutors.51 It was common for local governments to contribute to a college’s 
founding; for example, the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony 
contributed roughly £400 to the establishment of Harvard College, but this was 
usually the limit of governmental involvement.52 The oncoming Revolution, 
however, as it unified the Colonies and separated the American nation from 
mother England, changed this state of play. As the children of the Colonies 
became important to the newly established nation, those in charge of it began to 
take notice of them. 
The American Revolution brought about a change in the perception of 
education among the middle and upper classes in the USA. Education in the early 
years of the new Republic was viewed as the responsibility of the new 
government. The founding fathers quickly identified a relationship between a free 
people and a well-educated populace, and attempted to plan accordingly. 
“Education, in their view”, Good and Teller have asserted, “was a means of 
preserving liberty, securing unity, promoting good citizenship and developing the 
resources of the land and people. Education would help maintain the union of 
States, a united people and a republican government”.53 Frank Wilson Blackmar, 
author of The History of Federal and State Aid to Higher Education (1890), 
asserted that after the Revolution there existed in the newly United States a “new 
zeal for educated citizenship” and that it was vehemently advocated by statesmen 
that “education was to be the nation’s defense”.54 After the Revolution, freedom 
had to be defended, and this meant that the American populace needed to know 
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- at the very least - what freedom was, that they had it, and that it must be 
protected at all costs. 
This concern extended as far as an expansion of higher education for the 
new nation, and the Federal government strongly recommended that this be 
achieved through the establishment of a ‘National University’, which would be 
supported and run by the Federal government. Blackmar has noted that 
Washington viewed political intelligence as a national safeguard, and with all of 
the nation’s brightest youths from across the USA gathered together in one place, 
Blackmar highlighted, the Federal government would be able to “turn sectional 
pride into national feeling”.55 In order to avoid this watering down of the 
philosophies of the new Republic, Washington keenly supported the 
establishment of this Federal institution of education, and even bequeathed stock 
in a navigation company in his will, which was intended to be put to use in the 
establishment of this institution. This stock proved to be worthless, but had it not, 
it is likely that a National University would have been founded.  
Washington was not the only representative of the Federal government to 
support this initiative; of the first six presidents to be elected in the USA, four 
expressed strong support for a Federal university and recommended the 
consideration of such an institution to their respective Congresses.56 The National 
University never came to fruition, however; there was strong opposition to the 
ideological implications of a federally controlled institution of education, and 
each proposal was repeatedly blocked. When the founding of a Federal university 
was proposed in disguise by Congressman James Madison (the proposal asked 
only for the authority to establish a university and not, at the present time, for 
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any funds for it), Congressman John Nicholas (Virginia) opposed the measure, as 
he believed “the responsibility would fall on us to keep [fund] the institution”.57  
Nicholas claimed that the establishment of a national university was futile, 
as everyone would pay for it but few would benefit; even most who could afford 
the tuition would not be able to afford the cost of sending their children so far 
away to study, a problem which would only worsen as the USA expanded 
westward.58 He claimed the university would also not promote a unity of ideas, 
but instead entail “much evil”.59 Once again, this issue – that the Federal 
government could not be trusted to ‘finish what they started’ and that the burden 
would then fall on the tuition-payers, or worse the taxpayers, was a regular 
feature of the debate over Federal intervention. Especially in the early years of the 
Republic, few citizens received even a secondary level education, let alone a 
tertiary level education, therefore the direct benefits of an improved education 
system to the average American was hard to explain. No powerful narrative or 
unifying cause existed during this period that drew a line between the everyday 
citizen and a general better educated America and allowed the wants of the 
Federal government to be heard over the voice of the opposition.  
George Washington’s ideas languished and were eventually forgotten 
about until Thomas Jefferson’s second term. Jefferson once again proposed the 
idea of a national university, and also drew attention to the fact that the Federal 
government had no constitutional authority to direct education in the USA. 
Jefferson’s intention was to rectify this situation and allow the Federal 
government some control over the education of its citizens, but Jefferson’s plan 
backfired. The powerful ‘States’ rights’ lobby which existed in Washington at this 
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time – historian Albert Castel has described them as more Jeffersonian than 
Jefferson himself – immediately jumped on this fact and prevented an 
amendment to the Constitution. In highlighting the Federal government’s lack of 
authority, Jefferson accidentally undermined any opportunity the Federal 
government may have had to influence the education system without claiming 
constitutional authority.60 
This mistake did, however, enable Jefferson to establish two long-running 
patterns for the Federal government’s involvement in the American education 
system: firstly, he demonstrated the impetus to intervene in order to ensure a 
widespread commitment to fundamental US values; secondly, he demonstrated 
the fact that, where the education system is concerned, the Federal government 
is usually successful in its efforts eventually, albeit not always in the way it 
intended. Thomas Jefferson was indeed eventually successful in founding an 
academy of higher education that was dedicated to protecting the ideals of the 
Federal government, the Constitution and the nation. In 1802 he founded the 
United States Military Academy, better known today as West Point.61 It was not a 
national university, but it performed the same function. This was no accident; 
West Point was not intended to be seriously focused on military training, as is 
demonstrated by the fact that in the same Act in which Jefferson established a 
military academy, he simultaneously reduced the size of the army; this military 
academy had an agenda other than preparation for war.  
Indeed, the purpose of West Point was not, as was popularly assumed, to 
train soldiers to defend the nation, but instead to mould soldiers to support 
republican principles and to teach them to love their new government. Historian 
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Theodore J. Crackel asserted in his history of the academy, Mr Jefferson’s Army 
(1987), that “it was not armies, per se”, that Jefferson feared, “but an army loyal 
to incorrect political principles”.62 Another West Point historian, Robert M. S. 
McDonald, has furthered Crackel’s theory by emphasising that Jefferson 
“envisioned the academy as one of several mechanisms through which he could 
transform the Federalist leaning officer corps into a thoroughly republicanized 
(and Republicanized) cadre of men dedicated to the defense of the nation’s 
revolutionary ideals” and through highlighting the fact that Jefferson regularly 
appointed only cadets who shared his Republican views.63  
Jefferson himself had the honour of appointing the first superintendent of 
the Academy. Rather than choosing an established war veteran, as may have been 
expected, he chose Harvard graduate Jonathan Williams, a noted scientist and 
philosopher who had spent the entirety of the Revolutionary War in England as a 
representative of the US government. Classes were focused not on military 
strategy, but on science and technology, which the new government felt would 
best serve the nation both militarily (for the development of weapons) and 
economically (for the sale and export of new American-made inventions). 
Jefferson even made suggestions about which books should inhabit the 
Academy’s library, enabling him to further control the dissemination of 
knowledge to the matriculating students.64  
Whilst the establishment of a national university was an abuse of the 
Federal government’s powers, the alternative foundation of a similarly purposed 
‘military academy’ was instead a “‘necessary and proper’ outgrowth of the 
national government’s power to ‘raise and support armies’”.65 Jefferson regarded 
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education, McDonald has stated, as “too important – and potentially too 
influential over the character of the nation’s future military leaders” to be 
entrusted to an establishment outside of the Federal government. As such he 
utilised the powers that were available to him to ultimately circumvent the 
opposition, and the Constitution, and in doing so, began a governmental trend 
that would eventually result in a permanent Federal role in the US education 
system.66 
 
The Civil War and Reconstruction 
Willis Rudy has argued that war has always acted as a catalyst to the expansion 
of the American education system, and equally as a catalyst to the expansion of 
Federal involvement in it.67 This was certainly true of the Civil War, as a 
widespread expansion of secondary and higher education occurred during 
Reconstruction after the War. Yet as the economy of the South was in ruins after 
the Civil War, the Southern States neither shared in nor benefitted much from 
the vast expansion of higher education which the Northern States experienced 
during this period. The expansion of secondary education was delayed as 
Southern society could not resolve the issue of how to treat its newly freed former 
slaves, and the War had left most Southern colleges and universities destitute. 68   
To treat African Americans as equals conflicted with all that many 
Southern citizens knew, but to not treat them as freed men and women now 
conflicted with the laws of the newly reunited Union. Therefore, during the Civil 
War and the early years of Reconstruction, education for African Americans in 
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the South became, in part, a Federal and military affair. This involvement 
demonstrates an example of another common feature of Federal involvement in 
US education; the need to force the States to uphold the law or protect the US’s 
commitment to democracy. Under the direction of the Federal government, the 
military took control of the education system to ensure that African American 
students received the education due to them as US citizens. General Nathaniel P. 
Banks issued an order in 1864 that ensured that all of the freedmen under his 
protection in New Orleans, where he was based at the time, received a 
rudimentary education. In order to provide this education, the army assumed 
“the power to tax, and in fact requisition, to build, to hire and to regulate and 
discipline. The army supplied books, set up courses of study, and set the schools’ 
hours”.69 The Federal government assumed total control of the education system 
for African Americans in the State of Louisiana during this period.70 
 As a part of Congressional Reconstruction, all of the Southern States were 
required to provide a system of public schooling for all of their youth, and this 
included African American youths. For the most part, this system began as a 
segregated one. Before the outbreak of the Civil War, the few schools that existed 
for African Americans had been supported and run by volunteers, missionaries 
and philanthropists. After the end of the Civil War, most of these schools were 
absorbed into their local school systems and became the provision for the African 
American students in the area.71 Some locales temporarily established integrated 
school systems, but a mixture of protests and local ordinances soon created an 
entirely segregated school system in the South, which became enshrined in law 
after the Plessy vs. Ferguson ruling in 1896. Good and Teller have suggested that 
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it may have been for fear of this military seizure of the control of their schools 
that the Southern States so quickly agreed to provide public schooling for African 
American students after the Civil War – something which the majority of 
Southerners were against as schooling for African Americans had, up until 
recently, not even been legal in their States, let alone publicly funded.72 These 
separate schools, of course, were not equal either before Plessy or after it, but 
without this Federal pressure, it is unlikely that education for African Americans 
would have become a public concern at all.  
 
The Morrill Land Grant Acts (1862; 1890) 
The Civil War and its aftermath brought with it a significant and irrevocable 
change within American society, and higher education was not left untouched. 
Lucas recognised in American Higher Education that “the clear tendency in 
American higher education, throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, more than anything else, was one of concessions to the demand for more 
utilitarian learning”.73 Lucas asserts that this shift was achieved through the 
passage of the Morrill Land Grant Acts in 1862 and 1890; their passage 
demonstrated another long-term impetus for Federal involvement in the 
education system – the need to ensure that the schools, colleges and universities 
were teaching what the Federal government felt the nation’s students needed to 
be learning.74 As Good and Teller have recognised, land-grant colleges were 
founded (or, in some cases, converted) upon the idea that advanced scientific 
principles and formal learning had become relevant to the traditionally 
apprenticeship-controlled fields of agriculture and industry, and therefore the 
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modernisation of such fields was vital to the advancement of the American 
nation.75   
The first Morrill Land Grant Act was signed into law by President Abraham 
Lincoln in 1862 after five years of deliberation in the Houses. The Library of 
Congress outlined the Act as such: “The Morrill Act provided each State with 30 
acres of Federal land for each member in their Congressional delegation. The land 
was then sold by the States and the proceeds used to fund public colleges that 
focused on agriculture and the mechanical arts”.76  The Morrill Act also 
represented the first instance of Federal money being used specifically, directly 
and openly to fund higher education in the USA. The Act reached every State in 
the Union, and was sought after not just by small, struggling universities, but by 
well-established State institutions as well, despite the fact that it represented an 
intrusion of Federal concerns into matters of education - a factor which had been 
significant enough to derail the cause of the National University less than a 
century earlier.77  
Southern Democrats held up earlier incarnations of the Bill for years prior 
to the Civil War, during which time every hallmark of the ongoing debate over 
Federal intervention had been discussed. Southern States feared Federal 
intervention into matters of education in part because this Democrat stronghold 
disliked ‘big government’ and preferred to administer their own affairs at a State 
level; those opposed also feared being forced to integrate their schools or fund 
separate schools for African American students. President James Buchanan 
vetoed the bill, claiming it was unconstitutional and that it represented “the end 
of the Republic”.78 Buchanan defended his decision by stating that the passage of 
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a bill for Federal aid to education would mean that the Federal government would 
abuse its power and would “dictate the curriculum”.79  
Yet the outbreak of the Civil War made the Morrill Act relevant not just to 
farmers or educators, but to the defence of the nation. If an army marches on its 
stomach, the government has to make sure it is full; if the future of the nation 
relied upon the increasing educational level of its farmers, then it was the 
responsibility of the Federal government to create a viable system of knowledge 
transfer. The Morrill Act, with its agricultural foresight, represented a means 
through which this could be achieved.80 Factory labourers and skilled mechanics 
were also lacking in the USA at this time as the War had significantly slowed the 
flow of immigration from Europe; the Morrill Act promised a provision for 
training students in the Mechanic Arts.81 It even included a clause which 
mandated military training in all land-grant universities, a vital departure from 
the traditional exemption of college students from military service.82 This visible 
link between the American public and an improved education system helped to 
garner support for the Act. 
After the outbreak of the Civil War, the Morrill Act became equally as 
beneficial to the Federal government as it was to student farmers. It was popular 
among unaffiliated homesteaders, and its passage assured their loyalty to the 
Union government. The Congressmen and Senators who were present and 
approved the Morrill Act did so with an agenda in mind, and the funds arrived at 
the universities laced with conditions. The Morrill Act insisted upon  
 “the endowment, support and maintenance of at least one college, where 
the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical 
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studies, and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning 
as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the 
legislatures of the States may respectively prescribe, in order to promote 
the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several 
pursuits and professions in life”.83  
The Act prescribed the kind of knowledge to be taught and the kind of student to 
which it should be imparted, and served to benefit the nation as much as 
individual colleges or individual students. It is no accident that the bill was passed 
at a time when the South – traditionally the most vehement lobby against Federal 
intervention in the education system – had seceded from the Union and were, 
therefore, not able to influence Congressional proceedings; had Southern 
Representatives been present, the Morrill Act would have met far stronger 
opposition. More importantly, without the national imperative created by the 
outbreak of the Civil War, it is unlikely that the Act would have received such 
impassioned support from those who were present; the Morrill Act, whilst 
dressed up as an agricultural and educational measure, enabled the Federal 
government to utilise the USA’s youth and its education system to help the Union 
win the War. 
Further adding to the chagrin of the academic world, the first Morrill Act 
was not as successful as had been hoped as it had not ensured long term funding 
for the institutions it founded, and therefore many of them quickly found 
themselves without enough funds to survive. The Federal government did not 
‘finish what it started’ just as had been feared during the debate over the creation 
of the National University. The affected universities converged in Washington DC 
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to request further Federal support, and eventually they received it, in the form of 
the second Morrill Act (1890). This Act established that an annual appropriation 
from the National Treasury be given to each land-grant college. The universities’ 
need for this law, however, placed the power in the hands of the Federal 
government, which utilised it by calling for even tighter Federal controls. Annual 
reports were required regarding how the grant had been spent. If Federal officials 
deemed this spend inappropriate, they were at liberty to withhold some or all 
further grants to an institution, or even request the money back.84  
The Federal government, bit by bit, claimed a significant amount of control 
over American higher education. It could not direct how the money was spent, 
but it could stop payments if it disapproved of a university’s choices. This caused 
the universities to think carefully about the Federal government’s agenda. After 
the US Office of Education was established, these reports, previously submitted 
to the Secretary of Agriculture, were instead sent to the Secretary of the Interior. 
The Secretary of the Interior was allied more closely to the needs of the nation 
than the needs of an individual’s agricultural education, which further 
strengthened the Federal government’s hold over higher education.  
The Federal government also used the second Morrill Act to further the 
cause of African American education, as it had done in the early years of 
Reconstruction. The Act stated that funds could not be given to States that 
practised segregation, unless they provided agricultural and mechanical colleges 
for African American students as well. As a result, 17 institutions of higher 
education especially for African American students were founded in the former 
Confederate States so that these States in question could avoid integrating their 
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established land-grant colleges.85 Willis Rudy has asserted that it is highly 
unlikely that these 17 institutions would have been founded in the former 
Confederate States without the impetus provided by Federal controls.86 
 
Twentieth Century America 
Almost 25 years after the passage of the second Morrill Act, another war 
prompted further Federal intervention in the education system. Just two months 
before the USA’s entry into the First World War, the Smith-Hughes Act made 
Federal funds available specifically for the dissemination of knowledge in the 
vocational professions – agricultural and industrial work in particular – in high 
schools across the USA.87 The changes to the high school curriculum proposed in 
the Smith-Hughes Act were not dissimilar in nature to those outlined by the 
Cooley Bill – another bill which had advocated Federal funding for vocational 
education four years earlier – yet it succeeded where its predecessor had failed. 
This is due to the fact that, in the four intervening years between the two 
proposals, the outbreak of the First World War, and the USA’s subsequent 
commitment to it, had caused a radical change in the political situation of the 
USA.  
As the passage of the Smith-Hughes Act was a reaction to the First World 
War, it is no surprise that the funding also benefitted the nation as much as it 
improved schools or supported students, and it also came with strings attached. 
The changes which occurred in the USA after the nation joined the First World 
War in 1917 meant that vocational careers became far more closely linked to 
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national security – food, clothing and boots were needed to send to the soldiers 
fighting in France; an increase in industry was required in order to speed up 
mobilisation. The funding provided by the Smith-Hughes Act went some way to 
quickly bridging the gap between what the nation needed and what the nation 
had.  
The benefits which the Act would provide to the Federal government were 
the primary source of the opposition to the Smith-Hughes Act; educators felt that 
it exposed the education system to the vacillations of national politics.88 Noted 
educational theorist, John Dewey, criticised the Smith-Hughes Act on the eve of 
its signing and asked whether the new vocational education movement was 
designed to “increase ... the industrial intelligence and power of the worker” or if 
it was intended rather to “add to the profits of employers... by avoiding waste, 
getting more out of their machines and materials” in the hope that profits would 
increase.89 Dewey claimed that the bill “settled no problem; it merely symbolizes 
the inauguration of a conflict between irreconcilably opposed educational and 
industrial ideas”.90  
Whilst it did benefit those students who had no desire to enter academia, 
in elevating vocational education over a traditional liberal arts education, the 
tenets of the Smith-Hughes Act ultimately served the needs of the nation over the 
wants of the education system. Criticism of the Act declined greatly after the 
USA’s entry into the First World War in 1917, and the US education system 
continued its commitment to vocational education throughout the 1920s. 
Herbart Kliebard asserted in The American Curriculum that “the winds of 
change… had swept the educational world in the previous quarter century” – 
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change which had been driven by the wants and needs of the Federal 
government.91 
By the 1930s, schooling at every level was affected by the onset of the Great 
Depression; historians Frank J. Munger and Richard F. Fenno have argued that 
“the question of direct Federal aid to education was forcibly reopened by the 
economic collapse that followed 1929”.92 In many areas of the USA, 
schoolchildren had no schools to attend, and where schools were still in session 
it was often due to the fact that teachers had agreed to teach for free. Across the 
USA, pupils dropped out at an alarming rate in order to earn money to support 
their families.93  
Schools were kept open with Federal funds to ensure that pupils could 
attend them; the National Youth Administration (NYA) used Federal money to 
find on-campus jobs for students such as work as janitors, research assistants and 
work building playgrounds and other public facilities to ensure that they could 
afford to stay in school.94 The main reason for the institution of many of the 
programmes which concerned the education system directly was to ensure that 
the pupils stayed in school or were otherwise occupied in order to keep them out 
of the job market – and the unemployment line.95 No interest was shown in the 
kind of education the students received between 9am and 3pm or how 
enthusiastic an underpaid teacher would be. The main goal was to ensure that the 
students were busy, which prevented them from either taking a job from someone 
else, or adding to the already sky high unemployment figures.  
Without any direct involvement, the Federal government allocated more 
money to the education system during Roosevelt’s first two terms than any earlier 
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administration in American history.96 Historian Paula S. Fass has argued that “in 
the course of its relief efforts, the New Deal developed educational programs and 
facilities that paralleled those of traditional educational institutions. Those 
programs were federally administered and controlled”.97 The educational 
activities of the CCC camps became so established that, while still unregulated, 
they became formalised and extended; in 1937, Congress provided each works 
camp with a schoolhouse and increased the funding allocated to education 
therein.98 In 1941, CCC members from 47 States and the District of Columbia 
received educational credits for the schooling they received whilst in the camps. 
Unmonitored schooling provided and controlled entirely by the Federal 
government became, in retrospect, as much a part of the formal education system 
as the schools and colleges themselves, but entirely without regulation from an 
educational body.99 
Opposition to the education provided by the New Deal programmes did 
exist, and echoed earlier issues over Federal involvement. The programmes were 
considered by some National Education Association (NEA) members to be a 
“hostile intruder” into American education, and were thought to be “usurping 
what should remain local responsibilities”.100  Educator George S. Counts claimed 
that “the school will become an instrument for the perpetuation of the existing 
social order rather than a creative force in society”.101 Southern educators feared 
that Federal money would involve a caveat requiring desegregation or equal 
distribution of funds between white and black institutions.  
Opposition, however, did not prevent the Federal government from 
involving itself in American education. As Fass has argued, the New Deal enabled 
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the Federal government to “enter the educational arena through the back door, 
as it were, not as an agent of education, but as a dispenser of relief”. 102 By ring-
fencing its involvement as social relief, not educational policy, the Federal 
government avoided major controversy over its policies, whilst simultaneously 
utilising education and the education system to address the societal problems 
caused by the Depression. In addition, the Federal government’s involvement in 
the education system was largely beneficial to the individuals who received a 
federally funded education during the Depression years, which in itself helped to 
stem the flow of opposition.  
The Federal government showed no interest in permanently funding 
education, despite calls from public school officials who wished such legislation 
– free from Federal control of course – to be enacted.103 To offer long-term 
unfettered funding was both expensive and in no way beneficial to the Federal 
government. President Roosevelt continually reiterated his position that he 
“preferred to rely on the new State agencies he created to get funds to those most 
in need”, and, as such, retain the power to repeal funds when the emergency 
subsides.104  This flexibility proved useful to Roosevelt as a new emergency – the 
USA’s entry into the Second World War – brought with it a need for a different 
type of Federal intervention in the USA’s education system. Few programmes 
initiated by the New Deal administrations survived this change.105 
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The Second World War 
The outbreak of the Second World War, and the USA’s subsequent commitment 
to it, caused the Federal government to once again review the American education 
system and its efficacy, just as it had after the outbreak of the First World War. 
The Federal presence on campus increased during the Second World War as the 
government began using college facilities to train military personnel.106 Thelin 
has asserted that American colleges and universities “proved to be both resilient 
and useful as a part of the national war effort in World War II”.107 He has 
highlighted that “the campus reconstituted itself to provide a hospitable setting 
for a variety of intense military training programs at hundreds of colleges”.108 
Facilities and resources at colleges and universities across the country were made 
available to the Federal government to aid the nation in the War effort – in 
exchange for Federal dollars, of course.  
US patriotism and constitutional authority were not the only driving forces 
behind the colleges’ and universities’ acquiescence to the Federal government. 
The numbers of students matriculating in higher education dropped off sharply 
during the war years, placing a serious strain on the funds available to each 
institution. Federal research grants became vital to many institutions’ survival. 
Some universities and colleges, Lucas has recognised, became “almost entirely 
dependent on government subsidies for their very survival” during the war and 
by 1945, “upwards of half of the income supporting certain academic institutions 
came from the national government”.109 Without the financial support provided 
by the Federal government, many institutions of higher education would have 
been added to the casualties of the war.  
72 
 
The Serviceman’s Re-adjustment Act (1944) 
Federal involvement in the education system did not subside after the war, but 
instead massively increased with the passage of the Servicemen’s Readjustment 
Act, more commonly known as the GI Bill. It was passed one year before the end 
of the War and one year before the government’s specially appropriated war 
powers came to an end. The GI Bill was designed to provide “vocational training 
or formal education in any field on every possible level” and allocated funding for 
all returning servicemen and women to attend - if accepted - a college of their 
choice.110 Returning servicemen could take advantage of one year of education for 
90 days of service given to their country in the Second World War, plus another 
month for every month of active duty the soldier had served, up to but not 
exceeding 48 months – the length of a college degree. Tuition fees, book subsidies 
and college supplies were paid for by the Federal government, usually directly to 
the college or university, and each new servicemen-turned-student received 
either $50 or $75 per month dependent on their marital status.111  
Lucas has stated that “more than any other single initiative, [the GI Bill] 
brought massive changes to higher education in the postwar era”.112 The GI Bill 
engendered a dramatic shift in the demographics of the college campus, as it 
enabled a large number of working class Americans, who would not have had the 
opportunity otherwise, to attend college. It also became more common for mature 
students to attend college after the passage of the GI Bill as the majority of 
returning servicemen who took advantage of the opportunity had put college on 
hold in order to join the war effort or, alternatively, had neither the money nor 
the qualifications to attend college before the war. 
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The GI Bill, like the Federal government’s presence on campus during the 
war, was not without its critics. The Republican opposition feared that the GI Bill 
would, according to Rudy, “upset racial segregation in the South, unbalance the 
Federal budget, and somehow undermine the moral fiber of the nation”.113 The 
GI Bill also proved to be somewhat unpopular with educators, who feared that 
the increased accessibility to a college education for returning veterans would 
lead to a ‘dumbing down’ of academia. James B. Conant, president of Harvard, 
stated that he would have preferred a Bill which bestowed Federal dollars upon 
“a carefully selected number of returning veterans”.114 Robert M. Hutchins, 
chancellor of the University of Chicago, announced in an article written for 
Collier’s, entitled “The Threat to American Education”, that he believed the GI 
Bill would lead to universities subverting their academic standards in order to 
benefit from Federal dollars. Having learned from their behaviour during the 
Second World War, Hutchins asserted that “educational institutions... cannot 
resist money. The GI Bill of Rights gives them the chance to get more money than 
they ever dreamed of and to do it in the name of patriotism”.115 This, Hutchins 
claimed, would lead to a drop in academic standards, as he believed that the 
colleges would “not want to keep out unqualified veterans; they will not want to 
expel those who fail”.116 Hutchins also suggested that the real reason for the 
Federal government’s passage of the GI Bill was to keep the vast number of 
returning veterans off the unemployment lines, and the streets, and he resented 
the use of the education system as a form of welfare.117  
Hutchins was correct in his assumption; the main purpose of the GI Bill 
was to prevent a flood of returning veterans in to the workplace. Rudy supports 
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Hutchins’ claim that the GI Bill was passed in part due to “an abiding fear that 
the return of masses of veterans might trigger another major depression”.118  As 
historian Edward Humes has noted, “without a plan in place for those millions of 
returning men and women, the nation’s economy, culture, even its democracy 
could fall apart”.119 Education Historian Diane Ravitch also holds this view, 
asserting in her seminal history of higher education The Troubled Crusade: 
American Education, 1945 – 1980 (1983) that “the Federal officials in charge of 
postwar planning were chiefly interested in preventing joblessness and economic 
distress. To the veterans, the [GI Bill] was one more ‘goody’ in the total package; 
to the planners, it was a promising way to reduce the number of jobseekers in the 
period after demobilization”.120 The Bill also enabled the Federal government to 
delay the vast numbers of returning veterans from entering the workplace. As 
Thelin has recognised, “the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act focused on strategies 
to suspend returning GIs from the labor market so as to allow factories adequate 
time to retool for the switch from tank treads to automobile tires”.121 The Bill 
enabled the Federal government both to ‘reward’ soldiers for their service to their 
country during the War, and to skilfully avoid the problems of mass 
unemployment which the returning servicemen would otherwise have brought.  
The GI Bill clearly represented a Federal circumvention of the Tenth 
Amendment, but the GI Bill did not represent the kind of intervention into the 
education system that the US would witness post-war. As such, it cannot be 
considered to be the ‘moment’ at which the Federal government’s approach to 
intervention in the education system shifted. Whilst the GI Bill represented a 
massive Federal intervention in terms of economic underwriting, it did not 
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represent Federal influence in terms of the proposal of educational policy. At the 
time that it was passed, the United States was also still at war, which left the 
Federal government in a very different position, policy-wise, to peacetime. The 
GI Bill’s primary intention was not to increase Federal control of the education 
system, or to use the system of education to any end other than as a glorified car 
park for returning veterans; it was created to avoid the chaos which ensued after 
the First World War, and a return to the Great Depression from which the US had 
only recently escaped. Returning veterans could spend their first years back in 
the US in college, rather than the workplace (or unemployed) – or indeed on the 
52-20 welfare plan also included in the GI Bill, rather than in the workplace; the 
education provision was part of a far larger plan, and one which had very little to 
do with education  itself. 
The GI Bill did, however, act as a catalyst to the shift in the Federal 
government’s approach to intervention in the education system. It was wildly 
successful and encountered little opposition, thus demonstrating the potential for 
a Federal role in the education system. The success of the education provision in 
the GI Bill, and the subsequent impact on higher education, was not anticipated. 
Early projections assumed that around 8-10% of the returning veterans would 
take advantage of the GI Bill’s education provision, which is not a game-changing 
number. The main reason why the GI Bill had such an impact on college 
education far beyond what the Federal government and both supporters and 
critics of the GI Bill had expected was in fact down to higher education 
institutions themselves. Many colleges recognised the benefits that an influx of 
federally sponsored students could have on their institution; higher education 
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had struggled throughout the war due to far lower than average matriculation 
rates and, as the war came to a close, the targeted war research which had taken 
place on campuses across the nation also ended, which removed much needed 
funding from the colleges. The GI Bill represented an opportunity to recover from 
this, as it provided colleges with students – and tuition fees – in never before seen 
numbers and successfully averted this crisis. College enrolment was 45% higher 
in 1946 than in 1944.122  
The colleges and universities recognised this opportunity and embraced it. 
As Thelin has noted, “Harvard, for example, anticipated the postwar changes by 
initiating a vigorous advertisement and recruitment program among overseas 
servicemen before the war ended”.123  College enrolment rates doubled between 
1943 and 1946.124 Although the government laid the groundwork, it was the 
colleges themselves who caused the GI Bill to alter US higher education so 
dramatically. The only role which the Federal government retained in the 
implementation of the GI Bill beyond its administration was the caveat that an 
institution had to be federally approved in order for a veteran to attend on the GI 
Bill; this clause existed because the benefits offered by the GI Bill created a slew 
of pop-up colleges which in reality were little more than opportunistic diploma 
mills. Provided colleges could demonstrate that they were accredited by a 
regionally controlled accreditation agency, the GI Bill benefits were approved.125  
The benefits to society wrought by the GI Bill also demonstrated how vital 
education was to the progress and success of the nation. This better educated 
populace contributed significantly to the explosion of the middle class in the 
1950s and 1960s, and widened access to college education not only for the 
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returning veterans, but also for subsequent generations as it allowed veterans to 
escape from the class they were born into in vast numbers. The aims of the GI Bill 
were so successful that, despite the fact that its passage called for a phenomenal 
financial commitment, the Federal government also benefitted financially as well. 
Edwin Kiester Jr. has noted that “for every dollar spent on the GI Bill, the United 
States government eventually received as much as six dollars return in the form 
of higher taxes that were collected. These were the taxes that were paid by 
individuals who were beneficiaries of the advanced education which the GI Bill 
had made available to them”.126 Kiester Jr. recognised that the GI Bill may well 
have been “the best deal ever made by Uncle Sam”. 127 
The GI Bill does not represent the beginning of the US’s swing towards a 
formalised federal role in the education system; the Federal government provided 
a large amount of funding with remarkably few strings attached. Where the GI 
Bill was concerned, the Federal government were prepared to pay the piper with 
no expectation of being able to call the tune, because education itself was never 
the government’s focus where the GI Bill was concerned. It was intended to keep 
the returning GIs out of the job market, and it did just that. The ease with which 
the Federal government was able to intervene, however, did demonstrate how 
open the US public were to intervention. In particular, as Thelin has recognised, 
the federally funded research projects and the benefits reaped by the GI Bill 
“indelibly transform[ed] the missions and funding of American higher education 
in the period following the end of WWII in 1945”.128 The conjunction between the 
Federal government and the education system during and immediately after the 
Second World War was both successful and popular, and encountered 
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surprisingly little opposition. As such, it set the stage for a vast increase in Federal 
involvement in the education system in the post-war years, but the Federal 
government’s willingness to pay without actually participating did not survive the 
shift. 
 
A Case for Intervention 
Harry Truman, an ardent New Dealer, ascended to the Presidency suddenly on 
12th April 1945. Relatively inexperienced, he described the occasion as like having 
the moon, the stars and the planets fall on him.129 Truman became President, 
however, at a time of intense change, not just for US society, but on a global scale. 
Within weeks, the Second World War was over and Truman was required to guide 
his fellow Americans through to the New World: post war America. Before this 
world emerged, Truman was called upon to make one of the most important 
decisions in US history; whether or not to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. When 
he became President in April, he was not aware that the Manhattan Project had 
been successful; just four months later, he gave the Enola Gay the order to deploy 
over Hiroshima. Three days later he would do the same over Nagasaki.  
 This decision ended the war in the Pacific arena and shaped the course of 
US foreign policy for the next forty years. It also, however, had an irrevocable 
effect on US domestic policy. With the release of the atomic bombs over Japan, a 
new kind of threat emerged; for the first time in human history, mankind 
possessed the power to bring total destruction to all life on earth. The Second 
World War was over but, in the Pacific at least, it had been won not by military 
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might, but by superior scientific prowess. In the months and years after the end 
of the Second World War, this shift in power caused concern to grow across the 
world over the role that each nation’s scientific advancement would play in the 
future world order.130 An article published in School Life in 1947 announced that 
the USA was “on the threshold of the atomic age”; the anonymous author 
acknowledged that “accustomed as we are to a mechanized and highly technical 
civilization we nevertheless face a future of scientific development with 
considerable anxiety”.131 He also questioned what role this new frontier would 
play in the USA’s future, and asked the question on everyone’s lips: “will new 
scientific developments be employed primarily to kill and destroy?”132  
To add to this sense of urgency, the Federal government was struck by a 
fear that students in the Soviet Union were differently – and better – educated 
than American students. They feared that the Soviet education system favoured 
scientific research over liberal arts studies, and therefore a nation of inventors 
who could, in time, overpower the USA, were being fostered in the only nation 
realistically capable of becoming a threat to the USA. Additionally, it seemed that 
Soviet students were taught to love and support their government in a way not 
yet practised on American soil, which in turn created a fervour for their cause 
which would be hard to penetrate. Shortly after the end of the Second World War, 
education researcher George S. Counts translated a Soviet text on pedagogy – I 
Want to Be Like Stalin – which had been intended for Soviet eyes only and 
therefore offered a unique insight into the aims of the Soviet Union’s education 
system. He summed up the government’s fears in his introduction to his 
translation, asking “What are the Soviet leaders ‘up to’?; What are their plans for 
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the long future?; What may we expect from the Soviet leaders in the years 
ahead?”; Counts suggested that “if we knew the answers, we could shape our own 
policies with more assurance”.133 Educators and politicians alike recognised the 
important role which the education system could play in this non-military conflict 
and feared losing by being ‘left behind’ by the Soviet Union’s potentially superior 
practices.  
President Truman established that the future of the American nation 
would depend on the education level of its citizens in his Reorganization Plan, 
issued in 1946, and claimed that “over the years the prosperity of America and its 
place in the world will depend on the health, the education, the ingenuity and the 
integrity of its people and their ability to work together and with other nations”.134 
Moreover, Truman established that this improvement to the population was the 
responsibility of the Federal government, and stated that “the most basic, and at 
the same time the most difficult task of any country is the conservation and 
development of its human resources. Under our system of government this is a 
joint responsibility of the Federal, State and local governments, but in it the 
Federal government has a large and vital role to play”. 135  
Truman re-labelled the American people as ‘human resources’, thus 
establishing them as a commodity equal to energy resources or food resources. 
The use of this ‘resource’ was the responsibility of the Federal government, to be 
directed by the government in order to maximise its potential. Just as food and 
energy resources are redirected to the troops during a hot war, human resources 
would be redirected to impacted areas in order to meet the demands of a cold war. 
Truman demonstrated the Federal government’s understanding that it was no 
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longer suitable for it to play merely a financial role in promoting education as it 
had done through the GI Bill; it now needed to play a part in the creation and 
direction of education policy in order to protect national security.  
President Truman then established that the Federal government would 
develop education “through its research, advice, stimulation and financial aid”.136 
Truman again reiterated his reasons for financially supporting the education 
system two years later in a communication to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, in which he stated  
“I regard the proper education of our youth as a matter of paramount 
importance to the welfare and security of the United States. It is necessary 
and proper that the Federal government should furnish financial 
assistance which will make it possible for the States to provide educational 
facilities more nearly adequate to meet the pressing needs of our 
Nation”.137  
Both this communication, and his Reorganization Plan, were publicly available 
and copies of each were republished and circulated to the schools, colleges and 
universities through the government’s School Life magazine. Truman did not 
attempt to covertly infiltrate the education system, but instead openly declared it 
to be the domain of the Federal government, as was everything which was 
important to national security. He established that Federal involvement in the 
education system was not only acceptable, but necessary and proper. 
The difference between the Federal government’s approach to education 
prior to the end of the War and after it is not only attributable to the deployment 
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of the atomic bomb and the subsequent alterations to the perception of the 
importance of education to society. The very fact that Harry Truman was in a 
position to make that historic decision is notable in itself. After the sudden, albeit 
not unanticipated, death of President Roosevelt, Truman, a man who had held 
the office of the Vice President for less than three months, became the most 
powerful man in the United States, which by 1945 meant one of the most powerful 
men - if not the most powerful man – in the world. The new President Truman 
demonstrated two particularly relevant traits during his time in office: He 
betrayed a keen interest in education (particularly in the importance of education 
to shaping society, and in turn the need to reduce the barriers to higher education 
including financial and racial) and a penchant for ‘big government’ – for the 
Federal government to play an expanded role in shaping US society in areas in 
which it had traditionally had no role. These areas included, among others, race 
relations, medical care and the US education system. 
As a young man Harry Truman was focused on education. He was known 
around his home town of Independence for being studious or, in his own words, 
“a sissy”.138 Truman was one of only eleven boys at Independence High School 
alongside 30 girls, as it was not the norm in Missouri at the time for boys to attend 
high school – work was usually considered to be more appealing and more 
immediately needed.139 Biographer David McCulloch noted in his seminal study 
of Truman that, during his adolescence, Truman “grew dutifully, conspicuously 
studious, spending long afternoons in the town library, watched over by a white 
plaster bust of Ben Franklin”.140 He did well in school, and liked his teachers, he 
later described them as “the salt of the earth” and reminisced that “they gave us 
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our high ideals, and they hardly ever received more than forty dollars a month”.141 
His favourite teacher was Miss Margaret Phelps, a history teacher, and Truman 
himself also recalled that “reading history to me was far more than a romantic 
adventure. It was solid instruction and wise teaching that I somehow felt that I 
wanted and needed”.142 Truman stated that the influence which his teachers had 
in shaping his life was second only to that of his mother. 143 
His first plan upon graduating was to try for West Point. He was rejected 
due to his eyesight. Due to wild speculation and poor business sense, however, 
Truman’s father also lost all of the family’s money and property when Truman 
came of age for matriculation and, as McCulloch has noted, “college of any kind 
was out of the question”.144 Ferrell illuminates that college was “something that 
the son had wanted to do”.145 In a clear demonstration that Truman still wished 
to further his education in a formal setting despite his two earlier setbacks, he 
signed up for an accounting course at Little Spaulding’s Commercial College in 
Kansas City, MO, but his family proved too poor for Truman even to pursue this 
route. He instead went to work on the Santa Fe Railroad as a Construction 
Timekeeper. Truman later recalled this experience, and described his first job in 
pedagogical terms as “a very down-to-earth education”.146  
Education clearly penetrated Truman’s world view, and he pursued it 
throughout his life, despite his troubled beginnings. Journalist Merle Miller 
described Truman as “a self-educated man” but noted that “he mispronounced a 
lot of words, which in the beginning puzzled me. Then I realised that while he had 
often read them, he had seldom, if ever, spoken them aloud, not even in many 
cases heard them spoken aloud”.147 Truman’s lack of college education 
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continually bothered him. As McCulloch has noted, when he served in the First 
World War, Truman “felt he was in over his head, having never been to college, 
and worried constantly that he would fail. The mathematics was all at the college 
level”.148 On 17th April 1952, when asked by a news reporter about rumours that 
he would take a teaching position in the history department of a North Carolina 
University, Truman joked with that “I am no historian. I have no college degrees 
except honorary ones that they have given me since I have been in the Senate and 
the President of the United States, and I don’t believe that there is any college in 
the country that would consider me qualified to teach history – or anything 
else!”149  
This self-depreciation was unfounded. Truman biographer Roy Jenkins 
noted that Truman “was at least as well read in history and biography as was 
Roosevelt. He was steeped in the history of the Republic and particularly of the 
presidency, but he was also a considerable expert on the lives of the Roman 
emperors and of almost every great military commander in the history of the 
world. Yet his knowledge sat less easily on his shoulders”.150 Still, education 
remained important, and almost sacred to him. He received an honorary college 
degree from “a little college out in Iowa” which, in his own words, he “did not 
know they were going to confer… on me or [I] would not have been there – it was 
too late when I found out about it not to let them go ahead with their plan – [I] 
did not want to upset the apple cart”. At this point in 1952 he had no plans to 
accept another, however, despite hundreds of invitations, because “I am not very 
strong for honorary degrees if you have not earned them”.151   
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Truman valued education and, as his opinion on the importance of 
teachers demonstrated, believed that the education provided to a nation’s citizens 
played a definitive role in shaping the society of that nation. Truman was also 
thwarted in his own pursuit of higher education, not due to inability, but access. 
Writer James McMurtry Longo has noted that “he never forgot the pain of 
wanting to continue in school but not having the money to pay for it”.152 It is no 
surprise, therefore, that one of Truman’s main focuses when discussing the need 
for education in the modern world was the ways in which he could utilise his 
Presidential power in order to widen opportunities for students from less 
traditional backgrounds (no doubt also influenced by the success of the GI Bill) 
and to explore the ways in which education could be centrally organised to ensure 
that teaching the superiority of ‘democracy’ in theory and practise held pride of 
place within it. 
Finally, a third factor was intrinsic to the shift in the approach which the 
Federal government took towards the education system during the years after the 
Second World War: the expansion of ‘big government’. War engenders societal 
change, and the Second World War was no different; as Martin Francis has 
observed, “most Western democracies embarked on comprehensive programmes 
of social reform in the aftermath of the Second World War”.153 In Britain, post 
war society meant the establishment of the Welfare State by newly elected Prime 
Minister Clement Attlee, based on the recommendations made in the 1942 
Beveridge Report. In the US, Truman mirrored this post war widening of the 
government’s involvement in society and attempted to establish the Fair Deal. 
Both programmes utilised the post war chaos to attempt to institute new 
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government policies which were radically different from what each country had 
seen before. 
Truman’s pursuit of the Fair Deal program demonstrates that he was fully 
committed to establishing a long-term expanded role for the Federal government 
in domestic policy. Truman was no doubt influenced by FDR’s New Deal, and 
Second New Deal; Truman intended his programs to take the form of 
governmental support, however, rather than governmental relief. The Fair Deal 
was not about short-term survival, but government-sponsored long-term 
equality, a fairer society and prosperity for all Americans.  It was announced by 
Truman in his State of the Union address on 5th January 1949; Truman 
announced that “every segment of our population and every individual has a right 
to expect from our government a fair deal”.154 He called for anti-inflation 
measures, a national health service, reforms for farmers, the repeal of the Taft-
Hartley Act, the expansion of social security, a $0.75 minimum wage, housing 
programs, and increased Federal aid to education among a host of other 
programs.  
Few, if any, of his Fair Deal proposals were new; he had proposed the 
majority already in his first, post-FDR, term, but had been continually thwarted 
by the 80th (do-nothing) Congress. Some of Truman’s proposals were successful; 
social security was doubled and coverage extended; the minimum wage was 
increased and a public housing program was pursued; some of Truman’s farm 
policies passed, as did his bid to expand Federal power over rural electrification 
programs and flood control programs.155 Steven Casey has noted that “even after 
winning the presidency in his own right” in 1948, however, “Truman then made 
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so many basic mistakes in managing Congress – from refusing to press for 
straight up-down votes to leaving Washington at crucial moments – that his Fair 
Deal program soon stalled”.156  
Truman’s pursuit of the Fair Deal was largely unsuccessful in comparison 
to Britain establishment of the Welfare State. The major reason for this is 
Truman’s continuing inability to handle Congress and a lack of support from 
Southern Democrats who saw the Fair Deal as an attack on their keenly-held 
belief in States’ rights.157 In addition the growing power of the Republican 
opposition, the US’s entry into the Korean War in 1950 (which saw many 
domestic policy-focused liberal Democrats replaced with foreign policy-focused 
conservative Republicans); and the strength of private corporations in the US 
compared to the UK (especially where healthcare was concerned) also 
contributed to the failure of Truman’s liberal agenda.158 The intention of the 
program was clear, however; to engender an expanded role for the Federal 
government on behalf of the people and the nation. Where the education system 
was concerned, Truman pursued this with particular vigour.  
 The US and the UK’s post war approaches to alterations in the education 
system, however, were fundamentally different.  Britain’s approach to the 
expansion of the role of the government within the education system after the 
Second World War took the form of increased attention to secondary education. 
During the War, the Education Act (1944), more commonly known as the Butler 
Act, had been passed in the UK, raising the school leaving age to 15. This created 
an impetus after the War to provide these teenagers with a more substantial 
educational offering in return for their lengthened commitment, and ensured that 
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education was considered as a part of the creation of the UK’s post war Welfare 
State.159 As Claudia Golding has recognised,  
“nothing more clearly demonstrates the difference in schooling between 
the United States and Britain than the simultaneous passage by the Labour 
Government of the 1944 Education Act [and the 1944 Servicemen’s Re-
adjustment Act by Franklin Delano Roosevelt]. The American GI Bill paid 
tuition and a stipend for attending college, while the British Education Act 
of 1944 did no more than guarantee to all youth a publicly funded grammar 
or secondary-school education”.160 
Britain was focused on widening educational opportunity for secondary school 
age children during this period, whereas the US centred its attention on higher 
education. 
This was largely due to the fact that the USA had already addressed the 
issue of secondary education on a wide scale prior to the outbreak of the Second 
World War. The ‘High School movement’, which took place in the US from 1910-
1940 sought to make secondary level education universally available to US 
children. America was virtually alone in providing free and universally available 
secondary level education prior to the Second World War.161 Goldin notes that 
“compared with Britain and France… the United States by the 1930s was three to 
four decades ahead in post-elementary education and educational gaps remained 
large at least to the 1950s”.162 This difference, among other factors, was due to the 
structure of the American education system, and primarily the fact that “the 
Federal government had virtually no involvement” with the expansion of 
secondary education during this period.163 Expansion was a purely local or State 
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matter, and this greatly contributed to the US’s success, as did the opposite 
contribute to Europe’s failure. 
 Firstly, competition between both the local and State governments to 
attract domestic migrants to the area spurred the creation and building of 
schools, which greatly furthered the availability of secondary education.164 This 
local impetus was lacking across Europe, however, as the national governments 
exerted a significant amount of centralised control over the expansion of 
education, thus reducing inward competition. Secondly, centrally controlled 
programmes sought to ensure that there existed a standardisation of educational 
provision across the newly created institutions, which inevitably slowed the 
progress of expansion; the lack of centralised control in the US meant that the 
level of education being provided was often less of a concern than the fact that it 
was being provided, which in turn ensured speedy progress.165 The US’s lack of 
central intervention also contributed to lower educational standards however, as 
it was not possible to pursue a standardisation of educational provision across the 
new and expanded schools.166 
The United States’ pursuit of universal access to secondary-level education 
provision enabled the Federal government to focus on higher education whilst 
Europe focused on post-elementary education. The education provision 
contained within FDR’s Serviceman’s Re-adjustment Act (GI Bill) couldn’t have 
happened had the High School Movement not been as successful beforehand.167 
As it was, upon entry to the Second World War in 1941, some of the most 
successful US States could boast secondary enrolment rates of over 80%, which 
placed the returning servicemen in an ideal position to take advantage of an 
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expansion in higher education provision for graduating high school seniors which 
built on the success of the GI Bill. This difference meant that the US had the 
option to train its citizens to a higher standard of education on a grander scale 
earlier than the UK, and much of the rest of Europe. This in turn meant that the 
US Federal government was in a better position to begin utilising its students to 
help in the Cold War effort, as university graduates were capable of supporting 
the nation in ways that secondary school graduates were not ready to. The 
expansion of higher education also contributed to the US economy, which further 
supported the USA’s post war status as a superpower - a world leader -which was 
also vital to its Cold War effort.  
Truman and the Federal government understood that the US education 
system was vital both to the nation’s military success in the Cold War through 
rigorous training in nationally useful subjects, and to America’s continuing 
commitment to democracy and democratic ideals both through the shaping of 
students’ ideals, and because the system itself could embody these ideals by 
improving access to it for students from non-traditional backgrounds. Both 
domestically and militarily, these factors – the increased importance of a highly 
educated citizenry to national security created by the deployment of the atomic 
bomb; Truman’s commitment to education and access to education; and his 
participation in the post war trend for expanded governmental roles within 
domestic society - converged after Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s death in April 
1945 to create optimal ‘goldilocks’ conditions for the Executive branch to attempt 
to expand the Federal government’s influence over the organisation and 
usefulness of the US education system. 
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Conclusion 
From the earliest days of the Republic, the Federal government has used the 
education system to avert or assuage national emergencies, and has used national 
emergencies to direct the education system to serve its own ends. This chapter 
has demonstrated both the patterns that have defined Federal intervention into 
the US education system throughout American History, and the issues which 
have surrounded this involvement. The Federal government have sought to 
utilise the education system in order to ensure the continuation of a republican 
form of government, for example through the establishment of West Point; it has 
used ‘necessary and proper’ means to interfere in the day-to-day administration 
of the education system in order to ensure that it complies with the law, as was 
the case with African American education after the Civil War; it has appropriated 
the resources of the US education system in order to provide for the common 
defense of the USA, both directly and indirectly, such as the Morrill Land Grant 
Acts and the Smith Hughes Act; it has also been prepared to utilise the education 
system as an overflow for the job market in times of severe, or potentially severe 
national unemployment, such as during the Great Depression and towards the 
end of the Second World War.   
Each time the Federal government appropriated the services of the 
education system during a national emergency, it was protected by its 
constitutional right to protect the nation and its republican system of 
government, and was able to demonstrate that the education system played a vital 
role in this. The impetus for Federal involvement has always been driven by the 
need to utilise the education system to improve or protect the nation. As a result 
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students have often been viewed as resources to be used to achieve a greater goal, 
not as individuals who have goals of their own. Whenever the Federal government 
has been involved in education, students have rarely enjoyed as much autonomy 
to choose which subjects to study, where to study them, and in some instances 
what career to enter into after university or which political party to affiliate 
themselves with. Federal intervention in the education system has always 
occurred in order to achieve one goal: to somehow benefit the nation as a whole. 
 Whenever the Federal government encountered opposition to their 
intervention, they fought it, sometime lost, and still continued unabated in their 
mission to reroute the education system to serve the nation. When the founding 
fathers were denied their request to establish a national university, Thomas 
Jefferson instead established West Point, a national military school that was 
headed by an academic not a soldier, required students to learn academic subjects 
alongside military strategy, and insisted upon a certain political outlook from its 
students. Justin Morrill encountered opposition to his Bill from Southerners who 
feared that segregated schools would be ‘discriminated’ against when funds were 
distributed, but quickly passed the bill when the Southern opposition were not in 
Congress. 
 Each success further broke down the opposition’s arguments against 
Federal involvement. When the right factors converged in the late 1940s – a shift 
in the relationship between education and national security, the ascension of 
Harry S. Truman to the Presidency and a global re-evaluation of the relationship 
of central government to the welfare of the people – the government, and in 
particular the Executive branch, was able to create a serious bid for Federal 
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intervention in to education, and it was able to do so without widespread notice 
or protest. These factors, coupled with the long-term nature of the Cold War, led 
to a fundamental shift in the position of the Federal government in the education 
system. Whereas every other national emergency had prompted Federal 
involvement in the education system ‘for the duration’, the Cold War continued 
for longer than a generation. By the time the crisis had passed, Federal 
involvement had become a feature of the education system, and was normalised 
for a generation of voters. As will be explored later in this thesis, education 
became a central part of election campaigns and grew to such a state of normalcy 
that even the Executive branch could not prevent Federal involvement when it 
wanted to. Throughout American history, opposition to Federal intervention in 
the education system has enjoyed little success in thwarting the Federal 
government. From the earliest days of the Republic, the Federal government has 
utilised whatever means were available to it – constitutional right, national need, 
and a few dirty tricks – to ensure that when the nation has needed to utilise the 
education system, the education system has been available to be used.  
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EDUCATION 
FOR NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
The Federal Government, the Cold 
War and the US Education System 
 
“It has always been my opinion that an improved approach to the education of 
the rising generation is necessary if we expect to continue as leaders of the free 
world” – Harry S. Truman.168 
 
  
95 
 
Opposition to Federal control over the education system has long existed in the 
USA, and this opposition has feared and fought against a centrally run 
education system for centuries. The aim has always been to ensure the freedom 
of the American education system by protecting it from fluctuations in the wants 
and needs of the political system. Historian Paula S. Fass recognised in Outside 
In: Minorities and the Transformation of American Education (1989) that “the 
American system of education was great because it was democratic, and it was 
democratic because it was responsive to local needs and free of central control 
and direction”.169 Fass demonstrates that in order to ensure a democratic 
education system, the needs of the nation at large, as identified by the US 
Federal government, must not be a factor in its development and structure. This 
in turn prevents the subjugation of the student body to the vacillations of 
governmental whims.  
In order for the education system to remain a democratic institution, it is 
protected from interference by the US Federal government. During the early 
years of the Cold War, however, the Executive branch of the US Federal 
government made the decision to intervene within the US education system in 
order to protect and defend democracy, both within the education system and 
without it. As discussed in Chapter One, the important role which education was 
to play in the burgeoning Cold War became clear shortly after the passage of the 
GI Bill; it did not represent the beginning of the US Federal government’s post 
war fascination with education, but it was not far ahead, and served to remind the 
Federal government of the possibilities which lay within its power. The world’s 
entry into the atomic age alongside President Truman’s personal commitment to 
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education served to galvanise Executive interest in the US education system. The 
threat posed by the Soviet Union and the spread of Communism across Europe 
convinced the Executive branch that special measures must be taken in order to 
protect the US system of democratic government.  
Historian Andrew Hartman has demonstrated that panic over the efficacy 
of a nation’s education system is a common side effect of a nation’s uncertainty 
over its future.170 Whilst the nation was fiscally comfortable, the powerful 
position which the USA found itself in after the Second World War was far from 
assured. Moreover, the threat of a third world war – this time a nuclear war – 
hung over the heads of every American during this period. Furthering the cause 
of ‘democracy’ was seen as the cure for both of these problems. Commitment to 
democracy protected the United States against the evils of a communist system; 
the loss of this commitment, however, contained untold peril. To cope with this 
anxiety, Hartman has elucidated, “national citizens must collectively imagine a 
national future”.171 Hartman expanded his theory by positing that “perhaps the 
most important symbolic guarantee of a nation’s future is its children”.172 
Therefore, in order to reduce the sense of anxiety caused by an uncertain future, 
a more solidly grounded future must be created through the nation’s youths, and 
the easiest method through which the Federal government could ensure this was 
by increasing its level of control over the education system. 
Steady in the belief that strengthening democratic education in US schools 
was the most positive direction in which the US education could move, the 
Executive branch attempted to centralise the organisation of several pertinent 
features of the education system during the early years of the Cold War. It was 
not the Federal government’s intention to formally seize control of the education 
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system during this period, merely to subtly influence the matters which it 
perceived to be of direct importance to national security. No changes were ever 
forcibly imposed on the education system, nor were there any overt instances of 
formal Federal control over education. The story, however, lies in the extent to 
which US Federal government, and in particular the Executive branch, attempted 
to influence the content and direction of US education, its unorthodox and 
innovative utilisation of the powers available to it to do so, and how much these 
methods enabled it to increase its influence over the workings of the education 
system. These factors alone are worthy of note.  
This chapter will detail the way in which the Executive branch of the 
Federal government utilised the powers available to it during the Truman 
Administration to make a concerted attempt to expand Federal influence over the 
education system. Truman’s personal commitment to education and his belief in 
an expanded Federal government combined with national fears over the rise of 
communism to create a window of opportunity for change. The establishment of 
the President’s Commission on Higher Education (Truman Commission) 
represented an intentional attempt to use a power from one area of the Executive 
branch to overcome a lack of power in another. First, a discussion of the nature 
of presidential commissions will be presented in order to demonstrate that 
expansion of power is a recognised and longstanding utilisation of the Executive 
power to create presidential commissions. Secondly this chapter will establish 
that despite this fact, Truman’s utilisation of this power in the matter of education 
represented a significant departure from the previous presidential 
administrations. As is explored in Chapter One of this thesis, several events 
combined at the end of the Second World War to place education policy in a far 
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more prominent position within the Executive branch’s agenda than it 
traditionally occupied; as such, Truman’s motives for establishing the 
Commission will also be examined. 
This chapter will then demonstrate the methods which the Executive 
branch of the Truman Administration employed during the establishment of the 
Commission, including a carefully worded letter of appointment, and scrutiny 
over the selection of the Commission’s members, in order to give the Commission 
the best possible chance of finding in favour of the Executive branch’s policy 
agenda. Subsequently, the Commission’s report will be examined in order to 
demonstrate the success of the Executive’s agenda in establishing the Truman 
Commission, and how it worked both within and without the traditional 
framework of a presidential commission in order to advocate for an expanded 
Federal role in the US education system. In addition, scrutiny of another, non-
federal education commission which was in session during the same period as the 
Truman Commission will be presented in order to demonstrate the significance 
and impact of the Federal government’s influence over the Truman Commission.  
Finally, this chapter will explore the short and long term impact of the 
Truman Commission on the US education system. The impact which it had upon 
Congress, upon the Executive branch and its subsequent forays into education 
policy and upon the activities of the education division of the Executive branch – 
the United States Office of Education (USOE) – will all be explored. Federally 
sponsored programmes such as the US Commissioner of Education’s ‘Zeal for 
American Democracy’ programme will be explored; through this, the influence of 
the Executive branch’s agenda and success in implementing it is made clear. A 
discussion of the opposition to the Federal encroachment into the traditionally 
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State- or independently-controlled sphere of American education will also be 
presented in order to demonstrate both the issues raised in objection to the work 
of the Executive branch and the Truman Commission, and how ineffectual these 
objections were in denting the Federal government’s will and ability to gain 
influence over the education system in the early years of the Cold War.  
  
The Structure and Purpose of Presidential Commissions 
The ‘presidential commission’, in one form or another, is a power that has been 
utilised by the Executive Branch since its inception, and yet, as historian Amy B. 
Zegart has recognised, “surprisingly little has been written” about them.173 Early 
commentator Carl Marcy has suggested that this is because their very nature 
makes the presidential commission particularly difficult to study. They have 
many and varied purposes and focuses, their often low budgets limit their 
secretarial capacity and they usually have an informal structure, which Marcy 
blames for “much of the difficulty in studying and evaluating them”.174 The 
foremost commentator on presidential commissions, Thomas R. Wolanin, has 
defined a presidential commission as “(1) a corporate group created by a public 
Act, (2) which is advisory to the President, (3) all members of which are appointed 
directly by the President, (4) which is ad hoc, (5) at least one member of which is 
public [i.e. not an employee of the Executive branch of the Federal government] 
and (6) whose report is public”.175 Presidential commissions are often popularly 
assumed to be an obfuscation of a problem; a way for a president to appear to be 
addressing a problem without ever having to actually address it. 176 Those who 
have written extensively on this subject, however, disagree.  
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Carl Marcy, writing in 1945, claimed that “the value in the use of 
commissions, committees, boards and similarly designated multi-partite bodies 
as instruments of government has long been recognised… there can be little doubt 
that the President needs Commissions to help him… when the President of the 
United States determines policy, recommends policy or administers policy, he 
must have facts and expert advice”.177 Thomas Wolanin noted 30 years later, in 
1975, that “The common view of journalistic and academic commentators on 
presidential advisory commissions is that the primary purpose of the President 
in creating them is to evade issues and avoid taking action… the evidence 
indicates, quite to the contrary, that commissions are created to be instruments 
of action, reform and change, not of obfuscation and standpatism”.178 Amy B. 
Zegart, a more recent commentator, also discussed the assumption in 2004. She 
accepted that commissions intended to “defuse, defect or delay Presidential 
action on some controversial domestic issue without producing much in the way 
of substantive policy change” have existed3 and these types of commissions have 
received “the bulk of attention in the popular and scholarly literature”.179 Zegart 
continues to state, however, that this type “constitutes a surprisingly small share 
of the commissions actually used by Presidents”.180 
The presidential commission is in fact a widely accepted method through 
which the power of the Executive branch can be extended beyond the traditional 
remit bestowed upon the office of the Presidency. Whilst Wolanin formally 
identifies the purpose of a commission as follows: “the stated goal for every 
Presidential Commission is to be a policy analyst. They are instructed to make a 
                                                          
3 Zegart cites the Warren Commission on Kennedy’s Assassination, the Kerner Commission on 
the 1967 race riots and the Lockhart Commission on Obscenity and Pornography. 
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study assessing a specific problem, to evaluate current efforts to solve it, and to 
recommend whatever actions they deem appropriate to more successfully solve 
the problem”, he also quotes the insider perspective of an aide to President 
Lyndon B. Johnson. This anonymous aide shared his opinion during an interview 
with Wolanin, and established the benefit of a presidential commission to the 
Executive branch thusly: presidential commissions, he claimed, are “a way to get 
the establishment to bless something… to minimize the accusation that the decks 
are stacked” and to “dignify and give persuasive expression to the advocacy of 
ideas or to possible changes”.181;182  
As identified by Johnson’s aide, the true purpose of a presidential 
commission is often to enable legislation to pass Congress more easily, to 
popularise a certain viewpoint or policy change, and to add legitimacy to an 
Executive’s intentions by creating external and expert endorsement of his ideas. 
A member of the National Commission on Technology, Automation and 
Economic Progress stated in an interview with Wolanin that “the role of the 
commission is to show a consensus where one was not apparent before”.183 This 
demonstrates well the purpose of presidential commissions, and their benefit to 
the Executive branch. Both this quote and the sentiments from Johnson’s aide 
together suggest one thing however: that the ‘consensus’ in question has usually 
already been decided upon by the White House. One of President Truman’s aides 
has directly supported this theory by remarking to Wolanin in a private interview 
that, during the Truman Administration at least, commissions were most often 
used “to build a case for something that they were already convinced on”.184 
Wolanin also suggests that the very act of establishing a commission can 
act as an endorsement of, or at least an advertisement for, the President’s ideas. 
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Wolanin suggests that this is because “presidential commissions are highly 
visible” due to “the eminence and prestige of their members, and the fact that 
they represent an extraordinary action by the President giving them a 
Presidential mandate… The daily actions of the President are still front page 
news”.185 In creating a presidential commission, a president announces to the 
watching world that this line of enquiry is worthy of study long before the results 
are published, and the very act of establishment therefore can, in itself, begin to 
legitimise a concept or pursuit.  
Of course, during the process of investigation, it is possible that the 
commission members could find against the President’s position or statement of 
intent. Wolanin suggests that this original legitimacy, established through the 
very creation of the commission, in fact has the power to influence all subsequent 
actions of a commission. He highlights that  
“commissions are not expected to find that the problems they are dealing 
with are insignificant, or that no Federal action is necessary to solve them, 
or that Federal action cannot contribute significantly to their solution. The 
decision to have a commission implies a judgement that a problem is 
important, that some action is necessary, and that action by the Federal 
government will probably be appropriate and effective”.186  
In direct contrast to the popular claim that commissions are usually deliberately 
created in order to obfuscate a problem, it is significantly more likely that the 
majority of presidential commissions have instead been established to achieve 
what Wolanin refers to as ‘window dressing’. He defines ‘window dressing’ as the 
commission’s commitment to “sell or market a proposal to which the president is 
already committed”.187  
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Wolanin’s research revealed that this was at least a secondary purpose for 
almost all of the commissions during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
Johnson and Nixon eras. Commentator Daniel Bell has identified the presidential 
commission as “one more means of increased government manipulation of 
‘public opinion’”.188 The presidential commission enables the President and the 
White House to extend the scope of Executive power by utilising expert opinion 
to legitimise already-formed plans or to provide an alternative – and usually more 
appropriate – voice with which to popularise these ideas. Bell recognises, 
however, that this expanded use of Executive power is not all-encompassing, as, 
he states, “the government is not a monolith… but a hydra–headed body”, 
therefore if power is unduly increased in one branch, it still remains limited by 
the other two. 189 
Merton has argued that “from the beginning, presidents of the United States 
have… had their commissions. Washington began with a commission to look into 
the Whiskey Rebellion: ever since, presidents or Congress have instituted one or 
another kind of commission, at first sporadically and then, in this century, at a 
greatly quickened pace”.190 Wolanin argues, however, that Washington’s Whiskey 
Commission bares little to no resemblance to the modern day commissions, and 
that instead these 20th-Century commissions are “basically a product of the 
dramatic enlargement of the Federal government in the 20th Century, and the 
correspondingly larger role routinely played by Presidents, even in the absence of 
crises”.191 The first half of the 20th Century saw a dramatic increase in the use of 
presidential commissions by the Executive branch. The fifteen years prior to 
President Truman’s creation of the President’s Commission on Higher Education 
saw a “six fold increase… from the first 30 years of the century”.192 Marcy 
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identified in 1945 that “the last decade…has found Congress increasingly relying 
on investigations and reports prepared by presidential commissions”. 193 The 
climate in which the Truman Commission was established in 1946 was certainly 
a promising one, even if this political climate had shifted dramatically by the time 
the Commission’s report, Higher Education for American Democracy was 
published in 1947.  
 
The Purpose and Structure of the President’s Commission on Higher 
Education  
Similarly to earlier presidential commissions, the President’s Commission on 
Higher Education was created in large part in order to lend legitimacy to the 
Executive branch’s already-established plans for the US education system. The 
specific establishment of the Truman Commission was recommended by John W. 
Snyder, head of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR) in 
order to investigate how “higher education can be made to contribute most 
effectively to the economic and political welfare of this country”. He stated that 
“no matter is more important to a democratic government than the adequate 
education of its youth”.194 Snyder’s statements demonstrate clearly that he 
favours a stronger link between the Federal government and the education 
system in the future. The Truman Commission was established in order to 
investigate a specific agenda – they were tasked with discovering the ways in 
which higher education could contribute to the welfare of the nation, not whether 
it should. The latter is arguably the more important debate, but that debate was 
never bestowed upon the Truman Commission; that decision had been made 
before the members were brought together. The remit was laid out before the 
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Commission by President Truman, and, in line with earlier commissions, it was 
not expected to find against it.  
As Wolanin has identified, presidential commissions provide a voice for 
ideas which would be dismissed if they emanated from the White House, and this 
was the purpose of the Truman Commission.195 The Executive Branch had a 
clearly established agenda months before the Commission was created, as 
President Truman had already made attempts to involve the Federal government 
in the education system. On 21st January 1946, President Truman asked Congress 
for Federal grants to State educational systems, but was rejected.196 He also stated 
in his memoirs that Federal aid to education was “essential to the welfare of the 
country”.197 
The attempt to pass a Federal aid bill through Congress demonstrates 
clearly that President Truman intended for the Federal government to have an 
expanded role in the US education system, but also that he would require either 
expanded powers to pass his recommendations without Congress – which was 
unlikely – or further research and a different approach in order to convince 
Congress to follow his plan. As Wolanin has identified, “congressional consent is 
essential for most major presidential initiatives and is often not easily 
forthcoming… White House counterarguments to the fears and objections voiced 
in Congress are naturally suspected of being less than candid. It is hoped that a 
commission saying much the same thing as the White House will solve the 
credibility problem”.198 Truman had been unsuccessful in raising this issue, and 
the Tenth Amendment prevented him from directly forcing the issue further by 
himself. In establishing a commission made up almost exclusively of educators, 
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he created a voice for his recommendations which brought with it authority and 
some much needed distance from the Executive branch. 
The Executive branch utilised the powers available to it in order to reach 
the ends which could not be achieved directly; the President’s Commission on 
Higher Education lent legitimacy and support to the White House’s plans. This 
use of this power is not in itself illegal or unconstitutional, but when applied to 
the education system, it certainly falls into a grey area. As Marcy has recognised, 
“in domestic affairs, the President’s power to create commissions to assist him in 
the faithful execution of the law appears in theory at least to be unlimited”, but 
also had not previously been used with regards to influencing American 
education; the Truman Commission was the first to do so.199 Truman did not go 
against the Tenth Amendment, but he did use the powers available to him in order 
to circumvent the Tenth Amendment. As the work of the Commission later served 
to normalise the presence of the Federal government in the education system, 
Truman’s bold move is particularly significant.4  
President Truman had little regard for the ‘small government’ advocated 
by the Tenth Amendment, and education was not the only area which Truman 
believed would benefit if the Federal government was able to play a larger role. 
When discussing the idea of federalised medical care, Truman remarked that  
“I have never been able to understand all the fuss some people make about 
government wanting to do something to improve and protect the health of 
the people. I usually find those who are the loudest in protesting against 
                                                          
4 Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nixon all subsequently established Commissions on education. The 
long-term impact of the Truman Commission is discussed in more detail later in the chapter and 
in the Conclusion to this thesis. 
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medical help by the Federal government are those who do not need help. 
But the fact is that a large proportion of our population cannot afford to 
pay for proper medical and hospital care”. 200 
When considering the problem of State and local jurisdiction over this matter, 
Truman developed his point even further and stated that “the answer is simple. 
Too many local communities have not met this responsibility and cannot meet it 
without help”.201 He did not view an expanded governmental role as an 
encroachment, but rather as a means of organised support, both for citizens in 
need, and for struggling local and State governments.  
The later creation of a Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
suggests that health and education were viewed by Truman as being of one ilk, 
possibly as both were necessary for the welfare of the nation.  His approach 
mirrored that of the Labour government in power in the UK; the creation of the 
Welfare State in Britain created a new role for the government in numerous areas 
of domestic policy including education, medical care, elderly care and social 
security, the very thing that Truman strove to organise. Among other issues, 
Truman’s strained relations with Congress alongside the growing attention he 
was required to pay to foreign policy issues due to the rising Cold War placed the 
US development of social welfare in a vastly different and far less successful 
position to that of the UK.  
Although the creation of the Department was first suggested by Truman, 
it was not actually created until the Eisenhower Administration. In his 
recommendation, however, Truman suggested that “the government’s programs 
for health, education and security are of such great importance to our democracy 
that we should now establish an Executive department for their administration”. 
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202 Truman noted that such a department was necessary because “we must make 
possible greater equality of opportunity to all our citizens for an education. Only 
by doing so can we insure that our citizens will be capable of understanding and 
sharing the responsibilities of democracy”.2035 Although he never explicitly stated 
his views on the importance of the Tenth Amendment where education was 
concerned, his attempts to establish Federal financing for education – a move 
outside of the remit of the Amendment – and his views on the importance of 
Federal involvement in medical care, jointly suggest that he viewed it with little 
regard.  
Increased Federal involvement in traditionally privatised- or State-
matters was not the only item on the President’s list when he established the 
Truman Commission. As was common for presidential commissions, the 
President gave the Commission members several areas of enquiry to investigate, 
and all were clearly weighted to the President’s agenda. In a letter to commission 
President George F. Zook, Truman explained that  
“among the more specific questions with which I hope the Committee will 
concern itself are: ways and means of expanding educational opportunities 
for all able young people; the adequacy of curricula, especially in the fields 
of international affairs and social understanding; the desirability of 
establishing a series of intermediate technical institutes; the financial 
structure of higher education with particular reference to the requirements 
for the rapid expansion of physical facilities”.204   
                                                          
5 Louis W. Koenig added in The Truman Administration: Its Principles and Practice that “the 
Congress declined to approve it, and it was not until the administration of President Eisenhower 
that a Department of Health, Education and Welfare was established”.  
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This quote both demonstrates Truman and the White House’s intentions for the 
Committee, and corroborates the idea that expanding or extending the GI Bill was 
not Truman’s primary concern. He references it, but it is not the focus of the 
letter. Instead he called for a “re-examination of our system of higher education 
in terms of its objectives and in light of the social role it has to play”. This clearly 
demonstrates firstly that the Executive branch wanted to see expanded 
opportunity6 and secondly that the Executive clearly believed that academia both 
had a social role to play, and that it was time they began playing it. In short, the 
President’s Commission on Higher Education was charged with proving that a 
symbiotic relationship between the Federal government and the US education 
system was beneficial to both parties and should be pursued with haste.   
Interestingly a draft version of the letter to Zook included far more 
discussion of the ‘international situation’ and the importance of ‘protecting the 
national security’ and the ‘preservation of democracy’. Truman states that “few 
matters more closely affect our national welfare or our national security” than 
education and that  
“our democracy has been strong in large part because of the excellence of 
our schools and colleges and because of the relatively high educational 
level of our people… it will continue to be strong only as that level is raised 
and as our schools and colleges are strengthened. In the atomic age, 
ignorance or lack of social understanding can spell disaster for the entire 
world”.205  
                                                          
6 This is not the same as more university places as was provided for in the GI Bill. It is discussed 
specifically with reference to groups who were under-represented in higher education, namely 
African Americans, Jewish students and low income students – the only viable solution for 
which was a Federal push towards integration and Federal grants for scholarship. 
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Such heavy handed language was not included in the final letter, but it once again 
betrays some of the Executive branch’s primary motivations for establishing the 
committee. 
Carl Marcy has identified that the primary purpose of ‘opinion guiding’ 
commissions such as the President’s Commission on Higher Education is to “lay 
the groundwork in public discussion, [and] to prepare the way for legislation 
which may later follow”, and the report of the Truman Commission did just 
this.206 The act of establishing the Commission to explore these ideas 
immediately invested both the initial concept and the subsequent 
recommendations with more legitimacy than they would have had, had they 
emanated from the Executive branch directly. As Wolanin states, “commissions 
have members and staff who are said to be competent and qualified to examine 
the problem with which the commission is concerned” [emphasis in original].207 
The Truman Commission was made up of a highly capable membership, almost 
all of whom were directly involved in the highest levels of the education system 
(the majority were university or college presidents), and who could count among 
their number a former Commissioner of Education, a future Commissioner of 
Education and Eleanor Roosevelt. The members were qualified to explore the 
areas which the President had assigned to them and their recommendations 
carried both more weight and less baggage than if they had been made by the 
Executive branch.  
Further to this, the process of forcing the debate over the future of higher 
education through the establishment of the Commission allowed the many 
positive reasons in support of Federal intervention to actually be heard, rather 
than immediately dismissed simply because they came from the Executive 
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branch. As Daniel Bell has identified, “the distinctive virtue of the government 
commission arrangement is that there is a specific effort to involve the full range 
of elite or organised opinion in order to see if a real consensus can be achieved”.208 
Bell highlights the fact that the process of debate is often as important to public 
policy as the consensus reached or the direct implementation of policy: in the case 
of the Technology, Automation and Economic Progress Commission, he states, 
the “labor people” had to confront their ideological presuppositions about 
employment; in the case of the President’s Commission on Higher Education, the 
members were given the opportunity to publicly explore their own ideological and 
logistical standpoints concerning increased Federal involvement in the education 
system and its benefits to the nation.209 It was, therefore, the first government-
appointed body to formally suggest a number of controversial changes including 
Federal aid to education and the desegregation of the schools, and was able to 
provide a wide variety of well-thought-out reasons for doing so.  
 
Truman’s Selection of the Members 210 
The very concept of presidential commissions allows for the President to wield a 
large amount of control over the nature and shape of the debates which they 
pursue, and the conclusions to which they come. One way in which this is 
possible, which President Truman and the White House utilised in 1946, is 
through the Executive branch’s right to select the members of the commission. 
This power enables the President to stack the odds in his favour by purposefully 
choosing members who favour his own point of view. As Wolanin has identified, 
“for the requirement that all members must be ‘appointed by the President’… 
none of the members may be appointed by a subordinate of the President”; the 
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President commanded complete control over the selection process.211 In choosing 
the members for the Truman Commission, President Truman did rely largely on 
Francis Brown, George F. Zook and the American Council of Education (ACE) for 
recommendations. All three, however, also had longstanding reputations for 
advocating for greater Federal involvement in and financing for the US education 
system.212  
Those who supported Truman in his selection of the members also 
supported his agenda for the Commission, and this was reflected in the final 
decisions over membership. J. Donald Kingsley, the head of the OWMR 
Manpower Division, also played a significant role in selecting the members of the 
Commission. As Ethan Schrum has noted, Kingsley “advocated Federal support 
of higher education”, therefore it is reasonable to assume that his choice of 
participants reflected this viewpoint.213 Kingsley’s connection to the manpower 
debate also means that he would have been aware of the employment issues in 
post war America; there was a desperate need for trained personnel in some 
areas, alongside a glut of trained personnel in others. It is, therefore, also 
reasonable to assume that he understood the benefit to the USA if the Truman 
Commission advocated for the education system to become more connected to 
the needs of the nation as a whole.214  
None of the members of the Commission were outspoken opponents of 
Federal involvement in the US education system, but several members were 
outspoken advocates of it. The commission’s secretary, Francis Brown, was 
arguably the most controversial appointment as he had previously personally 
authored a plan to “create a Federal Commission with unprecedented power over 
higher education institutions”. 215 Ralph McDonald even wrote to the President 
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personally on behalf of the National Education Association (NEA) to complain 
that “Brown’s consistent sponsorship of measures to circumvent and override 
State education authorities and State constitutional provisions on education 
make his appointment to the key post in the commission the key cause of great 
alarm”.216 Brown was undoubtedly in full support of increased Federal 
involvement in the education system, and there is no way President Truman could 
have been unaware of this fact. Regardless of his obvious bias, Truman both 
appointed him to be the Secretary for the Commission, and enlisted his support 
in finding other members.  
 McDonald continued his criticism of Truman’s selection by opposing the 
investiture of George F. Zook as President of the Commission. 217 Zook had been 
a firm advocate of Federal involvement in education for over a decade. In 1934 he 
wrote an article entitled “Federal Aid to Education” which was published in 
School and Society. Similarly to Brown, in this article he advocated for a Federal 
agency which could allocate Federal funds to the education system. His 
resignation from the post of Commissioner of Education in 1934 came due to 
Roosevelt’s refusal to include a programme of Federal aid for education in the 
New Deal, and just one year prior to his appointment as President of the 
Commission, he had delivered a speech advocating greater Federal involvement 
in the education system at Harvard University.218 
In addition to Brown and Zook, Truman appointed several more members 
who were outspoken in their support of Federal involvement in education. These 
included Agnes Meyer, education activist and wife of Eugene Meyer, the owner of 
the Washington Post, who worked in support of Federal aid to education and the 
establishment of a Department of Health, Education and Welfare throughout her 
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life. Lyndon Johnson later cited Meyer as having had the greatest influence over 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965) and his education policies 
in general.219 Among others Frederick G. Hochwalt was also a very prominent 
advocate of Federal aid, and spearheaded the Catholic Church’s support of 
Federal aid to non-public schools in the USA from 1945 until the passage of the 
ESEA.220  
Crucially, however, the Commission could still be argued to have been 
‘representative’, as presidential commissions were expected to be. Truman 
appointed men, women, African Americans, Northerners, Southerners and 
representatives from Protestant, Catholic and Jewish institutions. This move was 
intentional, as was highlighted in a memo from Steelman to Kingsley in 1946. 
Steelman stated that “those appointed to the Commission were chosen to 
represent adequately 1) geographical 2) religious 3) character of institution 
(whether university or college; public or private; land-grant or integrated) and 4) 
major currents in educational thinking and leadership”.221  
 
The Commission’s Recommendations 
The members of the Truman Commission met seven times between their 
appointment and the publication of the first volume of Higher Education for 
American Democracy. At the first meeting, they formed five sub-committees 
which each focused on one aspect of the final report, and these sub-committee 
meetings took place alongside the regular Commission meetings. The topics of 
each sub-committee were as follows: 1) the responsibilities of higher education; 
2) ways and means of expanding educational opportunity; 3) the expansion of 
higher education; 4) financing higher education and 5) staffing higher 
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education.222 This chapter will be primarily concerned with the outcome of the 
first two subcommittees, which was subsequently translated into the first two 
volumes of Higher Education for American Democracy.  
Through its recommendations the Truman Commission created “a 
national rhetoric on higher education” which was a “well-crafted and deliberate 
attempt to persuade national, State and institutional policymakers about the 
purpose and needs of higher education”.223 The first volume of the report of the 
Truman Commission, Higher Education for American Democracy, opens with 
the words “The President’s Commission on Higher Education has been charged 
with the task of defining the responsibilities of colleges and universities in 
American democracy and in international affairs”.224 This statement outlined the 
direction that the rest of the report would take – an examination of the ways in 
which the US education system could support the preservation and protection of 
American democracy by any means, and a consideration of the ways in which this 
would be affected by international affairs.  
The Commission’s fear over the nation’s future is clear from the beginning 
of the report. On page two the threat caused by the ‘atomic age’ is highlighted; the 
Commission stated that “the coming of the atomic age, with its ambivalent 
promise of tremendous good or tremendous evil for mankind, has intensified the 
uncertainties of the future”. 225 The Commission continued “it has underscored 
the need for education and research for the self-protection of our democracy”.226 
The ‘uncertain future’ is immediately linked to two maxims which permeate the 
report as a whole: the need for the preservation of democracy and the idea of the 
education system as its saviour. By page 6, this ambivalent promise had escalated, 
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and the Commission stated that “atomic scientists are doing their upmost to make 
us realize how easily and quickly a world catastrophe may come”.227 
These themes are not always the main focus of the report. Other areas 
which President Truman charged the Commission with exploring, such as 
expanded opportunity or the need for technical education were made the focus, 
but the need for increased Federal involvement and a concern for the nation’s 
security act as undercurrents to the report, and resurface time and time again 
both in their own right and as further persuasion for the main focuses of the 
volumes. They are used to underscore both the vital need for change and the 
urgency with which the Commission perceived the need for such change. As 
Clark, Leslie and O’Brien have identified, the Commission demonstrated that 
“education would be instrumental in overcoming totalitarian governments 
abroad and prejudices within the nation, thereby re-enforcing the focus on access 
and equity”.228 These themes created a stronger argument and one which was 
harder to undermine. It shifted the debate from the circumvention of one aspect 
of the Constitution to the total destruction of democracy in the West.  
 
A ‘Societal Role’ for Education 
The members of the Truman Commission established early on in their report that 
they believed that the education system had a responsibility to the nation. They 
stated that  
“all too often the benefits of education have been sought and used for 
personal and private profit, to the neglect of public and social service. Yet 
individual freedom entails communal responsibility. The democratic way 
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of life can endure only as private careers and social obligations are made 
to mesh, as personal ambition is reconciled with public responsibility”.229  
The Commission linked the continuation of the American way of life with a 
fundamental alteration in the make-up and administration of the education 
system. It established the education system as the last bulwark between the USA 
and chaos, and placed the dizzying task of saving it on the shoulders of educators 
and students across the USA. The Commission members did not mince their 
words when discussing the extent to which education was able to support and 
save post war America, and stated that “effective democratic education will deal 
directly with current problems”. 230   
The Commission made it clear that it no longer believed that it was viable 
for the US education system to continue on without adapting to the pressures of 
the atomic age. The new ‘societal role’ was not to be optional: “American colleges 
and universities” the members claimed “face the need both for improving the 
performance of their traditional tasks and for assuming the new tasks created for 
them by the new internal conditions and external relations”.231 This was partly 
justified as the Commission laid the blame for the creation of the atomic age 
squarely on the shoulders of the education system as well. The Commission 
highlighted the fact that this was one of the reasons why it was its responsibility 
to protect the USA from it: “the scientific knowledge and technical skills that have 
made atomic and bacteriological warfare possible are the products of education 
and research, and higher education must share proportionately in the task of 
forging social and political defenses against obliteration”.232 
The Commission identified the Soviet Union in particular as an important 
area of study in the modern world. The USSR was referred to as “one of the 
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world’s greatest powers” whose “policies and deeds [were] of supreme 
importance”, and yet, claimed the Commission, “the average American college 
graduate knows almost nothing about Russia”.233 The Commission highlighted 
the need to better understand the Soviet Union’s ways of thinking and living in 
the new atomic age. They stated that knowledge of Soviet life “must be given an 
important place in American education”.234 The members further blamed the 
colleges and universities for not providing this type of education by stating that it 
could not even be undertaken immediately as around 500 books on Soviet culture 
would be required by an institution’s library before they could properly offer such 
a course, but “these books cannot be bought. They do not exist; it will take a major 
publishing enterprise to make them available”.235 The Commission criticised the 
education system both for creating the problems inherent in the atomic age, and 
for not being prepared to fix them. In doing so, it subtly created a need for the 
Federal government to step in and support the education system in saving the 
nation, as it clearly could not be trusted to ‘go it alone’.  
 The report of the Truman Commission noted that “American colleges and 
universities must envision a much larger role for higher education in the national 
life. They can no longer consider themselves merely the instrument for producing 
an intellectual elite”.236 Yet it did not explain why US colleges and universities 
must make this shift for reasons outside of the framework of its benefit the nation. 
At no point did it demonstrate a particular benefit to the education system or the 
individuals within it – a way in which it would improve the education system – 
only that the new post war America required it to alter, and therefore alter it must. 
The Commission also acknowledged on the same page that defining the 
responsibilities of higher education to American democracy was “the task that 
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President Truman assigned to this Commission” – the members were not tasked 
with defining the responsibilities of higher education to academia.237 This section 
is even entitled ‘E Pluribus Unum’ – a clear statement that the Commission 
intended to recommend that the education system subvert the needs of the 
individual in favour of the needs of the nation.   
 
Curriculum Adjustments  
The Truman Commission made some far more specific recommendations in 
Higher Education for American Democracy. It recommended that US colleges 
and universities should adjust their curriculums to include the teaching of 
democracy as both a political standpoint and a way of life. US students’ training 
in the tenets of democracy, it suggested, needed to stretch far beyond the confines 
of a general education level citizenship or government course. It stated that “it 
should become instead a primary aim of all classroom teaching”.238  The nation’s 
need was now so great as to advocate the reorganisation of the curriculum with 
the teaching of democracy at its heart, regardless of the subjects being studied. 
The report confirmed that “nothing less than a complete reorientation of our 
thinking will suffice if mankind is to survive”.239  
The Commission also recommended that students be trained in 
democratic thinking. It stated that merely living under a democratic system of 
government and understanding that government was not enough. Students, it 
claimed, must be taught by the colleges and universities to think like democratic 
people. This, it demonstrated, was achieved by inculcating strength of character, 
firmness of conviction and integrity of purpose in the student. Students must be 
trained not only to understand democracy, but to want to take part in it, to uphold 
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it, and to protect it. Personal ambition, the report stated, must be made to mesh 
with public responsibility as isolationism could no longer play a part in any aspect 
of American life, “personal or national”.240 The members of the Truman 
Commission made it clear that accountability lay with the universities and 
colleges; the report declares that “it is the responsibility of higher education to 
devise programs and methods which will make clear the ethical values and the 
concept of human relations upon which our political system rests. Otherwise we 
are likely to cling to the letter of democracy and lose its spirit”.241  
In order to ensure the future security of the USA, the Truman Commission 
encouraged colleges and universities to refocus their curriculums in order to 
incorporate the wishes of outside forces. The report stated that “the first and most 
essential charge upon higher education is that at all its levels and in all its fields 
of specialization it shall be the carrier of democratic values, ideals and 
processes”.242  Once again espousing the need for higher education to commit 
itself to the needs of the many over the needs of the few, the report declared that 
“teaching and learning must be invested with public purpose”.243 To further 
underline the necessity for students to experience democracy at every turn, the 
report recommended that even administrative processes be reorganised to 
prevent “campus life [being] carried on in an authoritarian atmosphere”.244 Even 
the clerical tasks were deemed too important to the safety of the nation to be left 
for higher education to organise independently. 
 
Education for Peace 
A further curriculum adjustment recommended by Higher Education for 
American Democracy was the addition of programmes which ‘educated for 
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peace’. The Commission noted that “education for peace is the condition of our 
survival and it must have a high priority in all our programs of education”.245 The 
members took pains, however, to define peace as something other than simply 
the absence of armed conflict; peace, they argued, required a commitment to the 
spirit of co-operation, and international understanding and acceptance.246 Their 
words foreshadowed the burgeoning Cold War, as the report states specifically 
that peace was not “national strength and balance of power agreements”.247  
The solution, the members agreed, was to train the USA’s youth in the ways 
of peace, not war.  They quoted the constitution of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and declared that 
“wars begin in the minds of men, and it is in the minds of men that the defenses 
of peace must be constructed”.248 The Commission recommended that, in order 
to support the cause of peace, universities and colleges should greatly expand 
their provision within the social science disciplines, and especially within 
international relations. It acknowledged that in order to preserve and protect 
peace “men will have to invent and perfect institutional forms – such as the 
United Nations, UNESCO and the International Monetary Fund and yet others – 
through which this cooperation can effectively take place” but in order to make 
this a viable prospect, “these institutional arrangements will have to be built upon 
and buttressed by an understanding among people”.249  
In order to achieve this, the report suggests that the universities and 
colleges would have to accept responsibility for teaching “cultural heritage, value 
premises, political ideology, legitimate national interests, folkways and patterns 
of sentiment and feeling”.250 The Commission declared that 
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“this will involve providing expanded opportunity in colleges and 
universities for the study of all aspects of international affairs: the nature 
and development of other civilizations and cultures; nationalism in its 
relation to internationalism; the tensions leading to war, as well as war 
itself; the ways in which war has been used as an instrument of national 
policy and the attitudes which nations have had in each war with respect 
to the justice of that war as they saw it – in other words, an analytical study 
of war and its causes as these have developed in the past”.251 
Later in the report, the Commission continued by highlighting that “the task of 
the colleges here is to make the transition from a curriculum centred almost 
exclusively on the American-West European tradition to one that embodies the 
intellectual experience of the whole of mankind”.252  
The commission did not make it explicitly clear whether it expected each 
university and college to provide one required course which covered all of this 
information, or whether, in a bolder and more invasive move, it expected the 
ideas inherent in this description to permeate all instruction across the course 
catalogue. The latter hypothesis seems ambitious, but is in fact more likely as it is 
supported by President Truman’s statement, made upon the report’s publication 
in 1947, that “sweeping changes in curriculum are needed. Students must be 
given opportunities through all their courses and their campus life to understand 
and to practise citizenship in our democracy”.253 Furthermore, the President 
stated that “freedom is the function of the mind and the spirit. Responsibilities 
for the development of the qualities which make for free men cannot be left as at 
present to some few courses or a few departments in a college”.254 It is clear from 
this assertion that the Truman Commission, and by extension President Truman, 
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sought to influence the curriculums on offer at higher education institutions 
across the nation. In conjunction, they sought to protect and preserve democracy 
through the utilisation of the higher education system. The Commission’s vision 
for the future of the social sciences amounted to the overhaul of an entire 
discipline and the creation of wholly new courses for the study of education for 
peace in countless colleges and universities across the USA. 
 
Federal Involvement 
Having established higher education’s role in the atomic age, the report also 
established that working with the Federal government in order to meet this 
challenge was the right thing for the education system to do. American 
education’s most important function, the Commission’s members highlighted, 
was to act as an instrument of social transition in order to ensure the kind of 
civilisation which a democracy demands. It was also important, they noted, that 
all institutions undertook this task, as “there must be sufficient unity of purpose 
in this essential diversity of higher education to produce a community of values 
and ideals among educated men”.255 In other words, any college or university not 
heeding the advice of the Truman Commission was endangering everyone. At one 
point the Commission even referred to the role of education in a democratic 
society as that of a ‘servant’.256 That the Truman Commission viewed the 
education system as a tool to be used to achieve other ends, rather than as an end 
in its own right, is made obvious throughout the report. Members made it clear 
that colleges and universities should not exist separately from the Federal 
government, but instead were irrevocably tied to it, not as an equal, but as a 
subordinate to be directed.  
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It is made clear in Higher Education for American Democracy that the 
Federal government should have a role in the education system, despite the 
traditional separation between the two. The Commission explicitly underlined 
the Federal government’s right to intervene in the closing paragraph of the first 
volume, when it invoked the Federal government’s constitutional right to 
intercede. It stated that “the Federal government assumes responsibility for 
supplementing State and local efforts in military defense against the Nation’s 
enemies without; surely it may as justifiably assume responsibility for 
supplementing State and local efforts against educational deficiencies and 
inequalities that are democracy’s enemies within”.257  
The Commission answered the criticism that the Federal government 
traditionally held no authority in the education system by declaring that “to 
assume that all we need to do is to apply to present and future problems ‘eternal’ 
truths revealed in earlier ages is likely to stifle creative imagination and 
intellectual daring. Such an assumption may blind us to new problems and the 
possible need for new solutions”.258 Although no specific call is ever made for a 
constitutional amendment or some more formal alteration of the rules which 
governed the relationship between the Federal government and the US education 
system, the experts who made up the members of the Truman Commission made 
clear to the public that Federal involvement in the education system was both 
necessary and inevitable.  
 
Federal Funding 
The Commission acknowledged in its report that none of the changes which it 
recommended were easy or cheap, especially as the Commission recommended 
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that the education system should implement its recommendations both on a 
widespread scale and a short timeline. The recommendation for fixing it was 
Federal funding to education. The Commission stated that  
“the radical character of the adjustments required in higher education, 
their magnitude and the pressure of time, all mean that neither individual 
institutions, nor national educational organizations have the resources to 
effect the necessary changes without outside stimulation and financial 
assistance. These, the Commission believes, will have to come from the 
Federal government”.259 
This was the very thing which Truman had been attempting to achieve since the 
beginning of his presidency, and would continue to fight for throughout both his 
terms, albeit unsuccessfully.  
The Commission stated that the reasoning behind its recommendation 
was “partly a matter of the numbers to be educated and partly one of the kind of 
education that is to be provided”.260 One of the main drives for Federal funding 
to education is to enable the education system to provide for the expansion of 
opportunity and access to poorer and more disadvantaged students who, the 
Commission fervently argued, were equally as capable of performing at a tertiary 
level, but not equally as able to pay for education at a tertiary level.  The discussion 
of the ‘democratic’ need to offer greater equality of opportunity was often 
accompanied, however, by discussion of the “critical need” for such expansion 
due to the changing world situation. In this instance it argued that the unique 
demands and pressures created by the atomic age required that all able students 
were trained accordingly, as the nation needed all the trained manpower it could 
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muster.7  Once again this allowed the Commission to overcome the 
constitutionality of the argument, as, the members stated, “aid to higher 
education is a proper concern of the Federal government because the health and 
strength of higher education is a matter of serious national import”.261 
Frederick Hochwalt and Martin R. P. McGuire wrote a dissent to the fifth 
volume of the report, Financing Higher Education. In their dissent they noted 
that if public education were to be supported by Federal financial aid, as the 
report proposed, then they feared that the “government in the United States 
might easily use the nation’s public colleges and universities to promote its 
political purposes”. They continue that “exclusive control of education, more than 
any other factor, made the dictatorships of Germany, Italy and Japan acceptable 
to an ever increasing number of their populations”.262 Ethan Schrum has stated 
that “in Hochwalt and McGuire’s view, the Commission flirted with an 
undemocratic centralization reminiscent of what the United States had just spent 
so much blood and treasure to destroy in WWII”.263  
It is important to note however that Monsignor Hochwalt and Dr. McGuire 
(Graduate Dean of the Catholic University of America) were not, in fact, opposed 
to Federal financial support for the education system, but merely to Federal 
financial support specifically and exclusively for public education and not private 
(Catholic) education, and had the Commission’s recommendations been for 
Federal funding inclusive of private universities, it is unlikely that they would 
have dissented.264 The concerns they raised are telling, however, as they 
demonstrate that the Commission did fully understand the implications of the 
                                                          
7 Discussed further in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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recommendations which it was making. Despite this, the Commission brought 
the issue of Federal funding for education in order to equalise access for rich and 
poor students into the mainstream of academic discussion, and it was positively 
received. It remained a central concern until widespread Federal funding for 
education was achieved with the passage of the NDEA in 1957.265  
 
The Truman Commission and the Executive Branch 
The fact that the recommendations for Federal involvement, and the subsequent 
shift they caused in the acceptance of Federal involvement in education, were 
made by a federally supported committee, is not to be overlooked. The 
importance of the Federal origins, sponsorship and guidance of the Truman 
Commission to the recommendations it eventually produced is further illustrated 
when considered alongside Thomas Dewey’s Temporary Commission, which was 
in session in New York during the same period that the Truman Commission was 
in session in Washington DC., and which also discussed the improvement of 
higher education. John B. Clark, W. Bruce Leslie and Kenneth P. O’Brien’s 2010 
work SUNY at Sixty: The Promise of the State University of New York discussed 
the work of this commission in detail, but Clark, Leslie and O’Brien also briefly 
compared the work of the two simultaneous commissions. They discovered that, 
as both were discussing the same system at the same time, both commissions 
discussed broadly similar themes, such as the need to end discrimination, the 
need to expand access, especially with regard to the retuning veterans, the need 
for greater organisation and efficiency in higher education and the need for more 
students to study for medical and health-related professions (there was an acute 
shortage during this period). Most interestingly, however, Clark, Leslie and 
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O’Brien noted that the Truman Commission studied one further area which 
Dewey’s Temporary Commission did not – ‘general education’. The Truman 
Commission, they noted, focused far more on the benefit that the American 
higher education system could be to American society generally, and they 
attributed this focus to the brief they were given by President Truman when he 
established the Commission.266 
More importantly, however, they demonstrated that President Truman 
gave the Commission this mandate where Dewey did not precisely because the 
Truman Commission operated within the Federal sphere, and the Dewey 
Commission did not. The Federal commission had reason to consider the impact 
of American higher education on society and the ways in which it could be of 
benefit to America generally because these were the questions that were relevant 
and important to the Federal government, whereas the Dewey Commission, 
specifically concerned with the higher education system in New York State, was 
less concerned by the international situation and the wider implications of 
education on American society and safety.267 As a State commission, it could offer 
few relevant commentaries on how its work, confined as it was to one State, could 
have a wider impact on American foreign policy.  
Clark, Leslie and O’Brien note their surprise at what they term to be an 
‘ambiguous’ environment for education policy to be discussed in; they identified 
that there was “no clear role for the Federal government in education” and 
highlighted that the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution actively cautioned 
against Federal involvement within American education.268 The difference 
between the work of the two commissions – that one was concerned only with 
matters that were important to the education system whereas the other discussed 
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how the education system itself could be important to the nation – illustrated well 
the fears that opponents to Federal involvement in education often voiced: that 
the Federal government were more concerned with the freedom of the nation 
generally than the freedom of the education system specifically. 
The recommendations which the Truman Commission made were 
inherently tied to the wants and needs of the institution which established it – the 
Executive branch. The main concern of the Executive branch was the developing 
international situation. Even though President Truman established in his ‘Letter 
of Appointment’ to the Commission members that his main concern was “to 
assure that all qualified veterans desirous of continuing their education have the 
opportunity to do so”, this was not, in fact, his main focus.269 A staff member on 
the Commission heard Truman say privately that the “returning veterans were 
only a temporary problem and that he was more concerned with the long-term 
development of education”.270 Zook also clearly understood Truman’s position, 
as he wrote in a letter to Steelman in April 1947 that the Commission needed more 
time to adequately complete its task because “we are not thinking in terms of 
immediate and changing problems, but of long range issues that should have a 
continuing effect upon the development of higher education in the United 
States”.271 
Rather than considering the immediate pressures on the education 
system, or the direction in which the education system needed to take itself in the 
modern world – both legitimate concerns – the Truman Commission instead 
chose to focus on the direction which the Federal government needed it to take in 
light of the burgeoning international situation; specifically, the advent of the 
atomic age and growing international tensions. The first atomic bombs had been 
130 
 
detonated less than a year before the establishment of the Truman Commission, 
and both the destruction that the bomb could create and the fear that other 
nations would soon develop the same technology were cited as motivations for its 
recommendations in the Truman Commission’s report.272  
The oncoming Cold War also clearly influenced the recommendations that 
the Truman Commission chose to make in their report. Although the Cold War 
had not yet begun at the time the Commission was established, it had done so by 
the time the report was published, and it could be argued that portents of the 
looming conflict were clear even before the first meeting took place. Josef Stalin 
gave a speech in which he suggested World War III was inevitable on Feb 9th 1946, 
and Winston Churchill delivered his famous ‘Iron Curtain’ speech in March 1946. 
Although President Truman publicly disavowed this speech, he had previously 
approved it, and at the same time that he publicly condemned Churchill’s speech, 
he privately remarked to Averell Harriman that Soviet refusal to withdraw from 
Iran could mean war anyway.273 
It is clear from the Truman Commission’s report that it understood a 
conflict between totalitarianism and democracy was on the horizon, and this 
clearly influenced its recommendations as to the social role it believed education 
should play in the post war world. Early on in Volume I, it stated that “within 
recent decades democratic principles have been dangerously challenged by 
authoritarianism, and World War II did not by any means resolve the conflict. 
The issue of a free society versus totalitarianism is still very much with us”.274 The 
Commission also made recommendations that the universities and colleges 
should incorporate more teaching about Russia and Russian civilisation into their 
curriculums.275 
131 
 
In addition, the report is peppered with discussions of ‘democracy’, ‘the 
need for democracy’ and ‘the protection of democracy’, which makes clear that 
the members perceived it to be under threat. This threat appears to be so great 
that it does not tally with the fact that the USA was victorious in the Second World 
War less than a year prior to the establishment of the Commission. It is clear from 
the language used in Higher Education for American Democracy that the 
members of the Truman Commission already beheld another conflict on the 
horizon which posed a great threat to the American way of life. Philo A. 
Hutcheson, who has written extensively on the Truman Commission, has stated 
that “[the report] balanced the details [concerning what supporting the education 
system would cost the Federal government] against a precise statement of the 
national need for such support”. The report itself stated that the “outlays are both 
investments in and insurance for the democratic future of a free people”.276  
The atmosphere created both by the post war situation and the atomic age, 
and by the oncoming Cold War offered a legitimacy and an urgency which helped 
to circumvent the lack of constitutional right for the Federal government to 
intervene in the education system – firstly the very existence of the Presidential 
Commission and the recommendations it made, and secondly the specific 
recommendation it made for further Federal involvement within its report. That 
concerns over national security were enough to overcome arguments over the 
Constitution is further supported by the framework set out in Aaron Wildavsky’s 
‘Two Presidencies’ thesis.8 The serious fears in post war USA created by the 
                                                          
8 Wildavsky’s 1966 article claimed that Presidents had a 70% success rate in garnering 
congressional support for foreign policy objectives, compared with only a 40% success rate for 
domestic policy issues. 
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invention of the atomic bomb and the spread of Communism in Eastern Europe, 
and the role of the colleges and universities in protecting the USA from the 
‘atomic age’, enabled the Truman Commission to ally the education system with 
the military, thus situating their recommendations closer to ‘foreign policy’ 
objectives than ‘domestic policy’, the traditional domain of the education system.9 
This reclassification worked to legitimise the Executive branch’s claims to 
involvement in this State matter.  
The vernacular used consistently throughout the report suggested that 
education was directly relevant to foreign policy initiatives. When viewed through 
Wildavsky’s ‘Two Presidencies’ thesis, which argues that the Executive wields 
greater power over matters connected to foreign policy than domestic policy, this 
language gives the report a legitimacy and strength that it would not otherwise 
have had.277 This language also set the pattern for the discussion of education by 
the Executive branch for the next decade. Education was seen to be vitally 
connected to the security of the nation, and therefore was a matter of foreign 
policy and a concern of the Executive branch.278 Karen Toombs Parsons 
demonstrated in her article “Exploring the "Two Presidencies" Phenomenon: 
New Evidence from the Truman Administration” (1994) that Truman’s first term 
fits well into the ‘Two Presidencies’ thesis as he was significantly more successful 
in garnering bipartisan support for foreign policy legislation during this term 
than he was for domestic policy – the idea that partisan politics ‘stops at the 
water’s edge’ – therefore it is not unreasonable to suggest that the Executive 
branch of the Truman Administration also understood the benefit of 
                                                          
9 The growing comparisons between students and soldiers is discussed in more detail later in 
this chapter. 
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demonstrating the positive effect legislation could have on the nation’s foreign 
policy and ultimately, therefore, its security.279 Toombs however also 
demonstrated that this phenomenon waned after 1947, therefore the emphasis on 
the foreign policy implications which permeated the Report of the President’s 
Commission on Higher Education were little help to the Commission in 
influencing Congress after the report was published.280  
Although this language did not aid the Truman Commission in the formal 
acceptance of their recommendations in Congress, it certainly did aid them in the 
widespread acceptance of the concept of Federal involvement in society generally.  
After the publication of Higher Education for American Democracy, Hutcheson 
has recognised, the “national discussion about Federal financing of higher 
education experienced a shift from questions about the propriety of Federal 
assistance to how the Federal government should offer assistance” – it was no 
longer a question of ‘if’, but ‘in what form’. For example in 1949, Senator Warren 
Magnuson commissioned another study on Federal aid to education, and this 
study also found that Federal aid was vital to the education system in order to 
protect national security.281 Hutcheson also asserted that this widespread 
acceptance of Federal support for education by the end of the 1940s is surprising 
to him “in view of the arguments about the constitutionality of such assistance”, 
but has also recognised that, despite this, Federal involvement within the 
education system did indeed become accepted in the USA by the end of the 
decade.282 
This acceptance was not without question. After the publication of Higher 
Education for American Democracy, Federal involvement in the US education 
system was widely discussed, but this discussion regularly acknowledged the 
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national need for such involvement, and yet rarely acknowledged the 
constitutionality of the debate. John R. Steelman stated in 1948 that “in the next 
few years, I believe we must plan, in the light of the Report of the President’s 
Commission on Higher Education, the best means by which the Federal 
government can give scholarship aid to worthy young people who desire to 
continue their education… If America is to retain its freedom in a world of 
conflicting ideologies, we must take steps to assure every American youth the 
opportunity to receive the highest level of education by which he can profit. A 
Federal scholarship program is a necessary step in achieving this goal”.283 The 
combination of the Truman Commission’s report having ‘prepared the way’ as it 
was intended to, and the Cold War imperative with which they framed their 
arguments enabled a direct representative of the Executive branch (Steelman was 
Assistant to the President) to openly voice his support for such a controversial 
measure. 
Even where the constitutionality of the debate was acknowledged, it was 
often overcome by fears over the ‘national situation’. Alfred D. Simpson discussed 
Volume V of Higher Education for American Democracy, ‘Financing Higher 
Education’, in The Journal of Higher Education in 1948. In his article he 
established that there was “some lack of interest among State political and 
educational leaders in the higher education of the people”, thereby demonstrating 
the need for more direct Federal influence, but simultaneously recognised that 
this involvement would be unconstitutional.284 He then discussed the efficacy of 
Federal financing of higher education, and pondered how Federal financing for 
the US education system could possibly equalise opportunity of access when the 
Federal government had no “constitutional ability to legislate directly on 
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education”. In short, Simpson identified that the Federal money would not 
equalise access in itself; that could only come from money given with conditions 
attached. Yet money given with conditions attached constituted Federal control 
of education and this was unconstitutional. Simpson then undermined his own 
argument, however, by acknowledging that “since this objective [Federal 
funding] is declared to be vital to the existence and strengthening of our 
democratic way of life, there can be no thought of abandoning it”. Simpson clearly 
places national security concerns over the unconstitutionality of the 
Commission’s recommendations, despite recognising them as such.285 For 
Simpson at least, national security trumped the US Constitution.  
 
The Truman Commission’s Impact on US Education  
It is notoriously difficult to accurately chart the immediate and long term impact 
which a presidential commission has upon its field. Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Martin 
Jaeckel noted in 1975 that “since there are no bodies directly charged with 
evaluating a Presidential Commission’s findings, its recommendations, and their 
implementation, this phase of the utilization process remains rather diffuse”.286 
The same was true at the time of the publication of the Truman Commission’s 
report; Marcy stated in 1945 that “the effects of such reports are hard to 
estimate”.287 Wolanin has stated that impact should be measured through policy 
change and presidential attention; Zegart, however, argued in 2004 that a 
Commission’s impact should be measured by how well the Commission carried 
out its core instructions. Zegart stated that judgement of “the conceptual 
framework should lead to a more nuanced, and more accurate, measure of 
Commission impact”.288 
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Despite the difficulties in measuring impact, the general consensus is that 
presidential commissions are rarely able to revolutionise their respective fields. 
“Presidential commissions as temporary advisory bodies”, Lazarsfeld and Jaeckel 
have stated, “are neither directly responsible for the implementation of their 
recommendations, nor for the further processing of the reports they have 
generated, once they themselves pass out of existence”.289 Commissions are often 
overlooked, and in fact are more regularly overlooked than implemented, but 
those who serve on them still believe the work to be worthwhile even after the 
fact. Mack has generalised that “service on a Presidential Commission is deemed 
worthwhile for the discipline and for the society by those who have experienced 
it” but that “the probability is high of a disappointing response or no response 
from the White House to social science findings and recommendations”.290  
This is largely due to the fact that, although governments establish 
commissions in order to academically assess a situation, once reported, party 
politics still governs implementation. As Marcy had noted, “the success of 
presidential commissions as fact-finders will depend largely on the President”.291 
The commission is an extension of the Executive branch, and is, therefore, reliant 
on the power and will of the President to implement its recommendations. In 
some cases party platforms have moved on by the time a report is published, so 
even if the commission’s report supports the position it was charged with 
supporting, this may no longer be the position which the president chooses to ally 
himself with. Reforms are often too wide ranging to be implemented before the 
politics of the situation moves on. Politics relies on the zeitgeist to enact change, 
and the slow pace of adequate research and implementation often belies this. As 
Merton identified, “In this regard, nothing much seems to have been done since 
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the 1940s (and, one suspects, long before) when a study of policy orientated 
research [also conducted by Merton] reported [in 1949] that the ‘tempo of policy 
decisions and action is often more rapid that the tempo of applied research’”.292  
In addition, if the President himself lacks power and influence, so will the 
recommendations of the Presidential Commission, regardless of how fervently 
the President supports it. In many ways this was certainly the case for the Truman 
Commission. As Roy Jenkins identified in his 1986 work Truman, “in domestic 
policy, [Truman] turned out to have more battles with Congress than any 
President since Andrew Johnson”.293 President Truman had unusually little 
power over Congress, and was famously unable to pass the majority of his bills, 
to the point where the 80th Congress was nicknamed the ‘do nothing’ Congress. 
Truman took office after FDR, a President with a famous track record of 
exercising greater freedom with legislative matters who often overstepped the 
bounds of executive power. This was due in part to the national emergencies 
caused by both the Great Depression and the Second World War. Where 
President Roosevelt took it upon himself to legislate without Congress, however, 
President Truman did not have the power or the authority.294  
As Truman was facing his own national emergency in 1946 – the 
establishment of a post war America and the looming Cold War with the Soviet 
Union, it is reasonable to suggest that he hoped to wield at least a modicum of his 
predecessor’s power. Of course Truman was keenly aware that he would not be as 
powerful a President as FDR, but it is unlikely that he could have predicted his 
upcoming struggles with Congress. He was not only unsuccessful where 
education was concerned. As Hugh Davis Graham noted in his 1985 article “The 
Ambiguous Legacy of American Presidential Commissions”, “despite Truman’s 
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Executive Orders establishing the Fair Employment Practice Committee, and 
directing the desegregation of the armed forces, he got from Congress only a 
gesture towards compensating the wartime evacuation claims of the Japanese-
Americans”.295 
Unfortunately for the Truman Commission, the 80th Congress was in 
session for the entire period in which the recommendations made in its report 
were likely to make legislative headway:  from January 1947 – 6 months after the 
Commission was established – to January 1949, a year after the report was 
published. Although Wolanin asserts that “the President expects that these 
commissions, in reaching a consensus which endorses his proposal will enable 
him to persuade and educate the Congress and the public”, in reality, Truman’s 
relationship with Congress had deteriorated so much by early 1948 that there is 
little likelihood that even the added weight of the expert opinions provided by the 
Truman Commission could have made significant difference to this ‘do nothing’ 
Congress.296 This poor relationship essentially put pay to any legislative hopes the 
Commission or the President may have harboured when the Truman Commission 
was established in 1946.  
It is possible, however, that the Truman Commission recognised the 
unlikelihood of immediate congressional success and structured its report 
accordingly. The report of the Truman Commission appears to have been 
organised to avoid a stringent focus on the unlikely and ‘unachievable’ elements 
– those which would have required Congress’ support to implement such as 
Federal financing for higher education – in order to allow the central ideas in the 
report to gain the spotlight – those such as education’s importance to national 
security and the democratic imperative for widening opportunity and access. As 
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Lazarsfeld and Jaeckel have noted, “anticipations of the impact and the 
repercussions of various formulations are known to enter into, perhaps even to 
govern, a Commission’s final deliberations”.10297 Although Federal financing for 
higher education was central to the success of the majority of the Commission’s 
recommendations, the volume which recommended it was published last (with 
the exception of Volume VI, which contained the Commission’s reference 
material). It is likely that it was published last in order to prevent this issue from 
dominating the discussion and obscuring discussion of the report’s important 
‘ideas’, which had the possibility of changing opinions and directly influencing 
impact without the need for Congress.  
 
The Societal Impact of the Truman Commission 
The President’s Commission on Higher Education did not have a tangible 
immediate impact upon public policy in the USA, and few of its recommendations 
were directly legislated for.  As an opinion guiding commission, however, 
legislation was not its only goal, and by the time the report was published, this 
may not even have been its primary goal. One of Truman’s aims when he 
established the Commission was to elevate the problems he perceived to be 
inherent within the education system to the national agenda. A Truman aide even 
                                                          
10 They specifically highlighted the case of the Population Commission, which “divided the 
publication of its report into three sections – on the diagnosis of the problem, recommendations 
concerning reproduction, and recommendations concerning administrative measures, 
respectively, in order to prevent the resulting publicity from focusing exclusively on the abortion 
issues”. 
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later noted that “the Higher Education Commission was strictly a study 
commission to set goals and priorities”.298 Although this does not tally exactly 
with earlier statements on the purpose of the establishment of the Truman 
Commission, it demonstrates well what the Truman Commission came to be 
remembered for.  
As Marcy has clarified, “the criterion of the successful opinion-guiding 
commission is not whether legislation results; that is not the purpose. Success is 
measured by public awareness of the conclusions reached and stimulation which 
is traceable to the fact that the material was available”.299 From this definition, 
the Truman Commission was a resounding success. As Hutcheson has identified, 
Higher Education for American Democracy “engaged educators at all types of 
institutions”.300 The Truman Commission was so successful in its purpose, that 
Wolanin even chose the Truman Commission as his example to illustrate the ways 
in which presidential commissions could greatly increase the Executive branch’s 
sphere of influence. He stated that “commissions have been active in various 
extensions of Federal responsibility”, for example, “supporting the expansion of 
higher education in the interests of national defense (National Commission on 
Higher Education, 1946-47)”.301  
The Truman Commission’s lack of legislative impact also did not prevent 
the report from having a significant long-term impact upon the US education 
system. As Merton has noted, “If [a Commission] produces a body of research, 
the socially consequential life of a commission can extend well beyond its 
existence as a formally convened body. Long after it has been discharged with 
presidential thanks, the inquiries mounted by the commission can remain 
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consequential”.30211 As Reuben and Perkins have noted, “the Zook report is 
considered one of the most influential documents in the history of American 
higher education”.303 Many of the recommendations made by the Truman 
Commission in Higher Education for American Democracy were implemented 
eventually; in fact, when viewed from the present, the report is almost prophetic. 
Thelin has stated that “when viewed from the perspective of 1980 or 2000, the 
report reads like a script for a succession of programs that ultimately became both 
familiar and famous”.304  
Gilbert and Heller have charted the progress of the report of the Truman 
Commission, and have compared the recommendations made in the report to 
subsequent changes made to American higher education. They have found that 
the report essentially created a blueprint for the changes that occurred 
throughout the remainder of the 20th century.305 This is especially true where the 
Commission’s recommendations concerning community colleges, funding and 
expanding access are concerned.306 They have recognised that, whilst the 
Commission was not the only factor in the change, “the role of the Federal 
government did change significantly in the decades following the 
Commission”.307 This increase has been particularly influenced by the passage of 
the Higher Education Act (HEA) in 1965. As Gilbert and Heller have shown, the 
                                                          
11 The same is true of several other presidential commissions. Marcy singles out Theodore 
Roosevelt’s Conservation Commission, and stated that “the value of the Conservation 
Commission [T. Roosevelt, 1908] is not found in specific legislation resulting from its studies, but 
rather in the part the Commission played in making the nation conservation conscious” (Marcy, 
37). 
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HEA was heavily influenced by the report of the Truman Commission, and many 
of the ideas expressed in the act echo those expressed by the Commission 18 years 
previously.308  
As David Truman stated in Wolanin’s Presidential Advisory 
Commissions, Truman to Nixon (1975), “basically, the creation of advisory 
committees marks a recognition of those ‘rules of the game’ in the United States 
that prescribe that individuals and groups likely to be affected should be 
consulted before governmental action is taken. Such consultation is in most cases 
prerequisite to the action’s being accepted as ‘fair’”.309 It is clear from his earlier 
actions that President Truman wanted the Executive branch to play a greater role 
in the US education system beyond the administrative role allowed in the GI Bill. 
In order to do this however, Truman either needed the support of Congress in 
order to legislate the education system, or to garner the support of the educational 
community so that they willingly allowed his recommendations to become 
mainstream without the need for legislation. The ‘do nothing’ Congress made the 
first unattainable; the work of the Truman Commission, however, represented a 
carefully controlled method through which the latter was achieved. The members 
were carefully selected to support the position of the Executive branch, and 
therefore so did their recommendations. Importantly, however, they were their 
recommendations, and thus more palatable to the wider education community.  
 
Federal Involvement in Education Immediately after the Commission 
The position outlined by the Truman Commission on the relevance of democracy 
education to national security was supported and perpetuated by a host of 
government officials. The Administrator of the Federal Security Agency, Oscar R. 
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Ewing, stated in a USOE Bulletin published in 1948 that in order “to preserve and 
perpetuate the ideals and principles of American democracy it is essential that 
they be understood”.310 In order to protect the world, Ewing explained, American 
students must learn about democracy. The author of the Bulletin furthered 
Ewing’s point by stating that education of this kind “tends to make dictatorship 
or totalitarianism impossible from within and thus safeguards freedom from 
government itself”.311  
The US Commissioner of Education, John W. Studebaker, announced in 
the same year that “first and foremost, education can help to strengthen 
democracy at home”.312 The second Cold War Commissioner of Education, Earl 
J. McGrath, echoed Studebaker’s position on the changing role of education in 
1950.313 He noted that “in every war we have fought, education has contributed 
mightily, and must be prepared if need be to increase that contribution”.314 These 
statements represented a clear departure from the notion of a separation of the 
Federal government and the US education system in the early years of the Cold 
War, as the Federal government openly proposed the subjugation of the needs of 
the individual in order to promote the needs of the country. 
From 1948 onwards, education committees, the USOE and politicians 
involved with education policy became more explicit when discussing the fact 
that, in order to ensure the survival of democracy in the modern world, it was 
necessary to imprint a positive image of the democratic system of government 
upon American students. In 1948 President Truman declared in a press release 
written about the report of the Truman Commission that “the Commission 
emphasises that effective democratic education will deal directly with current 
problems”.315 The President openly stated to the nation that the American 
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education system was vital to the war effort, leaving little doubt as to whether or 
not he intended to utilise it.  
Ward W. Keesecker, a writer and professor who regularly wrote on behalf 
of the USOE, demonstrated in a USOE Bulletin, published in 1948, that the ideals 
of a nation could be changed in a single generation if the youth were taught to 
believe a view opposite to their parents’ beliefs.316 If the education system was to 
focus on teaching American students to love democracy, then it would negate the 
fact that their parents did not. Keesecker’s view compounded that of US 
Commissioner of Education, Earl J. McGrath, who asserted in an article entitled 
“Education and the National Defense”, that conversely, “men and women...who 
had not been educated to live as free people in a free world could embrace a 
totalitarian solution to the social and political problems that invariably remain 
after the firing stops”; if American students were not taught to love democracy, 
then it would not matter if their parents did.317  
The Executive branch may also have had similar views on the adequacy 
and effectiveness of those in charge of the education system as it had previously 
highlighted concerning those in charge of medical care in the USA. After the 
publication of Higher Education for American Democracy, the Executive branch 
betrayed an overriding belief that those currently in charge of the schools, 
whether this be the State or local government, the superintendents or the PTA, 
were not steering it in the right direction. An article entitled “What are the Chief 
Threats to American Democracy?” published in School Life in 1948, declared that  
“people who have lived at a high emotional pitch through four years of war 
must be expected to relax when the immediate danger seems ended in 
victory. It is a human tendency to grow tired of constant watch keeping. 
145 
 
Yet that very vigilance is a safeguard upon which our basic liberties 
depend”.318  
This anonymous staff writer demonstrated well the government’s level of trust in 
the average American’s disposition. The author understood that the prevailing 
attitude in the USA during this period was a desire for a return to peace and the 
family orientated values of their childhood – real or imagined. The American 
public had to be supported in understanding both that the threat had not passed, 
and that this time their children and grandchildren were needed to fight the 
battles. The USOE claimed in 1948 that their ‘Zeal for American Democracy’ 
programme, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, 
highlighted “the urgent need for alerting Americans to the developing world crisis 
and helping meet it by strengthening American democracy through the schools 
and colleges”.319 The Federal government could not trust the general public to 
ensure that their children were properly versed in their nation’s history and 
politics, as it did not believe they understood the vital necessity to do so. 
An article in School Life further demonstrated the Federal government’s 
distrust of the suitability of the education system for such a task when discussing 
the quality of the teaching of the Bill of Rights in schools. The author exclaimed 
that “I wonder if the teachers themselves understand! I wonder if there is 
textbook material available for such teaching!”320 This distrust of teachers during 
the early Cold War was, of course, not limited to questions on their preparedness, 
but also their commitment to the USA, and to democracy itself. The second Red 
Scare was, in part, focused on weeding out Communist, or, in the majority of 
cases, merely left-leaning academics who were perceived to threaten the safety of 
the USA. This attack was focused on, but not limited to, institutions of higher 
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education where – some estimates calculated – upwards of 20% or even 30% of 
the academic staff were ‘subversives’. The Senate Judiciary Committee in Internal 
Security (1952) even alluded to the existence of “nests of Communists” within 
academia.321  
The events surrounding academic witch hunts within the USA during the 
early Cold War period have been widely written about, and therefore will not be 
dwelled upon here. That said, however, this intense fear that academia was 
infested with subversives who were intent on bringing down the USA from the 
inside served to reinforce the Federal government’s claim that the education 
system was vital to the safety of the USA. Moreover, it reinforced the idea that 
more input and greater monitoring from the Federal government was required in 
order to ensure that academia was fulfilling this task to the best of its abilities. By 
undermining the absolute authority of the teachers and professors to rule their 
classrooms and lecture halls, the Federal government successfully created a gap, 
which it then filled itself. It removed from the educators the power to dictate their 
own curriculum, and utilised that opportunity to promote its own replacement.   
 
The United States Office of Education 
The USOE served as a particularly useful tool through which the Federal 
government could influence the US education system in the early years of the 
Cold War, but that was not the USOE’s intended function. It was originally 
established as a Department of Education, but two years after its founding its 
Department status was rescinded as a result of heavy opposition over its official 
status both from within and without the Department.322 It was made clear after 
1869 that the USOE’s function was as a research office. The original charter of the 
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USOE stated its function to be as follows: “to collect such statistics and facts as 
shall show the condition and progress of education in the several States and 
territories”; to “diffuse such information as shall aid in the establishment and 
maintenance of efficient school systems”; and to “otherwise promote the cause of 
education throughout the country”.323  
Over the years the function of the USOE strayed from its original charter 
and it sometimes undertook work that fell outside its jurisdiction of research and 
dissemination, but four years prior to the date that the man who would be in office 
as the Commissioner of Education at the outbreak of the Cold War, John W. 
Studebaker, took up the position in 1934, the USOE was reorganised to become, 
once again, purely a research office.324 However, when the USOE moved from the 
Department of the Interior to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
in 1950, it had a staff of three hundred and a budget exceeding $40 million.325 
Interestingly, when the second Cold War Commissioner of Education, 
Studebaker’s successor Earl J. McGrath, explained how the USOE was 
administered in 1951, the USOE’s finances were applied to the following areas:  
“approximately 1 fourth of the total costs of operating the Office [of 
Education] is used in administering the programs of grants-in-aid. The 
remaining three fourths is concentrated in the following major areas: (1) 
Educational organization and administration; (2) methods of instruction; 
(3) improvement of the teaching profession; (4) international educational 
relations; and (5) the collection, analysis and publication of basic 
statistical information – together with (6) the overall planning and 
administrative services essential to the work in all these areas”.326  
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During the Cold War, the USOE expanded its role in the education sphere greatly 
to include far more than simply research, statistics and dissemination of 
information. 
 
School Life Magazine 
The USOE has its own publication, School Life magazine, the printing of which 
was approved by the director of the Budget.327 During the Cold War the magazine 
was published by the USOE every month and circulated to a wide range of 
schools, colleges and universities. Articles in School Life were written by a variety 
of contributors, ranging from staff writers and practising teachers and lecturers 
to expert educational theorists, politicians and even the President himself. The 
purpose of School Life was, according to the USOE’s own message printed in the 
front of each edition, to aid with the completion of the functions outlined in the 
charter, which was also printed in each edition of School Life during this period. 
During the early Cold War, however, the USOE worked outside this remit and, 
rather than just circulating statistics and current research, it used School Life to 
circulate ideas, plans, programmes and recommendations to schoolteachers and 
college lecturers, the outcome of which was a shift in the focus of the school 
system from the student to the nation.  
Between 1947 and 1951, articles with titles such as “Strengthen Education 
to Strengthen Democracy in a Divided World”; “What are the Chief Threats to 
American Democracy?”; “Better Schools Build a Stronger America” and “National 
Security to be Strengthened through Education” were published by the magazine, 
and all vehemently directed schools, colleges and universities to prioritise 
education for the benefit of the Cold War effort over education for the benefit of 
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the individual. A further group of articles all published within the same period, 
including “Communism’s Challenge to American Education”; “Fascism in 
Action”; “The Challenge of Soviet Education” and “I Want to be Like Stalin” 
warned what could happen if educators did not heed the USOE’s advice. One such 
article, entitled “Education for the Nation’s Defense”, became a running feature, 
which updated the reader each month as to what the education system was doing 
to ensure the national security, and what could still be done. One such feature 
alone included a section which highlighted the need for trained manpower in Cold 
War industries, discussed the work of the National Science Foundation (NSF) and 
explained the benefits of a union between the Federal government and the 
education system by demonstrating how Land Grant colleges had benefitted from 
it.328   
The USOE intentionally worked outside of the terms of its charter, and the 
secondary charter of School Life magazine, in order to attempt to influence the 
schools to alter both their methods of teaching and the subjects they taught. As 
there was no national curriculum in the USA, it is difficult to assess how 
successful it was, but historian Andrew Hartman, who has studied the curriculum 
of American schools during this period extensively, has stated that the 
progressive style of education, which was favoured at the time the Cold War broke 
out, became “more conservative” during the early Cold War years as it was 
“explicitly redirected towards the ends of civil and national defense”.329 The 
USOE managed to ‘redirect’ the American education system – the very thing 
opponents of Federal funding feared most – without spending more than the cost 
of publishing and circulating School Life. 
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‘Zeal for American Democracy’ 
The most significant way in which the government used the USOE to direct 
education was through the development of specific plans and instructions as to 
how schools could translate the rather vague aim of ‘defending American 
democracy’ into concrete teaching strategies and curriculum design. The USOE 
supported the Federal government’s attempts to increase education in democracy 
by establishing an entire programme dedicated to that end only. The ‘Zeal for 
American Democracy’ programme was designed, in the words of John W. 
Studebaker, to be “a vigorous program designed to vitalize and improve education 
in schools and colleges throughout the United States with respect to the ideals 
and benefits of democracy and to reveal the character and tactics of 
totalitarianism”.330 The programme’s full title, which was rarely used, was Zeal 
for American Democracy: Education to implant the ideas and benefits of 
democracy and to reveal the evil character and tactics of Communism”.331 It was 
launched by the USOE late in 1947, and was, the programme’s administrators 
claimed, “strongly supported by Congress”.332 The intention of the programme 
was to make “the traditions of our republican form of government more vivid and 
meaningful” and to ensure that American youths both learned about and 
practised democracy in schools, thereby gaining a better understanding of why it 
must be preserved.333 The programme was also designed to safeguard American 
students against the “glamorous and attractive promises and propagandas for the 
easy solution of all important social and economic problems”, namely 
Communism.334  
Studebaker - the programme’s principal architect and a man described by 
Andrew Hartman as “one of the foremost propagators of the view that the schools 
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should conform to the nation’s foreign policy needs” – intended the programme 
to be guided by the concept ‘democracy vs. communism’. 335  In 1948 he wrote an 
article entitled “Communism’s Challenge to American Education” for School Life 
in which he outlined what the school system could, and should, teach in the 
classroom in order to support the Federal government in the war effort. 
Studebaker believed that ‘’Americanism’ was inherently and inseparably linked 
to ‘democracy’, and that the former could not survive without the latter. He 
identified it specifically as “the glorious heritage of freedom and democracy that 
is ours as a people”.336 Specifically, he defined democracy as being “devoted to the 
enhancement of the individual… [it] encourages tolerance and permits, even 
nourishes heterodoxy...” and that “our American democratic ideals of 
government and society have produced the highest material living standards for 
our people of any ever recorded on the face of the earth”.337 Studebaker asserted 
that the students should learn how privileged they were to live under the US 
system of democracy by learning about “the long struggle by which the rights of 
American democracy were secured”.338  
Studebaker declared that “I believe that every pupil should have a chance 
to learn how difficult it was to establish freedom of speech and of the press, 
freedom of religion, the right to Habeas Corpus, and the other American 
freedoms”.339 The USOE continued to outline the intentions for the promotion of 
education for democracy thusly: to establish 1) An understanding of the meaning 
of democracy, its history, its practice, and its continuing development, together 
with an understanding of the dangerous alternatives posed by totalitarianism 
[emphasis in original]; 2) Enlightened loyalty to democratic ideals and national 
traditions; 3) the fundamentals of national responsibility and power, including 
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world geography and its relation to war potentials and to the economic and 
strategic foundations of an enduring peace; 4)Understanding of the United 
Nations, its organization, its accomplishments shortcomings and 
possibilities”.340  
The USOE supported schools, colleges and universities in setting up their 
individual ‘Zeal for American Democracy’ programmes and provided them with 
resource material, teaching aids, programmes of study and examples of good 
practice gleaned from various school systems and colleges.341 The USOE also 
directed the methods and type of study the students would undertake. This 
practice ensured that students learned a homogenous and, more importantly, 
federally approved, version of how the American government was administered. 
The USOE dictated that students would “examine carefully all undemocratically 
operated movements or organizations placing power in the hands of a few 
leaders”.342 In addition, students “should have a sufficient store of knowledge to 
be able to detect and expose totalitarian methods and practices”.343 More 
concerning, however, was Studebaker’s intention for students to also “weigh 
wisely the continual criticism levelled at politicians or other classes or groups 
blaming them for our social and economic difficulties”; this ‘lesson’, whilst not 
suggesting that students could not criticise their government, seems to suggest 
that they would be taught that they would not criticise their government.344. 
 The programme was designed and administered with the sole intention of 
ensuring that the USA’s future citizens would value democracy over alternative 
methods of government such as Communism or fascism, in order to protect them 
from converting the system of government in the years to come. There was little 
opposition to the programme despite the fact that it represented a vast departure 
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from standard practice in the teaching of social studies, as the programme was 
deemed to be vital for the nation and, importantly, involved no direct Federal 
funding to the education system. The National Council of Chief State School 
Officers even commended the government on their forthright approach to the 
matter, stating that “it is fitting that the official educational agency of our 
National Government exert leadership in promoting a program which calls for 
nationwide action. The National Council of Chief State School Officers, therefore, 
commends the United States Office of Education for its timely inauguration of the 
nationwide educational program ‘Zeal for American Democracy’”.345 
The year after the programme was launched the proponents of the 
programme organised a conference entitled ‘The National Conference on the Zeal 
for American Democracy’. Over the course of the conference, the delegates 
decided upon the best way to proceed with the programme. Those in attendance 
recommended to American schools and colleges that “they devote greater 
attention to planning and implementing the long range program of developing 
zeal for American democracy”.346 This was to be achieved, the delegates 
announced, by firstly teaching the meaning of democracy – “both its simple basic 
concepts and their implications for all segments of American life”.347 Secondly, 
teachers were to strengthen “basic loyalty to and trust of fellow citizens to an 
extent that the courage, vitality and unity of American democracy will grow and 
endure and withstand all attempts to divide our people”.348 What had begun as a 
vague attempt to improve the understanding among students of their system of 
government in the hope that they would favour it over the alternatives became, 
in less than a year, a programme designed to teach students to be loyal to that 
government directly. The Federal government’s programme to create a ‘zeal for 
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American democracy’ became instead a large-scale programme designed to 
instruct students that their way of government was right. By the end on 1952, 88% 
of American schools had implemented programs which were specifically intended 
to promote democracy and civil defense.349 
 
Militarisation for National Security  
In the December 1950 issue of the USOE’s School Life magazine, educator Homer 
Kempfer announced that “as war belongs to the military, so peace building is the 
educator’s task”; when addressing an educational conference in October 1950, the 
Commissioner of Education, Earl J. McGrath, stated that “politics and programs 
which were adequate the last time will not do today. 1950 is not 1941... Military 
know-how and educational know-why... these are the considerations of national 
policy which may guide higher education in the years ahead”.350 In 1948, 
Keesecker asserted in a USOE Bulletin that the schools should be used directly to 
fight the Cold War and protect American ideals. Keesecker likened the 
intervention into school business to the recruitment programme often enacted 
during ‘hot’ wartime, thereby demonstrating a precedent for the government’s 
intervention into the affairs of the education system. He demonstrated that “in 
war we provide vocational training to achieve military victory. By the same token 
should we not educate to promote respect for and devotion to our ideals and 
principles of freedom? If we believe in American freedom and if we believe it is 
worth fighting for, ought we not also educate for it?”351 
 It is the Federal government’s constitutional right and responsibility to 
command the military, and in times of war the Federal government are charged 
with protecting the USA and the American way of life – specifically, a “republican 
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form of government”.352 If in this new war the defence happened to include the 
schools, then the schools also came under the command of the Federal 
government. They must, therefore, also do what was asked of them, regardless of 
the threat to academic freedom. By likening the US education system to the 
military, the Federal government successfully demonstrated the importance of 
American schools, colleges and universities in winning the Cold War. The 
education system was vital to ensure that a republican form of government 
remained in office in the USA, and therefore it became the responsibility of the 
Federal government.   
To strengthen the Federal government’s claim that the schools were as 
important to the Cold War effort as the military, the language used to describe 
the schools’ involvement in the task became militarised in federally produced 
literature. By the time Kempfer wrote his article for School Life in 1950, the 
objective of the schools had been appropriately named ‘waging peace’. Kempfer 
stated that the US education system needed to “mobilize our total manpower to 
win the peace and to keep it won” and likened pupils to soldiers and schools and 
colleges to training camps:  
“peace that satisfies the democratic spirit can be created when enough 
people are willing to serve in a world army of peace builders. Like soldiers, 
they must become aware of their roles and be trained for them. Building 
awareness and providing the training are tasks for education. If a teacher 
or administrator deeply believes that men can learn to live together in 
peace, and that peace is dynamic and must be positively waged, then he is 
a commissioned officer in the army of education fighting for peace”.353 
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Kempfer also included a small section within his article which reminded readers 
that war in itself could promote the cause of peace; he wrote that “we need to 
learn that energy spent in the resolution of human problems all around the world 
is creating peace” [emphasis in original].354 Kempfer explained to the USOE’s 
readership that, without the cooperation of the schools to win the Cold War, the 
Cold War could not be won, and subsequently neither could a peaceful world be 
created from their victory. Kempfer’s position was supported by Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, who also remarked that “no man flying a warplane, no man with a 
defensive gun in his hand, can possibly be more important than a teacher”.355 Like 
Kempfer, he likened students to soldiers, teachers to generals and classrooms to 
battlegrounds. This language asserted that the Cold War would be fought in the 
schools, and the students must be trained to fight.  
An article published in Platform – a publication of the Newsweek Club 
and Educational Bureau – took this position further when an anonymous author 
stated in 1952 that “our institutions of learning are not considered by this school 
of thought as arenas where the student can test beliefs or, from the side-lines, 
watch thought do battle”.356 The author continued to quote the principal architect 
of the American Conservative movement, the founder of prominent conservative 
magazine National Review (1955) and later Emmy award winning host of the 
conservative public affairs programme Firing Line, William F. Buckley Jr. 
Buckley had defined the university the year before in similarly militaristic 
language in his prominent work God and Man at Yale (1951) as a “practice field 
on which the gladiators of the future are taught to use their weapons, are briefed 
in the wiles and stratagems of the enemy, and are inspired with the virtue of their 
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cause in anticipation of the day when they will step forward and join the struggle 
against error”.357  
The author appropriated Buckley’s position that academic freedom should 
not extend to a balanced discussion of political models in universities; Buckley 
defended this position by discussing the argument that teaching students about 
all prominent political thought models gives the students the opportunity to 
personally consider the tenets of each, and naturally come to the conclusion that 
democracy is the superior system. Buckley stated that anyone familiar with 
history, however, knew that the ‘truth’ that democracy was the best system did 
not always come to the fore, as was evidenced by the Twentieth Century triumphs 
of socialism, communism and fascism in Russia, Italy and Germany. As such, he 
argued, US universities had a responsibility to teach democracy as the only 
suitable political model to ensure that the students were not misled by their own 
‘truths’.  
Moreover, all political models that were not democracy must be 
considered as, and taught as, being ‘wrong’, even if they were not as ‘wrong’ as 
communism; to illustrate this position Buckley suggested that although murder 
was ‘more wrong’ than theft, this did not make theft any ‘more right’; if socialism 
was ‘better’ than communism, this still did not make it ‘right’ therefore only 
democracy could be taught as the ‘right’ political model.358 The anonymous 
author similarly defined ‘truth’ as “democracy” in his article and asserted that, as 
such, it was “a teacher’s duty to inculcate this value in others” as to present a 
balanced assessment was dangerous to the security of the nation.359 The lines 
defining who was responsible for the nation’s education and who was responsible 
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for the nation’s defense became increasingly blurred in the early years of the Cold 
War. 
 
Opposition  
Of course, a few lone voices did challenge the new direction for education which 
was proposed by the Truman Commission. The objections to Federal involvement 
which were raised by this small group, however, were disparate. Their 
protestations were not rooted in the same cause, and therefore the movement, if 
indeed it could be titled so, lacked strength and unity. One opponent, University 
of New Hampshire President Harold Stoke, believed that the new direction posed 
a threat to academic freedom, and the way relationships between universities and 
outside forces functioned. He believed that universities should be shrouded from 
outside forces in order to foster individual perspectives, rather than being used 
as a tool with which to react to societal changes. Stoke stated that the pursuit of 
knowledge for its own sake was no worse or dangerous than pursuit of knowledge 
on behalf of the government, military or industry.360  
The report of the Truman Commission attracted some direct negative 
commentary, as, one reviewer claimed, its recommendations placed private 
schools at risk of marginalisation. The anonymous critic asserted that “it is quite 
obvious that the basic philosophy of the report will tend to the development of an 
educational program in which the State and Federal control over all higher 
education will be so tremendous that privately supported schools will be affected 
whether funded or not”.361 The fear that Federal involvement in the education 
system would bring the USA closer to a ‘totalitarian’ style of education, however, 
was the most prevalent concern. A reviewer who discussed the report of the 
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Truman Commission believed that it promoted a ‘totalitarian approach’ to the 
government of the education system, and that this was not an acceptable route 
for the education system to follow, regardless of the end that the Federal 
government were attempting to achieve. He claimed that “the recommendations 
of the Commission, if accepted, would lead to statism, which is a form of 
totalitarianism”.362  
Even the dissenters who discovered a few allies found themselves in the 
minority, however. When money was not involved, the unification of the 
government’s objectives with those of the education system was not widely or 
forcefully objected to at any point, and democratic education in the classrooms 
and lecture halls soon came to be viewed as the normal State of affairs. As 
politicians and educators alike joined together to alter the objectives of the 
American education system, the line which separated the goals of academia from 
those of the government quickly blurred. Educator William Stanley Hoole 
declared in 1958 that “by the mid-1950s Americans everywhere were saying that 
the ‘Cold War’ would be won in the classroom”.363 He believed that his own 
statement – “what happens to American education will eventually happen to 
America” – had become a cliché.364 The American public accepted and 
normalised the concept of students as soldiers, and as their best hope in the 
daunting conflict.  
Moreover, those with the most reason to oppose the government’s plans 
had no power to do so. Teaching about Communism in American schools, colleges 
and universities had become a controversial issue in the USA in its own right, not 
least because rumours that teachers and professors who taught their students 
about Communism were in fact Communist sympathisers or, worse, Communist 
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infiltrators, were gathering strength in the USA. For a teacher to add to this a 
charge that they also opposed the teaching of democracy, or believed that it was 
wrong to teach American students to love and support their democratic 
government, was foolhardy. Commissioner Studebaker made the government’s 
position clear when he announced in School Life that “we, ourselves, as teachers, 
all of us, must believe in democracy, believe in it with a flaming faith based on the 
clearest intellectual and moral conviction and that we unswervingly communicate 
our faith to the pupils in our charge”.365 Teachers were expected to lead the charge 
for democracy, not undermine it. 
The American faculty were also expected to better prepare themselves for 
the task ahead. In a sweeping statement, Studebaker announced that “every 
teacher in every field should have a well-grounded understanding of American 
democracy and, during the period of pre-service training, should become 
proficient in the use of democratic classroom practices. Furthermore all teachers 
must keep reasonably well-informed about the major issues of contemporary 
society”.366 Whilst a detailed understanding of American political principles 
would be vital for a social studies teacher, the benefit of such knowledge for maths 
instructors could be questioned. That even teachers who would not be directly 
involved in the teaching of democracy were not exempt from Studebaker’s plan 
demonstrates that Studebaker was not prepared to risk students learning 
unauthorised and unchecked information from any sources whatsoever. 
Studebaker expected American teachers to portray a homogenous definition of 
democracy in all aspects of their school life.  
The Federal government instigated a campaign, carried out mostly 
through the medium of School Life, which informed teachers exactly why it was 
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their duty to promote democracy in their classrooms; this included an article 
written by Keesecker entitled “Duty of Teachers to Promote Ideals and Principles 
of American Democracy”. In this article, Keesecker not only explained to the 
USA’s teaching staff the reasons why it was their duty to imbue their students 
with a sense of democracy regardless of whether they had one themselves or not, 
but he also listed all of the State laws which required teachers to do so.367 
Commissioner McGrath stated in 1949 that “there is no justification, in principle 
or practice, for knowingly employing as teachers of our youth those whose 
commitments are contrary to the foundation principles of freedom itself”.368  
Teachers were not, however, given much chance to demonstrate the kind 
of sedition that the American public feared, as to circumvent this requirement 
carried serious consequences. The academic witch hunts, which became such a 
feature of the early Cold War period, did not only affect the right of educators to 
dictate what was taught in their classrooms. In addition, these witch hunts greatly 
curtailed their opportunity to speak out against the new direction taken by the 
education system. As Hartman has identified, “just as free speech could be 
abrogated if it was a threat to the nation, teachers could be fired for political 
behaviour deemed dangerous or conspiratorial”.369 Unless teachers were willing 
not only to lose their jobs, but to be blacklisted from teaching altogether, they 
were not in a position to raise any concerns over the work of the Federal 
government in the education system, especially as that work was advertised to be 
of direct benefit to the Cold War. To speak out against it would not only have been 
foolish, it would have been dangerous.  
The Executive branch of the Federal government utilised the powers 
available to it to infiltrate the US education system in the post war and early Cold 
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War period in order to ensure that the education system was serving the nation 
in its time of need. The establishment of a presidential commission in order to 
explore the state of the US education system enabled the Executive branch of the 
Truman Administration to utilise the powers that it did have at its disposal in 
order to expand its power and influence elsewhere. The careful selection of the 
members in addition to the clear mandate delivered to them upon appointment 
worked alongside persuasive contextual factors provided by the escalation of the 
Cold War and Truman’s personal commitment to education and disregard for 
small government to create a Commission prepared and willing to advocate for 
Federal involvement within the US education system as a priority, and even a 
necessity. 
 The report of the Truman Commission created a discussion among 
educators, publications and the general public which highlighted its perception 
of the pressing need for increased Federal involvement in education, and began 
to normalise the concept of Federal involvement within education. This in turn 
enabled the various educational outreaches of the Executive branch such as the 
USOE and its publication School Life to begin playing a greater role within 
education. The familiarity of the debate coupled with the cautionary Cold War 
rhetoric associated with the alternative – that no Federal involvement could have 
catastrophic consequences – and enabled the Executive branch in its many forms 
to easily quell opposition to its new venture. As issues of national security crept 
into the classroom, they brought the Federal government with them, and this shift 
had a deep and long-lasting impact on the administration and curriculum of the 
US education system.  
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A CASE OF 
INTERVENTION 
 
The Federal Government in the 
Sciences 
 
“The danger lies in the future”370 
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With the detonation on the atomic bomb in 1945, the world was irrevocably 
changed. Scientific advancement was made as vital to national security as military 
development, and scientists as important as soldiers. This “atomic age”, made 
possible through the efforts of an educated few, brought with it a sense of panic 
and uncertainty across the world. Despite being the only world power at the time 
to possess atomic weapons, the USA did not escape this pervading anxiety. By 
1947, John R. Steelman, the Assistant to the President (a position later renamed 
to the White House Chief of Staff) noted in his report to the President, Science 
and Public Policy, that “scientific progress is a prime requisite for national 
security, since without it our economic and military strength cannot keep pace 
with potential competitors”.371 Steelman feared that if the USA did not continue 
to make significant advances in science and technology, it would neither be able 
to protect the world from undemocratic forces, nor defend itself.  
Regardless of the USA’s current scientific prowess, the government greatly 
feared being overtaken by hostile powers. This dread was compounded by the 
knowledge that the USA would soon have neither the scientists nor the facilities 
to compete with the rest of the world. Its manpower pool was running low and, 
due to the fast pace of scientific progression, its laboratories were rapidly 
becoming obsolete. In 1947, the report from the White House’s Program for 
Research and Development declared that the USA was “in danger of falling 
behind the rest of the world technologically”.372 The report attributed this 
situation to the fact that “like Germany, we had a shiny new industrial plant to 
compete with a world bogged down by vested interests in obsolescence. But 
capital investment nearly stopped in the thirties, [and] was directed to the 
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specialized needs of war in the early forties. And when Europe rebuilds its 
industries, it will have the shiny modern equipment”.373 This fear only grew after 
the Soviet Union successfully tested its own atomic bomb in 1949. By 1952, the 
US Office of Education stated in its Bulletin that “the survival of our democratic 
life may depend upon our increased technological progress… Our supply of 
scientists and engineers is already getting dangerously low”.374  It believed that 
“the battle for the freedoms we so fondly cherished may be lost in the 
laboratory”.375 
As M. H. Trytten, the Director of the Office of Scientific Personnel in the 
National Research Council, identified, “technology has already raced forward in 
new directions, and it is evident that warfare in the future will bring forth new 
and startling instruments”.376 Any foreign developments which the USA could not 
match on home soil, it feared, left the world susceptible to the wills of stronger, 
more advanced, governments elsewhere. Maintaining its lead in the scientific 
community became a vital component of the nation’s survival in the early years 
of the Cold War. As historian Audra J. Wolfe identified in her book Competing 
with the Soviets: Science, Technology and the State in Cold War America (2013),  
“the fundamental characteristic of Cold War Science is the central role that 
the scientific enterprise came to play in the maintenance of the nation-
state… For all their differences, leaders in both the Soviet Union and the 
United States agreed that massive displays of technological might were 
critical weapons in the international battle for hearts and minds”. 377 
Wolfe continued to highlight that “scientific achievement had apparently won the 
war for the Allies; it would presumably be the critical factor in deciding the Cold 
War as well. This assumption transformed the scale and scope of scientific 
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investigation”.378 In order for the US to remain militarily strong, significant 
advancements needed to be made in the scientific disciplines, and at speed. 
Scientific advancement was not just required for military matters. As the 
Cold War developed, a greater focus was placed on the everyday lives of US 
citizens. The battleground shifted to domestic matters, and it became important 
to the US Federal government’s Cold War effort to be able to demonstrate 
advancement in these areas as well as in weapons advancement. Research and 
development in the fields of science, technology, engineering and maths – 
commonly referred to today as STEM subjects, as they will be throughout the 
remainder of this thesis – played a major role in this endeavour. Improvement in 
STEM fields had the potential to improve living standards, medical care, food 
production and a host of other areas which affected the day-to-day living 
standards of average Americans. Newly developed labour saving devices, medical 
advancements and agricultural inventions reinforced the idea of the American 
dream and of the USA as a land of promise and prosperity. This in turn enabled 
the USA to remain a paragon of progress and domestic bliss on the world’s stage 
– a vital victory in the ideological battle of the Cold War.  
Domestic scientific achievements could also be used to directly improve 
the USA’s standing overseas, and to foster positive relations with third world 
nations. As Wolfe has identified, when US scientists collaborated with Indian 
scientists in order to develop more productive and nutritious varieties of wheat, 
it was hoped that “this project, supported with funds from the Department of 
State and the Department of Agriculture, and American seed companies, [would] 
prevent starvation and accompanying unrest among the exploding population on 
the Indian subcontinent”.379 The USA’s assistance in reducing famine, in turn, 
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preserved the fragile Indian democracy and kept India from succumbing to the 
advances of its Communist neighbours. “From the Indian perspective”, Wolfe has 
argued, this US government funded project “offered the quickest route to 
modernisation and, they hoped, economic independence”.380 From the American 
perspective, the project enabled the US Federal government to defend democracy 
without deploying troops. Scientific research was used as a weapon in the fight 
against Communism, and was successful. Wolfe has demonstrated that this 
experience, and others similar to it, confirmed to the US Federal government that 
“the products of science could, therefore, offer multiple foreign policy rewards, 
from promoting goodwill and developing alliances to ensuring economic 
dominance. Science could be a carrot as well as a stick”.381 Science was designated 
as a weapon, and weapons were the responsibility of the Federal government.  
As the Federal government intended to utilise STEM research both to 
improve the USA’s military knowledge and to demonstrate the superiority of the 
American way of life to the watching world, the creation of a program of scientific 
research and development that was at the cutting edge was doubly important to 
the US government. This factor significantly altered the state and status of STEM 
education in the USA in the years after the Second World War. The effects of the 
burgeoning atomic age upon the education system can be seen as early as 1947, 
when John Dale Russell, the Director of the USOE’s Division of Higher 
Education, recognised the important role which STEM would play in the Cold 
War. Russell stated that “the contributions of science to the winning of the 
[Second World] War have deeply impressed all thinking people”. Russell was not 
alone in his observations; he noted that there was now a “distinct national trend 
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toward emphasis on science”, and this national trend would undoubtedly affect 
the US education system.382 
Russell highlighted the fact that a greater focus would have to be placed on 
science education in schools, colleges and universities in order to improve the 
USA’s abilities in STEM fields. He correctly assessed that “this trend will 
inevitably affect colleges as to curriculum; staffing and requirements for 
instructional equipment/laboratories etc.”.383 George F. Zook, head of the 
President’s Commission on Higher Education (Truman Commission), made the 
same connection in 1948. Zook made it clear in Volume I of the Truman 
Commission’s report, Higher Education for American Democracy (1947) that 
training the new generation of scientists and engineers was not only the domain 
of higher education institutions, it was their responsibility. He asserted that “the 
scientific knowledge and technical skills that have made atomic and 
bacteriological warfare possible are the products of education and research, and 
higher education must share proportionately in the task of forging social and 
political defenses against obliteration”.384 STEM subjects in high school and, 
more importantly, in college and university level education, were quickly 
identified as vital components of the USA’s plan to utilise scientific advancement 
in order to successfully fight the Cold War, and this made them central to the 
Federal government’s plan of attack.  
This chapter will demonstrate the ways in which Cold War concerns 
encouraged the Federal government, led by President Harry Truman, to become 
involved in shaping institutions of higher education during this period. It will 
assess the ways in which the Federal government justified this interest despite 
the lack of a Department of Education to act on its behalf, or Constitutional 
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authority to act under its own steam. Moreover it will discuss the ways in which 
the manpower shortage which the USA experienced in the years after the Second 
World War threatened national security, and how the steps which the Federal 
government took in order to solve the USA’s scientific manpower problems 
affected both the concept and reality of earning an undergraduate or graduate 
degree for college students in the early years of the Cold War and beyond. Finally, 
this chapter will explore how the Federal government’s increased interest in turn 
affected this campus research, and the implications of the Federal government’s 
program of scientific research in colleges and universities. The majority of 
scholarship concerning Federal involvement in higher education in STEM fields 
has previously focused on the effects of the National Defense Education Act 
(1958), passed as a result of the Sputnik Crisis of 1957. This chapter will 
demonstrate, however, that the Federal government had already placed a number 
of controls over university and, to some extent, elementary and secondary school 
science departments long before this event thrust science education to the 
forefront of the national consciousness.  
 
The Role of ‘Basic’ Research 
One of the major factors that affected the relevance of higher education to 
national security, and therefore brought it to the attention of the Federal 
government during the early years of the Cold War, was the burgeoning 
importance after the Second World War of ‘basic research’, also known as 
‘fundamental’ or ‘pure’ research. Basic research is the undertaking of scientific 
research for its own sake, with no specific goal or invention in mind. This type of 
research allows for the exploration of fundamental principles. This research is 
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then funnelled through to applied research, and informs its direction or 
application. It is a key component of scientific advancement, and without it, 
applied scientific research has no starting point. The Federal government 
understood how pivotal basic research had been to the Allied powers’ success in 
the Second World War, and how vital it would become to the USA’s success in the 
Cold War. President Truman stated in 1952 that  
“during the last decade we have seen how basic scientific research can alter 
the foundations of world power. We have seen that this research yields a 
stream of new knowledge which fortifies our economic welfare as well as 
our national strength. We have learned that a strong, steady and wide 
ranging effort in science is as essential to our sustained national security 
as the production of weapons and trained military personnel”.385 
 Steelman also singled out basic research as both the most important and 
yet the most vulnerable area of scientific research. He highlighted the USA’s need 
for basic research in Science and Public Policy (1947). Steelman recounted how 
Britain’s deficiency in basic research prior to the First World War had negatively 
affected its national security, and explained to the President that “particularly in 
the basic industries, British facilities and technology were older and less efficient 
than its German counterparts. The balance of power in Europe was upset 
primarily as a result of this fact and the world was plunged into two devastating 
wars”; Britain, Steelman elucidated, was not able to keep Germany at bay before 
the First World War primarily because it lagged behind in science and 
technology.386  
 There was, however, distressingly little basic research being conducted in 
the USA or in friendly overseas nations in the early years of the Cold War, which 
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left the USA exposed and vulnerable to hostile powers. Prior to the outbreak of 
the Second World War, the USA had relied heavily on European nations to 
conduct basic research on its behalf. Yet, by the end of the Second World War 
much of Europe had either been ravaged by war, or was lost behind the Iron 
Curtain, and the USA’s sources of basic research had dried up. The 1947 report 
on the White House’s Program for Research and Development highlighted that 
“we can no longer import basic research as we did before the war”.387 Importantly, 
the report also highlighted the fact that  
“This country has never been strong on pure science. Typically, we apply 
and industrialize discoveries made in Europe. During the war, basic 
research practically stopped. It will be years before the shattered 
laboratories and universities of Europe are re-established. If we want a 
stock of increasing knowledge about the nature of the physical world we’ll 
have to build it ourselves”.388  
The same issue was discussed in Higher Education for American Democracy in 
1947: 
“In the past, American scientists have contributed more to technical 
development than to fundamental science [basic research]. We have 
depended largely on the men and the laboratories of Europe for advance 
in basic research. This we can no longer do, partly because conditions in 
Europe do not promise much strength in science for some time to come, 
and partly because the free exchange of ideas among scientists of all 
nations is, temporarily we hope, impeded by the unsettled state of the 
world. America is now on her own in accumulating a stockpile of 
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fundamental scientific knowledge as a basis for technological 
development”.389 
The reports warned that “the fact that only a thin trickle of scientific knowledge 
is today reaching us from other countries constitutes an emergency and a 
challenge”.390 If the Federal government intended to protect national security, as 
was its clearly stated constitutional responsibility, then the output of basic 
research conducted on American soil had to be increased, and quickly.  
Steelman recommended in 1947 that “in the future… the relative emphasis 
of the Federal program ought to shift towards the support of basic research on an 
unprecedented scale”.391 In the same year, the President announced that “to meet 
this challenge we must promote the rapid growth of basic research, the cross-
fertilization of ideas among our scientists, and the maturing of a new generation 
of scientists who will think boldly and daringly”.392 George F. Zook proclaimed in 
Higher Education for American Democracy (1947) that “it is imperative that 
basic research, largely suspended during the war, be resumed and expanded”. 393 
Basic research drew the focus of the Federal government, and as a result, so did 
the USA’s higher education system.  
The Federal government identified the need to improve the USA’s output 
of basic research as a matter of national security, but whilst applied scientific 
research was carried out in many quarters, including industry and the 
government’s own research laboratories, basic scientific research was then, and 
remains today, primarily the domain of universities and colleges. This caused 
several problems for the Federal government. The first was financial; whereas 
applied research was regularly funded by corporate contracts, this was not the 
case for basic research carried out on campuses during the years of the Cold War. 
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As there is no fixed outcome from studying basic science – and therefore no 
foreseeable line of profit – industry funding was scarce. Even the small amount 
of funding that research in higher education usually received prior to 1941 had 
dramatically decreased during the war years. Zook noted that “in 1930, university 
expenditures were 12% of the total national budget for research and technical 
development in the natural sciences; whereas during the period 1941 – 1945, 
university expenditures averaged only 2% of the total excluding amounts for 
research in atomic energy”.394 This dramatic drop in funding, coupled with the 
fact that funding had been low to start with, meant that the output of basic 
research from university and college campuses was neither high enough to yield 
the results the government had hoped for, nor did the institutions have the means 
to increase their output independently. The only avenue open to the Federal 
government to both increase and improve basic research was to pay for it itself.  
The second problem was one of access. As Steelman identified in 1947, the 
“colleges and universities… are the key to the problem” and he recommended that 
“the most productive approach to support of basic research is through providing 
financial aid to college and university laboratories”.395 Direct Federal funding, 
however, was associated with direct Federal control, and therefore would have 
raised significant questions concerning academic freedom. The Federal 
government neither had nor has any specific constitutional right to involve itself, 
financially or otherwise, in the research undertaken in institutions of higher 
education. Section 8 of the Constitution does provide to Congress “the power... to 
promote the progress of science and the arts, by means of patents and copyrights” 
but, as Good and Teller have recognised, there is nothing to suggest that the 
Founding Fathers “considered the relation between school education and 
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progress in science and the arts”.396 As a result, merely giving money to the 
education system in order to improve it was not an option for the Federal 
government.397   
Without the funding required to complete the work, the universities and 
colleges remained the weak link in the government’s plan. The Federal 
government was forced once again to rely on the ‘Cold War imperative’ – and its 
constitutionally protected right to defend the nation from hostile attacks. In order 
to do this, the Federal government had to establish that basic research fell under 
the umbrella of protecting national security. This automatically established 
university and college research as relevant to national security, and therefore not 
only relevant to, but also the responsibility of, the Federal government. As basic 
research was vital to applied research, and applied research was vital to the USA’s 
Cold War effort, demonstrating the link between basic STEM research and 
national security was not difficult for the Federal government. The next step, 
however, was devising a palatable method through which this research could be 
/funded and directed.  
 
The National Science Foundation 
The establishment of the National Science Foundation (NSF) was first 
recommended to President Truman in Science and Public Policy (1947), a report 
written by John R. Steelman. The NSF, Steelman explained, would be an 
organisation through which the Federal government could gain greater access to 
and control over scientific research in universities. In a press release issued after 
the publication of Science and Public Policy, President Truman noted that “the 
report confirms a belief, previously expressed by me, that the national welfare 
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requires support from the Federal government of basic research in universities 
and non-profit research institutions, through creation by Congress of a National 
Science Foundation”.398 The National Science Foundation (NSF) was established 
in 1950, and protecting the national defence was listed above health and medicine 
in the Foundation’s prioritisation of research.399 Whilst the NSF did provide 
Federal money for educational institutions (50% of the total budget had to go to 
educational institutions) its objective was to efficiently program and co-ordinate 
“all federally financed research and development” – giving money for science 
research in education, but with strings attached.400 The NSF was established in 
order to enable the Federal government to exert an increased level of control over 
the direction of activities conducted in these institutions in the name of national 
defence.  
The NSF was not the only source of Federal funding available to 
universities and colleges during the early years of the Cold War, but it was 
charged with co-ordinating grants for research from all sources to prevent 
overlap, therefore ensuring as streamlined a national research program as 
possible. As Steelman had recommended in Science and Public Policy, the NSF 
was to be “primarily concerned with grants in support of basic research to be 
conducted by the colleges and universities and with co-ordination of grants for 
basic research made by other Federal agencies”.401 The NSF served to formalise 
both the link between academic research and the needs of the Cold War effort, 
and the right of the Federal government to be involved in the direction and 
amount of basic research that was undertaken in the USA during the early years 
of the Cold War and beyond. Through targeted Federal funding, the NSF enabled 
the Federal government to vastly increase the amount of scientific research taking 
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place on college campuses. In addition, the NSF allowed the Federal government 
to bridge the gap between the amount of basic research conducted in higher 
education institutions and the needs of the Federal government, and also enabled 
it to control and monitor what research was undertaken.402  
Traditionally, research carried out in universities was separated from 
Federal intervention and sanctions (such as enforced secrecy, clearance levels or 
directed research); in post-war America, however, this independence was put at 
risk. The NSF was established in order to “formulate a broad national policy 
designed to assure that the scope and the quality of basic research in the country 
are adequate for national security and technological progress”.403  The focus here 
is, naturally, on national security. The bestowal of grants from the NSF was 
intended to be based upon each project’s value to the Cold War effort, rather than 
its contribution to ‘science’ as an abstract concept.404 This undermined the right 
of the universities and colleges to study whatever they chose, uninfluenced by the 
Federal government. Although the Federal government did not force any 
university to accept research grants, higher education was struggling financially 
during this period, and grants were hard to come by, especially for basic research. 
By granting money for targeted research only, the Federal government inexorably 
altered the direction and focus of basic research in higher education during this 
period.  
The NSF’s control over the focus of the research conducted was not its only 
caveat. The NSF also had the right and the responsibility to oversee the “co-
ordination of grants for basic research”.405 This power directly challenged the 
traditional separation of higher education and the Federal government. It was 
intended to prevent the overlap of research, a sensible goal; in order to adequately 
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achieve this, however, the NSF was also required to interfere with what could be 
studied, where and by whom. This meant that the NSF kept a detailed list of all 
the scientific and technological personnel in the country, which included 
researchers working in higher education.406 Further to this, the NSF also retained 
control of the project and its direction after the grant had been approved. The Act 
in which the NSF was proposed stated that  
“as a condition for receiving financial support from the director, each 
contracting organization or institution or individual, as the case may be, 
shall make available full data on all inventions, discoveries and other 
significant findings resulting from research and development financed by 
the Federal government, and shall submit whatever reports the Director 
may deem necessary to effectuate the purposes of this act... The Director 
is hereby authorized and directed to record, collect, edit, publish and 
disseminate pertinent data on all inventions and discoveries and other 
findings resulting from federally financed research and development 
activities”.407 
This was further compounded by the fact that the NSF bestowed funds for 
such a short period of time – a shorter period than almost all scientific research 
projects would actually take to complete. Federally funded scholarships and 
fellowships were available for only one year’s study for scientists.408 This gave it 
even greater power to direct research, as scientists faced the ominous threat of 
having their funding cancelled half way through a project if the NSF was not 
happy with the direction it had taken. Through the financial power of NSF grants 
and their careful co-ordination, campus laboratories across the USA were 
178 
 
converted to war work as easily as peacetime factories had been converted to 
munitions plants in the Second World War.  
Opposition to the funding from the NSF, and to other sources of Federal 
funding such as the Office of Naval Research (ONR), the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) and the Department of Defense (DOD), was minimal. Some 
Quakers who were working as scientists in university or college laboratories 
refused Federal funding for basic research on religious grounds, as they could not 
control whether or not the government would use their basic research to fuel 
applied research in weapons development. In addition, Lee DuBridge, President 
of the California Institute of Technology (CalTech), criticised Federal funding, as 
he feared the consequences if science was forced to “exist merely from the crumbs 
that fall from the table of a weapons development program”.409 By 1953, however, 
DuBridge acknowledged that CalTech would “go broke” quickly if the university’s 
Federal funding were to disappear.410 In many instances, however, the chance to 
contribute was welcomed; as Wolfe has identified, “Many of the men working 
within the universities as scientists during this period had served in the Second 
World War, and viewed their government-funded research with patriotic pride as 
an extension of their service”.411 Even those who were not so keen on the increased 
Federal presence on the campus accepted it as a necessity. Wolfe argues that 
scientists in the 1950s were not so different from all the other average Americans 
during the 1950s, who bought in wholeheartedly to the necessity of the arms race 
for the national security. They believed that only the development of ever bigger 
and better weapons could maintain their uneasy peace with the Soviet Union, and 
basic research was vital to this end.412 On the whole, the needs of the Cold War 
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superseded the needs of the individual even in the eyes of the individuals 
themselves. 
Regardless of opposition, however, the NSF’s impact on research 
conducted in universities was not as uniformly positive as Steelman had hoped. 
In a report entitled The Relationship between the Federal Government and 
Education Beyond the High School (1956), author Richard G. Axt asserted that 
there had been a negative side to government intervention in university research. 
Axt asserted that, whilst “Federal contracts and grants have been the major factor 
in the expansion of university research”, this had meant that “hundreds of 
scientists and thousands of graduate students are now dependents on Federal 
funds for the continuation of their research and graduate education”.413 In less 
than a decade, the Federal government had assumed control of graduate research 
as university laboratories had already come to rely on the money it provided.  
Federal funding strongly favoured the support of STEM subjects, which 
was detrimental to the social sciences and the humanities.414 In addition, even 
those fields which did receive funding (primarily STEM) were adversely affected 
by Federal funding. The NSF’s focus when distributing grants among campuses 
was always based on the benefit to science, not the benefit to education. The NSF 
had a policy of funding the ‘best science’ – awarding funding to the party 
considered most capable of carrying out the research, not the department that 
would most benefit from the money. Axt stated that “there are indications that 
Federal research projects have affected both the distribution of research and 
educational facilities in different areas of the country and the concentration of 
talent in these areas”.415  
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Departments which did not lead in their field before the creation of the 
NSF were not supported in their growth by the NSF. It also made it more difficult 
for universities and colleges that were already particularly strong in one area to 
grow in other departments, as the focus had to be maintained in the areas in 
which it was already strong. Whilst this policy was a sensible approach for 
ensuring high quality research, it lead to geographic inequality in the distribution 
of grants. This in turn meant that different scientific departments prospered at 
different rates and led to a geographic inequality in the quality of science 
departments. The NSF grants streamlined the research carried out on campus 
and limited otherwise broad spectrums of research interests. Students who did 
not live on the East Coast or in California were greatly affected, as were poorer 
students who were restricted in their choice of geographical location as it was 
cheaper to attend a local college than to study out-of-State.416 
Axt also recognised that the research projects which were funded by the 
government were often a burden as well as a blessing. Whilst the Federal grant 
covered the costs of the research project itself, universities were often expected to 
finance the ‘indirect’ costs and overhead costs (such as paying new research or 
teaching assistants as the professor was busier, the need for more classrooms due 
to the increased student body, and the costs of running the building) as they were 
not covered by the government. These costs often totalled more than most 
institutions could easily afford, and in some instances required the redirection of 
costs from other areas of the department, or other departments, so as not to 
default on the Federal grant. 
Federal money was prolific throughout higher education by the mid-1950s. 
In 1955, President Eisenhower highlighted that “next year the Department of 
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Defense will spend about $100 million on research at colleges and universities, 
exclusive of an additional $100 million for the operation of large research centers 
managed for the government by several dozen universities”.417 Eisenhower 
continued to state that “the Atomic Energy Commission has had a large number 
of research contracts at universities and colleges over the last decade, and the 
research grant budget of the National Science Foundation has doubled every year 
since the establishment of that agency in 1951”.418 The relationship between 
university research and the Federal government, for better or worse, was firmly 
established in just five years. In 1956, Axt claimed that of the $300 million spent 
annually at colleges and universities on research in science, roughly $150 million 
came from Federal sources, including, but not limited to, the NSF. In fields that 
were considered to be important to the war effort, such as physics, almost 90% of 
the funding was Federal. This meant that many departments were almost totally 
reliant on the Federal government for the continuation of their research, which 
in turn meant that keeping the government happy was vital to their survival. In 
these departments, a separation between education and the Federal government 
no longer existed. 
 
The ‘Manpower’ Problem 
The USA was progressing towards a future in which basic research would be 
financially supported by the Federal government in order to protect US national 
security. Yet despite this development, the Federal government could not 
honestly state that this would make the USA ‘safe’. In fact, quite the opposite was 
true. The increased funds made available for the improvement in the quality of 
basic research taking place in the universities were useless to the nation if the 
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quantity of basic research being undertaken still did not fulfil the nation’s needs. 
The ‘Washington Report’, published in 1947, identified that “for the present, it’s 
not money that limits research as much as a shortage of scientific manpower. The 
half-million dollars available this year for military research won’t all be spent 
because trained men aren’t available to do the work”.419  Science and Public Policy 
recognised that  
“expansion in trained personnel has not kept pace with that of our national 
research and development budget. Whereas that budget increased 100% 
between 1930 and 1940, our supply of research scientists and technicians 
rose from 49,500 to 92,000 in the same period, or some 85%. Between 
1940 and 1947, the national research and development budget increased 
335%, while the supply of trained manpower was expanding only 35%”.420 
The Federal government was presented with a new problem: increasing the 
number of scientists willing and capable of undertaking basic scientific research 
on university and college campuses. No amount of funding for research would 
improve the USA’s scientific standing if there were not enough scientists to carry 
out the work.  
Not only was there a shortage of trained scientists in the USA, but the 
outlook for the future showed no improvement, as the number of students 
choosing to study science at tertiary level was far below where it needed to be in 
order to compete with the Soviet Union. In 1947, the Engineering Manpower 
Commission of the Engineers Joint Council established that  
“the number of young engineering graduates who can reasonably be 
expected to be available for scientific employment over the next ten years 
will be far below the estimated annual need of 30,000 men. It may drop to 
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as low as 12,000 by 1952. From 1954 until 1957 it will be about 17,000 per 
year. After 1957 it should start increasing, but will not equal the annual 
need until about 1965”.421 
Moreover, the report of a committee that was succinctly titled the ‘Joint 
Conference of the Cooperative Committee for the Teaching of Science and 
Mathematics of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and 
the US Office of Education’ recognised that  
“the present annual output of engineers and technicians in the USSR is 
approximately 100,000 with prospect for rapid expansion. The outlook is 
not the same for the United States. Present evidence indicates that the 
supply of scientists and engineers in the United States will not continue to 
expand at the same rapid rate”.422 
Far more Russian students studied STEM subjects at university than did their 
American counterparts, leaving the USA far behind in its ability to produce basic 
or applied research at the same rate as its enemies, regardless of funding. The 
Federal government understood that, without intervention, the USA would 
continue to lag behind the Soviet Union in this most vital battleground for years 
to come.  
Several factors contributed to the USA’s scarcity of trained scientists and 
engineers during the late 1940s. The Great Depression had affected the birth rate, 
which in turn affected the number of teenagers available to take up university 
places in the late 1940s.423 The Depression also significantly impacted the 
number of intelligent men and women who could afford to attend college or 
university – the only institutions capable of training students to a high enough 
level for a career in scientific research. This already reduced number was then 
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further impacted by the onset of the Second World War. In addition to the 
considerable number of capable young men who had been lost on the battlefield, 
Zook noted that “the United States did not safeguard its scientific manpower 
during the recent war as other nations did”.424 Not only did the USA lose young 
men with potential, it lost men who had already received training in STEM 
subjects.425 Consequently, Zook highlighted, “we now do not have enough trained 
personnel to staff the research and development laboratories of industry, 
government and the universities”.426  
The Second World War also directly affected the number of Americans 
who matriculated in college between 1942 and 1946, as so many college aged men 
and women chose to enlist instead of enrol. Steelman recognised that “in the years 
from 1934 to 1938 about 1400 doctorates in science were awarded yearly and in 
1941 nearly 1900 were conferred”, however, “it is estimated that our manpower 
pool today is smaller by 90,000 bachelors and 5,000 doctors of science than it 
would have been if pre-war trends continued”.427 After the end of the Second 
World War, the GI Bill smoothed the way for the returning veterans, but the 
number of teenagers who matriculated after the war was reduced as not all 
capable students could afford to attend higher education. In addition, many who 
could afford to go chose not to, as employment for men and women who had a 
high school level education was plentiful and often well paid in the years after the 
War. This option therefore provided a tempting alternative to campus life. 
 Of those who did make it as far as matriculation, science was often not the 
obvious choice for a major. The program of ‘life-adjustment education’ was seen 
as the prime culprit. ‘Life-adjustment education’ focused on preparing students 
for their adult lives rather than their adult careers, and placed a greater emphasis 
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on citizenship education and patriotism than STEM subjects. Education historian 
Herbert M. Kliebard has identified that “life-adjustment education was seen as 
the prime example of the USA’s ‘soft’ education in contrast to the rigorous Soviet 
system”.428 He asserts that “while American children were learning how to get 
along with their peers or how to bake a cherry pie... Soviet children were being 
steeped in the hard sciences and mathematics needed to win the technological 
race that had become the centrepiece of the Cold War”.429 University Professor 
and native Siberian Demitri B. Shimkin also attempted to explain the reasons why 
Soviet pupils were superior to American pupils, stating that “Soviet education is 
a State training programme preparing personnel for planned, pre-determined 
positions in the labor force. American Education seeks, in contrast, to develop the 
inherent capacities of individuals so that they might lead socially useful lives and 
exercise reasonable judgement as citizens”.430 As the previous chapter 
highlighted, high school curriculums during this period often also focused more 
on education for democracy than on a firm grounding in science and technology. 
In turn, high school seniors were often more inclined to choose to study the 
humanities or social sciences at college, rather than the nationally important 
STEM subjects.  
The final factor which affected the availability of trained scientists to carry 
out basic research on behalf of the Federal government was that, after the end of 
the Second World War, there was an increased need for trained scientists to work 
in the industrial sector outside of the university campus. In addition, scientific 
jobs within the industrial sector invariably offered far higher salaries to graduates 
than did university or government research, and therefore this plentiful supply of 
well-paid positions habitually lured the cream of the crop away from campus 
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research. George F. Zook recognised that “because of the lower salaries paid in 
educational institutions, such competition tends to concentrate the manpower 
shortage in the universities and makes it difficult for them to get and keep the 
most able men –  those who should be training others”.431 John R. Steelman 
recognised that “when employment in one sector of the research triangle [higher 
education, government and industry] increases, there is a corresponding 
reduction in other sectors – evidence that a limited manpower supply is shifting 
about”.432 As a result of the growth in the industrial sector, the universities’ share 
of the manpower pool in science, and in turn, the government’s, were directly 
impacted and fell from a 48% share in 1930 to a 36% share in 1947.433  
In a statement issued upon receipt of Science and Public Policy, President 
Truman identified this combination of issues and stated that  
“the shortage of highly trained scientists is the product of sharply 
increased demand accompanied by less-than-normal supply. Expenditure 
for research and development are more than three times as high as the pre-
war level. At the same time, curtailment in education during the war 
deprived us of about half the normal increase in scientists, totalling some 
thirty-five thousand graduates, including 5,000 doctors of science”.434  
President Truman acknowledged both that a convergence of social, economic and 
military factors had occurred after the end of the Second World War which left 
the USA with a worryingly small stockpile of scientifically trained manpower at a 
time when scientific knowhow had become vital to the security of the USA, and 
that the curtailment of education had to be reversed soon in order to prevent the 
situation from worsening.  
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 The Federal government attacked this problem with the same fervour with 
which it addressed the lack of money available to university research programs. 
The Scientific Manpower Committee noted in 1950 that “it is of paramount 
importance to the security of the United States that the nation maintain, in peace 
and in war, an adequate supply of scientifically and technically trained manpower 
to carry on progressive research on basic science”.435 In 1951, the President’s 
National Manpower Mobilization Policy stated that “we must rely heavily on 
science and technology and that malutilization of persons having scientific and 
special skills represents a direct and unnecessary reduction of our defense 
potential”.436 The Federal government recognised that the shortage once again 
posed a threat to the national security, and resolved to address the situation.  
The government had two options to assuage the severity of the manpower 
shortage in the years after the Second World War: train ‘new’ scientists through 
the universities and colleges, or tempt ‘existing’ scientists from outside the USA 
to make up the shortfall. Initially, the Federal government chose the latter option, 
and offered asylum to Nazi scientists in return for their expertise in support of 
the USA’s scientific programs. Entitled ‘Operation Paperclip’, the Federal 
government sought out Nazis with expertise in STEM fields – including Nobel 
Prize winners – and agreed to absolve their past crimes in exchange for scientific 
knowledge. Operation Paperclip, however, proved unpopular with academics and 
the general American public. A telegram sent to the President on 30th December 
1946 from a number of prominent academics outlined the opposition. The 
academics feared that not all of those recruited had truly renounced their fascist 
views, and therefore were not appropriate people to be shaping the USA’s future. 
They feared that the former Nazi scientists would “inculcate those anti-
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democratic doctrines which seek to undermine and destroy national unity”, and 
therefore would do more damage to the safety of American democracy than 
science could do to save it.437 The group asserted that “we hold these individuals 
to be potentially dangerous carriers of racial and religious hatred. Their former 
eminence as Nazi party members and supporters raises the issue of their fitness 
to become American Citizens or hold key positions in American industrial, 
scientific and educational institutions”.438 They also feared that these men and 
their families would receive permanent residency, creating a Nazi community 
within the borders of the US States.439 STEM research was vital because the 
government intended to use it to ensure the USA’s safety in the modern world; 
conversely, however, Operation Paperclip actively invited ‘subversives’ to make 
their lives on US soil. Despite opposition, the government continued with 
Operation Paperclip. The USA was not the only nation to have had this idea, 
however, therefore the pool of available Nazi scientists was soon exhausted, and 
the Federal government was forced to seek another solution to the USA’s shortage 
of scientifically trained manpower.   
The Federal government was left with only one solution: to train more 
scientists. Vannevar Bush was the first to recognise this after the Second World 
War, and he described it in a report to the President entitled Science and the 
Endless Frontier (1945). Bush stated in a letter to Steelman that “if we are to 
develop the scientific activities of the country on a broad basis and on a scale 
commensurate with the country’s needs, the first requirement is a continuing 
expansion of the university program in order to develop the flow of new 
knowledge and the supply of scientists... Only by doing so can the bottleneck be 
broken”.440 Bush continued to highlight that “to enlarge the group of specially 
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qualified men and women it is necessary to increase the number who go to 
college. Our engineers and scientists for the next few years must come from the 
graduating classes in our colleges”.441 Later, Frederick Emmons Terman, the 
Dean of Engineering at Stanford University, identified in a letter he wrote to 
Steelman following the publication of Science and Public Policy that “universities 
are our only source of scientific and technological manpower, and they are our 
principal sources of fundamental scientific knowledge. There-fore, any effort to 
strengthen the scientific position of the country must start by strengthening and 
expanding the scientific activities of our universities”.442 Terman, who is also 
credited with being the co-founder of Silicon Valley, a mecca of scientific activity 
and a testament to the USA’s scientific ability, firmly believed in the importance 
of scientific teaching and research to the nation and the irreplaceable function 
higher education would play in this endeavour. His letter established that the 
institutions of higher education were to play a fundamental part in the American 
government’s effort to win the Cold War – both in research and training. 
In post-war America, however, a significant chasm existed between the 
number of students who were capable of completing a college level degree, and 
the number of these students who were actually afforded the opportunity. The 
report from the ‘Joint Conference of the Co-operative Committee on the Teaching 
of Science and Mathematics of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science and the US Office of Education’, which was published towards the end of 
the Truman Administration, highlighted the problem that “there is a potential 
supply of scientists and mathematicians that needs to be tapped. Only 40% of the 
high school graduates of college ability are granted a college degree. What 
happens to the other 60%? What happens to this large pool containing many 
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potential scientists and engineers? 20% drop out during college, and 40% never 
enter college”.443 Commissioner Earl J. McGrath also discussed this fact in School 
Life, stating that  
“it is true that a higher percentage of qualified youth go to college and 
university in the United States than in any other nation; but it is also true 
that no nation – the United States included – has begun to approach 
numerical adequacy in its higher education system... A democratic nation 
can ill afford this continuing loss of its ambitious and able youth who, year 
after year, are trained below the limits of their potential development”.444 
This, and many other reports published during the Truman Administration, 
indicated that “the foremost reason for the failure of these potential scientists, 
engineers and leaders of our nation to undertake college studies is lack of 
money”.445  
The solution was simple: the Federal government must increase the 
number of American students who studied STEM subjects at the tertiary level. 
Yet neither the Federal government nor the academic community had the power 
either to force Americans to attend an institution of higher education, or to dictate 
what they studied upon matriculation. This, however, proved to be no deterrent 
to the Federal government, as it was able to rely upon the ‘Cold War imperative’ 
to support its endeavours and give weight to its arguments. President Truman 
had already established that education, as well as research, was vital to the 
national defence, as he had stated in a letter published in 1947 in the widely 
circulated report of the Truman Commission, Higher Education for American 
Democracy, that  
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“the coming of the Atomic Age… has deepened and broadened the 
responsibilities of higher education for anticipating and preparing for the 
social and economic changes that will come with the application of atomic 
energy to industrial uses. At the same time it has underscored the need for 
education and research for the self-protection of our democracy, for 
demonstrating the merits of our way of life to other peoples”.446 
Steelman corroborated Truman’s stance, and acknowledged that a drop in trained 
scientific manpower threatened the safety of the USA, both because “it renders 
the universities and colleges less able than formerly to expand basic research at a 
time when such basic research is urgent” and because “it makes it less likely that 
students now enrolled will receive the rigorous training necessary to the 
successful expansion of basic research in the future”.447 As it was the 
responsibility of the Federal government to protect the USA, it was the 
responsibility of the Federal government to respond to this problem.448   
Steelman was not alone in his view that, as the problem threatened the 
USA’s national security, it should be tackled by the Federal government. A School 
Life article from 1947 noted that “to maintain American leadership in scientific 
research and discovery is a deep concern of those responsible for the national 
defense”.449 George F. Kennan stated in Full Strength for the Long Pull (1950) 
that “this need for a substantial and rapid increase in the number of people who 
go to colleges and universities is a national problem requiring national action”.450 
An argument was even made in the ‘Report of the Joint Conference of the Co-
operative Committee on the Teaching of Science and Mathematics of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science and the US Office of 
Education’ that the Federal government should provide financing to students of 
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higher education in the USA. The attendees highlighted that “we are spending 
large sums of money to develop our material resources and at the same time fail 
to develop a large part of our human resources. We spend millions of dollars for 
stockpiles of critical minerals, but we spend little to increase our supply of the 
most vital instruments of defense – the scientists”. 451 This report once again re-
iterates the common post war tendency to equate scientists with warriors. No 
longer were the military the first line of defence – scientists had superseded 
soldiers as the “most vital instruments of defense” and were, therefore, of national 
importance.452 
Steelman recognised that the problem was so severe that it would most 
likely take at least a decade of dedication to increase the stockpile of scientific 
manpower until the problem was fixed. He advised the President that “such a 
program must, however, be our objective, and policies must be directed toward 
its realization”.453 A School Life article published in 1951 informed readers that 
the Commissioner of Education, Earl J. McGrath, believed that “maintaining a 
minimal essential flow of men through the colleges” was vital to the Cold War 
effort, which therefore made it “a matter of fundamental national interest”.454  
University and college student recruitment, at least where degrees in STEM 
subjects were concerned, was transformed from a matter of individual ambition 
to a matter of national pride, with an urgency which necessitated Federal 
intervention.  
 
Student Deferment in Selective Service 
Just increasing the number of students who had the opportunity to attend college, 
however, was not enough; the Federal government also needed to influence the 
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number of students who graduated with degrees in STEM subjects. Yet, soon 
after this problem had been recognised, the Korean War broke out and presented 
the Federal government with a unique opportunity to influence this very area of 
academia. At first glance, the Korean War conferred upon the Federal 
government yet another barrier to its goal of increasing the number of 
matriculating – and graduating – students in the USA: this barrier came in the 
form of the draft. The majority of men eligible for the draft for the Korean War 
were also of college age, which threatened to further reduce the available pool of 
college graduates, potentially for years to come. The Korean War also greatly 
intensified the need for these graduates. Technical manpower provided by the 
colleges and universities was made even more important to the nation as, in 
numbers alone, the USA could not match the strength of hostile forces from 
countries with far larger populations. The Chairman of the Scientific Manpower 
Advisory Committee, Charles A. Thomas, stated in the Committee’s report that 
“in terms of gross numbers of men, the United States is inferior to its potential 
enemies”.455 It was vital, therefore, that the US army could outmatch hostile 
forces in other ways, the primary method being superior weaponry designed by 
college educated men.456  
The problem was that the USA had still not had time to replenish its 
shortage of scientists, therefore research was not yet being carried out at a level 
commensurate with the nation’s need. The ‘extra barrier’ created by the draft 
made the situation even worse, and therefore became the focus of the Federal 
government’s plan. The draft bestowed upon the Federal government a channel 
through which it could influence the number of students who chose to study 
STEM subjects at institutions of higher education. The Federal government had 
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learned from its mistakes in the Second World War, and well understood the need 
to protect scientific manpower from military service. In addition, it chose to 
extend this protection to college students who studied subjects which were 
deemed to be nationally useful. This protection from the draft could then have a 
positive impact on the number of high school students who ‘voluntarily’ chose to 
study STEM subjects at university. The Scientific Manpower Advisory Committee 
was particularly concerned with the preservation and utilisation of students with 
an aptitude for science after the outbreak of the Korean War. It identified that 
“the present problem, then, is to create a plan that will assure a continuing supply 
of men with special training, and to devise a method that will secure the best use 
of them as well as those who are already trained”.457 The Federal government 
could certainly ill afford to reduce the potential pool of scientific manpower even 
further, therefore a plan which safeguarded both trained scientific personnel and 
those willing to undertake the training required to join them was deemed vital to 
national security.  
M. H. Trytten, the Director of the Office of Scientific Personnel in the 
National Research Council, had undertaken a study into this very area prior to 
the outbreak of the Korean War, and had concluded that to indiscriminately 
induct youths into the army regardless of academic prowess falsely established 
the armed forces as the “absolute priority in the defense of the nation” and 
presupposed that “every man can serve his country more effectively in uniform 
than in any other way”.458 Trytten identified that the draft directly challenged the 
nation’s need to protect highly trained personnel. He stated in his report, Student 
Deferment in Selective Service: A Vital Factor in National Security (1952), better 
known as the Trytten Report, that “the maximum strength of the nation can be 
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achieved only if the individual serves where he can contribute most. Universality 
of service in uniform, on the other hand, necessarily results in reduced national 
strength”.459  
His view was corroborated by Charles A. Thomas, whose work for the 
Scientific Manpower Advisory Committee had identified a similar path. Thomas 
had stated that 
“at present there are about 65,000 scientists and engineers of age 25 or 
less. They represent less than ONE PERCENT of the civilian male 
population in this draft age group. A large fraction of these young men are 
already employed in work of vital importance to the nation and more are 
needed. When the special skills which they possess are more urgently 
required by the armed forces, a more adequate number of them should be 
inducted and assigned to the military speciality which will make the best 
use of their capabilities. But it is most vital that these trained scientists and 
engineers are not removed from the defense activities for service in non-
specialized military assignments”.460  
Deferment of useful personnel from conscription was of course not a new 
phenomenon in the USA – the deferment of men in professions such as farming, 
iron-working or medicine was common in Colonial times – but this was the first 
time in which college students had been recommended for deferment on such a 
large scale, and with so few qualifying factors.461 The reason behind this radical 
move is simple; the Federal government recognised that a high number of well 
trained personnel, especially in scientific fields, were as vital to the USA’s Cold 
War effort as iron-workers and farmers had been to success in previous conflicts.  
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Trytten gave the Federal government both the opportunity and the 
justification to encourage students to choose to study for degrees in STEM 
subjects over the humanities. He stated in his report that to “adopt policies 
relegating [college] training to a position of secondary importance is to invite 
catastrophe” and that to prioritise the military would leave technical warfare in 
the hands of “the remainder of the population”.462;463 These statements 
demonstrated that higher education was as important to the nation as the work 
of the military. As such, Trytten argued, it would be ‘catastrophic’ to allow them 
to remain solely under civilian authority. Higher education must not be left to the 
“remainder of the population” ’ but must instead be treated with as much care as 
the military; in short, the government must ensure the safeguarding of useful 
personnel. Trytten’s report acknowledged openly that the national situation, 
caused broadly by the Cold War and more specifically by the Korean War (his 
report was updated and reprinted after the Korean War began), required that the 
Federal government involve itself directly in matters of higher education.  
A national policy of student deferment was unpopular when first proposed 
as it was seen as elitist and unnecessary. Critics such as Harvard President James 
Conant labelled it as discriminatory to all but a privileged few students as men 
who could not afford a college education would not be eligible to apply for the 
draft exemption. Trytten also noted that Conant believed that it was an 
unnecessary exemption; as the period of service was only two years, discharged 
men could simply resume or begin their studies afterwards.464 Trytten defended 
the exemption, however, by demonstrating that it was necessary in order to 
protect national security. Trytten explained that a mandatory two year service in 
the armed forces for men graduating from high school would result in all male 
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students graduating from college or university two years later. In turn this would 
mean that the USA would have to wait two years longer for a boost in its pool of 
specialised personnel – a wait that the nation could ill afford.465 Trytten also 
demonstrated that the gap in schooling caused by enlistment would lead to a 
widespread loss of academic momentum, which could encourage a greater 
number of students to abandon a college education entirely in favour of either 
remaining in the military or entering the workforce immediately after their 
discharge. This, Trytten argued, would strongly affect national security as the 
USA would lose out on the long term boost in the number of trained scientists 
that were graduating.466  
The loss of men to university research programs was not the only problem 
which Trytten anticipated. He also identified that, as the nation was now involved 
in a ‘hot war’ in Korea, the armed forces also increasingly relied upon specially 
trained personnel to carry out military duties as a matter of national security. If 
men were exclusively drafted before receiving a college education, these roles, 
which were equally vital to the nation’s safety, would also remain unfilled.467 
General Omar Bradley stated in 1952 that “The military services have the same 
need, especially during wartime, for first rate men… We must have in the future 
of American education a method of developing first rate men”.468 Drafting 
American men straight out of high school not only damaged the nations’ future 
pool of scientific manpower, but also the quality of its soldiers. As the age limit 
for the draft was twenty-six years old, no exemption would mean that, in just a 
few short years, no college educated men with vital specialist training could be 
called up to fight.  
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The Federal government adopted the recommendations Trytten proposed 
in Student Deferment in Selective Service. After review by a Congressional 
Committee, his plan to amend the Selective Service Act of 1948 was effected by 
Executive Order of the President in March 1951. It authorised the President, 
“under such rules and regulation as he may prescribe, to provide for the 
deferment from training and service under this title in the armed forces of the 
Unites States”.469;470 The Act stated that enrolled, full-time college, professional 
or graduate students were eligible for “occupational deferment for study 
necessary to the national health, safety or interest”, and that the director of 
Selective Service was “authorized to prescribe a test and to establish qualifying 
test scores, or scholastic standing, or both, for such deferment”.471 Provided the 
students could meet a certain standard, as determined by the Selective Service 
College Qualification Test (SSCQT), they were deemed eligible to apply for 
deferment. 
The test, which was based upon the Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT), was administered to all draft age men who met the criteria. In order to 
be considered to be eligible, students had to have already secured a place in 
college, be able to afford the tuition fees or demonstrate that they had already 
won a scholarship, and wish to be considered for deferment. The test was not 
mandatory for students who met this criteria, but roughly seventy-five percent of 
those eligible to take it did so. Eighty percent of those who sat the test were 
deferred. Deferment was granted if the student either scored above 70 on the test, 
or if their score placed them in the top half of their class if they were a freshman, 
the top two thirds if they were a sophomore or the top three quarters for juniors. 
If the student was attempting to gain deferment for graduate school, he had to 
199 
 
score 70 or above or place in the top fifty percent of his senior class.472 These two 
alternative methods of qualification ensured that elite, selective institutions with 
a high number of intelligent students would not be discriminated against by being 
forced to lose the bottom fifty percent of their student body even if they scored 
over 70. In turn, it also ensured that small, liberal arts schools with a low number 
of enrolled students would not face losing the majority of their student body as at 
least the top fifty percent of their classes would be deferred regardless of their 
score.  
Trytten stated in Student Deferment in Selective Service that “the student 
deferment policy continues to be the means by which the Federal government 
seeks to answer the question of which young men shall be permitted to continue 
their training in college and university, and which should be classified as available 
for military service”.473  This is a clear acknowledgment that the decision as to 
which men would be permitted to attend college now lay in large part with the 
Federal government, and the criteria were far from fair. The test favoured early 
achievers, as students initially had to place in the top fifty percent of their 
freshman class. Students who had the potential to blossom over time were not 
given the opportunity to do so before they undertook military training. Deferment 
also required that students remain in “good standing” within their class, 
otherwise their deferment status would be revoked.474  This meant that if students 
began to struggle with their work, they could have their deferment status revoked. 
It also meant that students’ college experiences could have been vastly altered as 
they were not given the opportunity to ‘act out’, as is often so common for college 
students to do. Indeed, in the 1960s, when college students became known for 
campus protests, the support for student deferment among the general public 
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dropped dramatically and draft boards began disregarding SSCQT scores more 
regularly.475  
The program of student deferment also favoured wealthy students over 
working class students of equal intelligence, as students had to have already 
secured a college place – and more importantly be able to pay for it – before they 
became eligible to sit the SSCQT. It also favoured white students over students 
from ethnic minorities as there were far more college places available for white 
students than there were for minority students. Trytten acknowledged this in his 
report, stating that “the college student population does include a 
disproportionately large representation from the middle- and upper-income 
groups. Furthermore, members of some racial and ethnic groups and residents of 
some sections of the country, including rural residents, generally are 
disadvantaged in access to the opportunity for college education”.476 Trytten 
offered no solution for this problem however, and instead chose to claim national 
security as the more pressing matter; “we cannot afford, in order just to make a 
gesture toward surface equality, to sacrifice the future development of our society 
by an action which in the event of full scale war would be futile – or, worse, 
dangerously wasteful of much needed skills”.477 He did suggest that the Federal 
government should make hardship loans available to these marginalised 
students, but no program was ever established alongside this policy for student 
deferment.478 
The test purported not to discriminate against students who did not want 
to major in STEM subjects, and students studying humanities were equally as 
eligible to take the test as those studying chemistry or physics. Trytten stated that 
this was a necessary clause as, if the deferment program was subject specific, the 
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Federal government’s interference into affairs of higher education would skew 
the traditionally varied make-up of the student body. Trytten claimed that this 
decision had been made for two reasons; firstly, it had been motivated by issues 
of national security. The conflict was expected to be long and drawn out, and 
Trytten, in conjunction with other specialists from both the military and the 
education system, believed that the future of the Cold War could not be foreseen, 
and as such, neither could the future needs of the country. No one, he explained, 
could have foreseen the usefulness of a Russian language degree prior to the 
beginning of the Cold War, or a Japanese language degree prior to the Second 
World War..479 To marginalise some subjects in favour of others, he 
acknowledged, could prove to be very dangerous to the future of national security. 
Secondly, Trytten believed that to prioritise some subjects over others would 
“undoubtedly increase the flow of youth into some of these various fields of 
training and would decrease the flow into others”.480 This, in turn, would cause a 
serious shift in the output of universities that may, in Trytten’s words, “seriously 
affect the future course of our culture and civilization, since this is determined by 
the aggregate efforts of those who work in the many fields of intellectual 
activity”.481 Trytten acknowledged that this level of interference into the make-up 
of higher education would give the Federal government a great level of power over 
the future of the USA, and therefore was to be avoided. 
The program of student deferment, however, did favour students who 
intended to major in STEM subjects. This is not surprising, as STEM subjects had 
been the driving force of the policy from the beginning, and continued to be the 
driving force of the policy of student deferment, even if the policy itself did allow 
for the deferment of students studying other disciplines. Both Trytten and the 
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other committees who supported the policy of student deferment had come to the 
same conclusion. Trytten wrote in his report that “it was unanimous and 
considered the opinion of these committees that the nation’s immediate and long-
range security urgently required an uninterrupted flow of sufficient numbers of 
scientific and specialized personnel into advanced training for subsequent 
utilization in either civilian or military occupations”.482 The purpose of the 
program of student deferment was to protect and grow the nation’s stock of 
scientific manpower, and if the program did not favour STEM majors – however 
subversively – it would not have fulfilled its brief.  
To begin with, the SSCQT, the sole decider for deferment, favoured 
scientifically orientated students. Trytten highlighted in his report that “in 
engineering, physical sciences and mathematics, the percentage of examinees 
passing the test was well above average throughout”.483 Despite the fact that the 
test was split into two parts – one verbal and one quantitative – Trytten 
acknowledged that students who intended to study science, maths or engineering 
outstripped humanities students on the quantitative test – a result to be expected 
– but humanities students’ results virtually equalled those of scientifically 
orientated students on the verbal portion of the test. This meant that a far greater 
number of scientific students scored highly on the SSCQT than did humanities 
students, leaving a greater number of the former free to continue their studies 
uninterrupted, and a greater number of humanities students were deemed 
eligible for the draft.484 Whilst the local draft boards technically had the power to 
decide who was deferred and who was inducted, in this case, Donald D. Stewart 
has noted, the local boards generally followed the Federal government’s 
recommendations with regards to student deferment. As such, students’ scores 
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from the federally administered test were the main determining factor in their 
deferment from the armed forces. Moreover, as the tests favoured scientists and 
mathematicians, this meant that the Federal government was able to positively 
influence the number of students who majored in STEM subjects without actually 
involving itself in student recruitment or registration. 485 
The test was not the only way in which the program for student deferment 
influenced students to study STEM subjects over the humanities or social 
sciences. The main reason why the program had been enforced was to protect 
scientific and technical personnel, and as the Trytten Report was made public, 
this information was also public. The program’s very existence glorified the study 
of STEM subjects in the public eye. Science was designated as necessary to the 
war effort and scientists were painted as being as heroic as soldiers. Trytten 
himself knew that this alone would influence students when choosing their major, 
and even declared as much in another part of the report: he stated that “any 
policy, no matter what it is, will work some change in the pattern of higher 
education and in the pattern of training that is formed by the selections of fields 
of study by the youth of today, who seek to adjust themselves to a new and 
different world”.486 Trytten knew that this would affect the nation as well as the 
schools, as he continued to note that “whatever the effect, it will be of great 
significance in the future, not only to the colleges and universities, but to the 
civilization that is shaped by their graduates”.487 The claim that the policy was 
enacted with no thought to the effect that it would have on the distribution of 
students between majors is an untruth.  
Finally, the policy of student deferment also had the potential to affect 
students’ choice of major in a way that Trytten did not acknowledge, but which 
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contemporary commentator Donald D. Stewart did. The policy of student 
deferment allowed for just that, the opportunity to be deferred from military 
service in order to undertake a college degree. Upon completion of the degree, 
students were allowed a period of four months’ grace in order to secure 
employment which was useful to the war effort, or they would then begin their 
military service.488 Although students in the social sciences, humanities, 
education, and in related fields were eligible for deferment after graduation, 
Stewart recognised that in reality “such former students are disadvantaged, for 
the positions of most are not so likely to be considered “essential” by the local 
board as those available, for example, to graduates in engineering or the natural 
sciences”.489 Stewart believed that this clause would disadvantage students in the 
social sciences and humanities and that they would be more likely to be drafted 
upon graduation as a result. 
 Stewart noted that this clause discriminated against humanities and social 
science students after graduation, but he did not identify its potential to 
discriminate against the humanities or social sciences as disciplines in 
themselves. This clause, however, also had the potential to affect the make-up of 
higher education directly. As securing a job useful to the war effort within four 
months of graduation and therefore avoiding the draft after college was likely to 
be far easier if a student possessed a scientific or mathematical undergraduate 
degree, it is foolish to assume that this would not have had an impact on future 
students’ choice of major. As a result, this clause not only had the potential to 
disadvantage humanities students upon graduation, but also, once again, to 
influence students’ choice of major in favour of the nationally useful STEM 
subjects.  
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It is true that Congress attempted to level the playing field for deferred 
students by raising the age of liability for induction from twenty-six to thirty-five 
years of age. This meant, in theory, that being drafted eventually was likely for all 
students, regardless of their scores on the SSCQT. As Stewart has also 
demonstrated, however, in reality this was not the case. Regardless of status, the 
induction of a man over twenty-six was unlikely during the Korean War for two 
reasons. Firstly, at the time the policy was enacted, there still existed a policy of 
exemption for men with dependents. Due to the low median age of marriage in 
the early 1950s and the high rate of childbirth, most men over twenty-six were 
likely to fall into this category at some point soon after graduation.490 Secondly, 
there was actually little benefit to the military in inducting a thirty-five-year-old 
man used to desk work over a nineteen-year-old, and nineteen-year-olds with no 
aptitude for STEM subjects were not in short supply.491  
High school graduates could not help but have been influenced by the 
Federal government’s prioritisation of STEM fields in tertiary education. STEM 
fields were promoted as being nationally useful, and akin to becoming a soldier 
(without ever actually having to fight). Majoring in a STEM field also meant that 
such students were more likely to gain acceptance to university, were more likely 
to avoid the draft, were more likely to receive funding for their research and they 
were more likely to secure a high paying job which enabled them to avoid the draft 
after they graduated. For any student to be deferred in their freshman year they 
had to have already secured a place at college – the AFQT placed the IQ of college 
graduates as 20 points higher on average than that of the general population – 
and then additionally they had to place in the top fifty percent of their class.492 It 
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is not unreasonable to assume that the USA’s best and brightest would have been 
able to connect these simple dots to avoid the draft indefinitely.  
Like the students, the Federal government was also aware of the impact 
that its efforts to increase the number of graduates in STEM subjects would have 
on education in the humanities and social sciences, and subsequently the balance 
of the nation’s distribution of knowledge. Commissioner of Education Earl J. 
McGrath was quoted in a School Life article discussing the fact that  
“there is a growing concern among the nation’s educators and statesmen 
over the growing possibility that government action in one narrowly 
defined area may lead to an undue emphasis on the natural sciences and 
result in an imbalance in education and in the national culture. The 
congress may well consider whether it’s necessary and desirable action on 
behalf of the natural sciences has not brought upon it further obligation to 
act with similar effectiveness in the fields of social studies and the 
humanities”.493  
The Commissioner of Education openly acknowledged that the actions of the 
Federal government could have a negative effect upon the quality and quantity of 
education in the humanities and social sciences. Despite his call for this 
burgeoning issue to be addressed, no action to this effect was ever taken. It is fair 
to argue that this is because education in the humanities and social sciences 
lacked the requisite importance to national security which was needed in order to 
command the attention of the Federal government. 
Trytten took pains to justify the Federal government’s move by clarifying 
that the direction of the American higher education system “touches deeply the 
future of the nation because what we do with our youth today will determine the 
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kind of people we have tomorrow, and thus will affect our strength in technology, 
our culture, our social organization, our economy, and in a special way our 
military power”.494  With the rise of technical warfare it had become too 
important to be ignored by the Federal government, as, Trytten highlighted, 
“there is scarcely an activity which contributes to the national health, safety or 
welfare that does not rest squarely upon the knowledge and skill of specialists 
trained to high levels of competence in colleges and universities. And military 
defense itself is peculiarly dependent on the specialized personnel of the nation, 
whether serving in uniform or not”.495 The strength of the military, and therefore 
the future of the nation, depended in large part on higher education. The 
institution was needed to serve the nation, and therefore the Federal government 
was needed to co-ordinate this effort.  
In contrast to his earlier statement, at one point in the report Trytten 
asserted that “for the first time in our history, the Federal government finds it 
necessary to take administrative action which affects indirectly the course of 
higher education by affecting directly the youth of college age”.496 This constitutes 
a rare admission that the Federal government’s Cold War policies on education 
circumvented the perceived bounds of its authority over the system. This 
statement also demonstrates that the Federal government’s decision to influence 
the direction of higher education was a conscious decision made specifically to 
benefit the nation and protect national security for the duration of the Cold War. 
Trytten invoked the ‘Cold War imperative’ to justify the Federal government’s 
actions; “the only defense for student deferment”, stated Trytten, “is that the 
nation needs the special skills resulting from college training”.497 Yet whilst this 
statement may seem to acknowledge that the Federal government’s activities 
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could be perceived to be wrong, Trytten was in fact demonstrating that its defence 
for doing so was impregnable. 
 
The Reserve Officer Training Corps 
As the work of the universities began to affect the War effort, the military became 
increasingly involved in campus life. The program of student deferment from 
Selective Service was not the only way in which the Federal government exercised 
power over college and university campuses after the Second World War; the 
Reserve Officer Training Corps program, more commonly known as the ROTC, 
had 481 senior ROTC programs running at 235 institutions across the USA in 
1951, and opened 36 new units on 33 campuses, 25 of which were new to the 
program, during that year alone.498 In addition the Navy ROTC (NROTC) had 52 
units and the Air ROTC planned to open 62 Air ROTC units on campuses 
throughout the USA to add to its existing 187 units.499 123,336 students were 
enrolled in ROTC programs in 1951, with a further 12,512 in the NROTC and 
62,097 enrolled in the Air ROTC.500 Trytten recognised in Student Deferment in 
Selective Service that “the growth of [ROTC] programs since WWII has been 
great. Many new units have been established and enrolments in the Corps have 
grown until the number now deferred for reserve officers’ training in the colleges 
exceeds the number deferred under the student deferment program”.501  
Like the program for student deferment in selective service, the ROTC 
program greatly impacted college campuses. Richard G. Axt, of the NSF, noted in 
an address delivered at the President’s Committee on Education beyond the High 
School in 1956 that although the ROTC program was not taken particularly 
seriously on campuses prior to the Second World War, it rose in importance 
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during the War years, and this growth continued after the War.502 Before the 
Second World War, Axt asserted, the ROTC required “little intellectual effort 
beyond memory and a little time for preparation of assignments”. 503  Little or no 
academic credit was given for courses undertaken as part of the ROTC program 
and in a number of institutions it had become a substitute for physical education. 
For most members, joining the ROTC was an ‘extra’ activity undertaken whilst at 
college.504 By the end of the Korean War, however, the ROTC consisted of a much 
broader program, which included a variety of non-military courses which often 
overlapped with regular college courses and included a heavy workload which 
required a disproportionate amount of the students’ time to prepare for. Most 
ROTC programs also accounted for roughly twenty percent of its members’ course 
load, thereby reducing the amount of ‘regular’ courses which members could take, 
thus affecting both their overall college experience, and the breadth of their 
knowledge upon graduation.505 Axt also highlighted the fact that the ROTC was 
based on college campuses and used college buildings and college resources. 
Despite the fact that the Federal government expected the colleges and 
universities to accept liability for their ‘custody’ of government material (all 
ROTC resources were housed in college storage spaces), and, additionally, that 
Axt had estimated that the ROTC program was currently using $175 million worth 
of college facilities, the Federal government had never reimbursed the colleges 
for their output, nor did it have any plans to do so.  
By the end of the Korean War the Federal government and the military 
had, in some cases, assumed responsibility for providing higher education 
directly. Axt recognised in 1955 that there were  
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“substantive programs of education beyond the high school which are 
provided directly by government agencies rather than by private State 
institutions and agencies. Largest [sic] of these are the many education and 
training programs of the Department of Defense. In addition to the well-
known service academies, postgraduate and staff schools, there are literally 
thousands of special courses and programs for both enlisted men and 
officers”.506 
The government had chosen on some occasions simply to step in and begin 
teaching classes itself, rather than attempting to indirectly influence the 
institutions it was working with. By 1955 about 837,000 military personnel 
(almost thirty percent of those who served during that year) received “specialized 
training”.507 The majority of this training, Axt confirmed, was in STEM subjects, 
and much of it “closely paralleled programs offered by the regular public and 
private educational institutions”.508  
Despite the fact that the students were in the armed forces, the Federal 
government’s activity still directly affected the freedom associated with higher 
education. The program afforded those enrolled the opportunity to study at a 
tertiary level whilst serving in the military, but they were only offered subjects 
which were considered to be nationally useful, rather than the range of General 
Education courses offered on a civilian course. It is also possible that the 
education they received whilst in the military discouraged them from seeking a 
formal undergraduate education upon being discharged as they had already 
received tertiary level training. As a result, the program further affected the ability 
of the higher education system to offer students the freedom to choose their major 
211 
 
based on individual preference, without having to consider its national 
importance.  
 Increasing the number of American youths who graduated with degrees 
in STEM fields was viewed as being equally as important to the national security 
as improving the output of basic research, or indeed, ensuring that enough men 
enlisted in the armed forces. That the protection of the USA’s national security 
was the responsibility of the Federal government gave the government enough 
grounding upon which to base a centrally controlled and organised program 
which sought to increase the USA’s output of STEM graduates. Once again, the 
‘Cold War imperative’ and national security concerns enabled the Federal 
government to intervene in matters of higher education in order to convert the 
schools into a production line of nationally useful graduates. The government’s 
intervention altered the role of the universities; as Trytten had recognised in 
Student Deferment in Selective Service, “if the emergency continues long enough 
the steps we take and the measures we adopt will become all too soon the way of 
life of the nation and will shape and fashion the nature of the civilization in which 
our children live. The present international uncertainty seems likely to continue 
a long time, in the judgement of most observers”.509 Instead of shaping society, 
institutions began to be shaped by it, shifting the power to influence the future of 
the USA from higher education to the current administration, and from 
individual choice to government recommendations.  
 
Conclusion  
The Federal government consistently asserted throughout the early Cold War 
years that it avoided assuming direct or indirect control of civilian matters. Henry 
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H. Armsby explained in Scientific and Professional Manpower (1954) that “our 
democratic traditions call for avoidance of direct mandatory controls over the 
civilian population such as are properly exercised by the armed forces over 
persons in the military service”.510 Yet in the case of higher education – a civilian, 
not military, institution – it circumvented this guideline by establishing that the 
colleges and universities were as important to the war effort as the military. 
Armsby clarified his remark by reminding his reader that “military and civilian 
activities… are mutually interdependent in periods of mobilization and especially 
in times of war”; civilian institutions were indeed able to avoid Federal 
intervention, but only so long as they remained civilian.511 When it was decided 
that basic research was vital to the national security and that the colleges and 
universities were, in Steelman’s words, the “key to the problem”, the universities 
and colleges lost the right to assert their academic freedom and to choose for 
themselves the direction and form their research would take.512 Equally, when the 
Selective Service Board defined grounds for deferment from the draft as being 
“engaged in an activity which, in the opinion of the board is essential to the 
national health, safety or interest”, it classified a college or university education 
as essential to the national health, safety or interest as well. This action 
transferred the colleges and universities to the care of the body responsible for 
the national health, welfare and security, the Federal government.513 Colleges and 
universities held the key to the national security, and it was the Federal 
government’s responsibility to take possession of it.  
Kleinman has demonstrated the impact wrought by the Federal 
government’s intervention into scientific research in the early years of the Cold 
War well, by placing two quotes on the place of science in politics side by side. In 
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the first quote, spoken by Fiorello La Guardia during his time as Mayor of New 
York City (1934 – 1945), La Guardia noted that  
“science knows no politics. Are we in this frenzy of economy, brought about 
by those who control the wealth of the country, seeking to put a barrier on 
science and research…? Science will go on when existing political parties 
will long have been forgotten… do not seek to put the hand of politics on 
these scientific men who are doing great work”. 514  
The second quote from sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, however, was from much 
later, 1975, and Bourdieu states that “the ‘pure’ universe of even the ‘purest’ 
science is a social field like any other, with its distribution of power and its 
monopolies, its struggles and strategies, interests and profits”. Between 1945 and 
1975, the role science played in politics changed dramatically, and as such, so did 
the role played by politics in science.515 
National security was the priority of both the Federal government and the 
military. Trytten took pains to highlight this fact in Student Deferment in 
Selective Service, and stated that “let it be repeated again and again that our chief 
concern must be for the national security, today, and in the decades to come. And 
that security depends on the effective integration of civilian and military 
activities”.516 Trytten explained that “the welfare of the nation must be the sole 
criterion for decision”.517 Axt recognised the imbalance of the Federal 
government’s policies regarding higher education. He highlighted that “existing 
Federal programs… are intended mainly to further the specialized purposes of the 
agencies rather than to aid education or educational institutions”.518  
Axt also recalled a fellow commentator who, when deliberating the Federal 
government’s position in education, had even entitled his talk ‘Services Required 
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and Requested of Higher Education to meet National Needs for which the Federal 
Government has Special Responsibility’.519 Axt asserted that under this heading 
would fall “the ROTC programs, Federal research contracts and grants, including 
support of agricultural experimental research stations, defense related research 
and medical research, technical assistance to foreign countries – even GI Bill aid 
to veterans in continuing their education”.520 Wherever the Federal government 
could seize control of higher education for the benefit of the nation, it had done 
so.  
During the early years of the Cold War, the government converted 
education itself into a weapon. The American education system came to form a 
part of the nation’s armour; Studebaker briefly discussed how the USA could not 
survive if the education system turned out too many ‘seconds’, meaning inferior 
students. It was imperative that the Soviet Union could not find any cracks. Using 
language usually reserved for the factory floor, Studebaker stated that “now, when 
our pupils come off the educational assembly line, we must be sure that no one of 
them lacks anything essential”.521 The industrial language which Studebaker 
employed when discussing the schools further emphasises the Federal 
government’s concept of American students as the ‘products’ of an education 
factory designed to produce workers for the nation, not citizens of a nation built 
on the concept of individual choice. Education became a business that created a 
product.  
The unique pressures of the Cold War enabled the Federal government to 
influence which students went to college, what they studied when they got there, 
what career they entered upon graduation, what direction university research 
should take, who should study it, how long for, and what should be done with the 
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research upon completion. It had begun to influence every area of higher 
education, and the focus on the individual had shifted visibly to a focus on the 
needs of the nation. As Wolfe has identified, the early Cold War was the “time 
during which Federal support for science and technology was most strongly 
associated with military and defense needs”, and this shift came at the expense of 
a separation of the government and the education system.522 As the Cold War 
demanded more of American higher education, the Federal government 
responded. 
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DESEGREGATION 
AND THE COLD 
WAR DYNAMIC 
 
The Complex Relationship between 
the ‘Cold War Imperative’ and Civil 
Rights in Education 
“The swift movement of events and the growing complexity of our national life 
and of world affairs make it imperative, at the earliest possible time, to translate 
our democratic ideal into a living reality”.523 
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Regardless of the state of mainstream education in the United States in the early 
years of the Cold War, the standard of education for African Americans was 
worse. In 1947, there were significant numerical differences between the number 
of white and black students who were afforded the opportunity to go to school at 
all levels. Whereas 97.1% of white children between the ages of seven and nine 
attended elementary school, for African American students the figure dropped to 
89.2%; 82.5% of white teenagers attended high school, but only 71.9% of African 
American teenagers could expect to attend.524 The disparity within higher 
education is less easy to measure as integrated institutions often did not keep – 
and certainly were not keen to divulge – racially defined records concerning 
attendance.525 Zook asserted in 1947, however, that “it requires no parade of 
statistics to know that the situation for young people of minority groups is today 
unsatisfactory, both in their opportunity to enter college and in the happiness of 
their college life” [emphasis in original].526 Figures from 1940 illuminate the 
situation somewhat; before the USA entered the Second World War, 11% of 
whites who were aged 20 years or over had completed at least one year of college 
and almost 5% had finished 4 years, whereas only 3% of the African American 
population of the same age had completed one year of college and less than 1.5% 
had finished a full four-year course.527 
Although the gap between mainstream education and African American 
education had begun to close towards the end of the 1930s, progress was painfully 
slow. What progress was made was largely due to Depression-era intervention 
from the Federal government. Paula Fass has argued that “it was only in the 
context of Federal policies [during the New Deal era] that blacks became part of 
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the definition of American pluralism and a problem for the schools... The New 
Deal and the War made segregation untenable and set the stage for blacks to 
become the central dilemma for school and social policies in a pluralistic 
society”.528 All of the New Deal alphabet agencies which were involved in 
education offered relief to African Americans on an equal basis with whites. Many 
Works Progress Administration (WPA) projects called for fairer enrolment 
practices for African American students at the schools they worked with, and 
advocated greater equality of pay for black and white teachers.529  
Many of these Federal administrations discovered and highlighted greater 
inequalities than had previously been known.530 Fass has argued that “for black 
Americans, the New Deal had helped to confirm the belief, initiated during the 
Reconstruction... that salvation might lie with the Lord, but educational 
opportunity would come at the hands of the Federal government”.531 After the 
War, however, the focus of Federal education policy did not immediately benefit 
African Americans; a far greater percentage of white veterans than African 
American veterans benefitted from the GI Bill of 1944, and this achievement gap 
widens even further for African American veterans who returned to the South.532 
This is largely due to the fact that the Federal government did not expect the 
educational provision included within the GI Bill to be as successful as it was, and 
as such did not place any stringent controls on how the benefits should be 
administered by the States. As such, individual State policies created wildly 
different results for African American applicants.533 By 1947, black students 
comprised only 3.1% of the total number of enrolments in higher education, 
despite the fact that African Americans constituted roughly 10% of the total 
population of the USA.534  
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The inequality in numbers was only part of the problem, as African 
American college students who were able to secure a place at a university or 
college rarely received an education of the same quality as white students at either 
integrated or segregated institutions after matriculation. In the North, black 
students studied in predominantly integrated institutions, but were usually 
treated as inferior to their white counterparts. At some integrated institutions, 
black students could be subject to the quota system – a system which allowed for 
only a limited number of African American students to be accepted to institutions 
each year, regardless of their academic ability.535 This system severely limited the 
availability of places for African Americans, and meant that entrance was based 
less on ability than availability.  
Even if black students did gain admission to an integrated Northern 
college or university, they were also regularly subjected to discriminatory policies 
and practices within the institution. Within integrated colleges, segregation often 
still featured; black students were frequently expected to sit separately from white 
students and were rarely afforded the opportunity to live alongside their white 
classmates in on-campus housing. For the many African American students who 
matriculated – or wanted to matriculate – in Northern colleges during this 
period, the problems of inequality of both access and education were the 
educational issues which most needed to be addressed. Whilst there were serious 
issues inherent in the way Northern institutions treated African American 
students, however, these issues paled into insignificance when compared to the 
problems inherent in Southern institutions.  
In the South, segregated institutions were the norm, and unsurprisingly 
the schools provided for African American students were far inferior to those 
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provided for white students. This inferiority occurred at every level and impacted 
every aspect of school life, from the availability and quality of textbooks and the 
training level of teachers, to the availability of school lunches and the structural 
integrity of classrooms.536 Whilst high quality institutions did exist for African 
American students in the mid-20th century, the majority remained significantly 
inferior to their white counterparts. 
The Executive branch recognised the importance of tackling both 
discrimination and segregation in education during this period, both to benefit 
the African American community and the wider Cold War effort. The United 
States Office of Education’s (USOE) Bulletin highlighted in 1948 that “the fact 
that Negros have not produced their proportionate share of leaders in the 
different fields of endeavour may be largely attributed to the lack of opportunities 
to develop and use their talents”.537 The Executive branch acknowledged that 
African American students were not incapable of reaching the dizzy educational 
heights of higher education, but that they had so far been prevented from doing 
so in equal percentages to white students because they regularly received a lower 
quality of education and inhibited access to improvements.  
There existed three separate pressures which caused the interests of the 
Executive branch of the Federal government to converge with those of African 
American students during the early years of the Cold War: firstly, the logistical 
problems that a persistently undereducated section of the citizenship presented 
to the USA’s manpower pool; secondly, the impact that discrimination against 
African American citizens had upon the USA’s image overseas, and thirdly, 
President Truman’s own personal commitment to creating equality of 
opportunity for all American citizens, due both to his own personal opinion of 
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education and his desire to court the African American vote. These circumstances 
combined to create a powerful impetus for change within US society in the years 
after the Second World War. 
This chapter will demonstrate that these various pressures on the 
Executive branch of the Truman Administration to improve access to and the 
quality of education for African American students during the early years of the 
Cold War caused it to once again involve itself in the US education system. Thus 
the Executive branch – specifically represented by the President’s Commission 
on Higher Education (the Truman Commission), the US Office of Education, the 
President’s Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR) and the Justice and State 
Departments – identified and acted upon a variety of powers which enabled it to 
influence the direction of the US education system in order to improve the state 
of African American education and the USA’s chances in the Cold War. The 
recommendations and impact of the Truman Commission and the PCCR, the 
work of the USOE with regards to educational equality, and the influence of the 
Justice Department and the work of the State Department on the passage of 
Brown v. Board of Education will be examined. This chapter will establish that 
the Executive branch in its many forms attempted to influence the development 
of the US education system in order to benefit both the USA’s Cold War effort and 
the well-being of the African American community, despite the education 
administration’s traditional status as a matter of States’ rights, thus furthering 
the central argument of this thesis.  
This chapter will also further contribute to the existing literature which 
centres on the Cold War/ civil rights/ Federal government dynamic. Discussion 
of the complex relationship between the Executive branch of the Truman 
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Administration and the US education system within this Cold War/ civil rights 
framework highlights an aspect of this dynamic that has not yet been explored by 
historians in the field. Examining this interaction within the wider framework of 
the Executive branch’s approach to mainstream education policy, offered in the 
earlier chapters of this thesis, offers a twist to the traditional story of the Federal 
government’s role in Brown v. Board of Education and the various reasons for 
this. The Truman Administration identified the vital need for a strong education 
system in order to create a well-educated and democratic population and place 
the USA in strong position from which to fight the Cold War. Crucially, the 
Truman Administration also included the education of African American citizens 
within this ‘need’, thereby creating a ‘logistical’ imperative for reform.  
Whilst President Eisenhower continued Truman’s pursuit of a better 
educated populace, he did not specifically include African American students in 
this quest; therefore both the personal imperative and the logistical imperative, 
and their benefits to the Civil Rights movement as motivating factors for change, 
were lost in the 1952 election. This left only the strategic imperative for civil rights 
reform to be addressed by the Eisenhower Administration. Current scholarship 
in this area does not properly situate the Federal discussion of education policy 
making for the African American community during the Truman and Eisenhower 
Administrations alongside their wider discussions of education policy generally. 
The Federal government’s approach to general education policy must be 
understood in order to recognise the impact which it had on Truman’s Executive 
branch’s formulation of their approach to African American education policy 
making, and to fully understand how notable Eisenhower’s absence of African 
American education policy truly was. 
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Where only the headline-grabbing instances of African American 
education policy are examined, the Truman Administration’s motivations for 
intervention into this sub-section of the education system can appear one-sided. 
When closer examination is made of its approach to education for black students 
and both less well-known and never-implemented programmes are explored, 
imperatives beyond the strategic become clear. It is not the purpose of this 
chapter to offer an all-encompassing discussion of the Federal government’s 
approach to education policy making for African Americans, but instead to firmly 
situate the current discussion within its relevant contextual framework. Without 
this education history perspective, understanding of Federal intervention into 
education policy making for African American students is limited, and the 
motivation for intervention (or lack thereof) is regularly attributed to the strategic 
imperative alone. This has created an oversimplified understanding of the 
interactions between the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations and civil 
rights in education.  
Thomas Borstelmann’s renowned monograph The Cold War and the Color 
Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena, published in 2001, discusses 
the extent to which foreign and domestic policy overlapped during the Cold War, 
with specific focus on the Civil Rights movement in the USA. Borstelmann 
presents an original exploration of the extent to which Cold War considerations 
impacted the progression of civil rights in America, and how the Civil Rights 
movement impacted the nation’s Cold War narrative. Borstelmann’s account 
neglects to explore the relevance of wider Federal education policy to Federal 
policy on African American education, however, and instead chooses to 
demonstrate that the Federal approach to African American education policy was 
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only related to the government’s wider civil rights policies. By not engaging with 
this important perspective, Borstelmann’s assertions are, at times, limited.   
A one-sided view of Truman’s personal commitment to civil rights is 
presented in The Cold War and the Color Line; Borstelmann demonstrates that 
Truman had only a political and not a personal commitment to civil rights, a view 
which this thesis does not wholly agree with. Whilst Borstelmann asserts that 
Truman did not believe in equality, he has not fully explored the extent to which 
Truman did support equality of opportunity, nor Truman’s belief that 
opportunity began with a good education. Had Borstelmann examined Truman’s 
commitment to equalising access to education for all American youths, he would 
have found a President with a far softer attitude towards equalisation of 
opportunity for African Americans where education was concerned than the one 
which he presented in The Cold War and the Color Line. President Truman did 
not view all civil rights protests as equal, and prioritised the pursuit of some over 
the pursuit of others. As with his wider policy decisions, education was high on 
his list, but these wider policy decisions must be studied alongside his approach 
to civil rights in order to fully understand his motivations. 
Borstelmann also treats Brown as a phenomenon unique to the 
Eisenhower Administration, which ignores the majority of the Judicial and 
Federal story. Unlike Dudziak, Borstelmann acknowledges the significant shift in 
civil rights policy that occurred with the shift in Administrations in 1952, but his 
lack of engagement with education policy limits this discussion to a generalised 
view of Eisenhower’s approach to civil rights, rather than a specific exploration of 
his interaction with civil rights within the education system. Borstelmann stated 
that “[Eisenhower’s] conservative view of the role of the Federal government in 
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American society precluded significant Federal intervention in matters of 
segregation, which he saw as falling under local and State jurisdiction” yet part of 
the narrative here is missing.538 Whilst it was certainly the case that Eisenhower 
had a more conservative approach to Federal intervention than Truman, and did 
see segregation as a State matter, he was not completely averse to Federal 
intervention where the wider education system was concerned, despite the fact 
that this was also a State matter. It should be noted that Eisenhower was reluctant 
to exert Federal power over the education system, but this did not prevent him 
from pursuing this end, especially in the case of school construction and the 
expansion of the USA’s technical manpower pool, as he also recognised the Cold 
War imperative of such achievements.539 This demonstrates that his opinions on 
the matter were more fluid than Borstelmann suggests. 
 This additional understanding allows a more complex exploration of the 
Cold War/ civil rights/ Federal government dynamic as it highlights a situation 
in which there was a convergence of interests between the needs of the Civil 
Rights movement and the needs of the Cold War, but not the needs of the Federal 
government. Eisenhower viewed education policy in general as impacted by the 
Cold War imperative and therefore subject to Federal intervention, but regarded 
segregation within education specifically as a purely domestic matter. Without a 
clearer understanding of Eisenhower’s motivations, full understanding of his 
actions is not possible. The two issues – the need to improve the education system 
for the Cold War, and the will to protect Southern domestic rights to run a 
segregated system – often conflicted, which forced Eisenhower to choose. Unless 
these two pursuits are recognised as occurring concurrently, it is not possible to 
explore whether Eisenhower prioritised his plans to improve education over his 
226 
 
desire not to involve himself in the desegregation of the schools or vice-versa, and 
subsequently to better understand the true extent to which the Cold War 
impacted the Civil Rights movement within the education system. As such, 
Borstelmann’s research is limited in its discussion of the extent to which the Cold 
War affected the progression of civil rights.   
Brenda Gayle Plummer’s 1996 work Rising Wind: Black Americans and 
US Foreign Affairs, 1935-1996, offers a unique perspective on the civil rights/ 
foreign policy dynamic as Plummer begins her investigation prior to both the 
Cold War and the Second World War.540 Plummer instead traces the relationship 
from 1935 through to the end of the Eisenhower Administration. She is successful 
in demonstrating that the African American educated classes could boast a far 
longer history of engagement in foreign affairs than had previously been 
assumed. Plummer highlights the important role which foreign affairs played in 
the development of domestic African American-driven civil rights protest, and 
additionally the value of receiving a quality education to this dynamic; she notes 
that it was specifically the black educated elite who displayed this interest in 
foreign affairs.  
Plummer does not, however, explore the relevance of this information to 
the Federal government’s interaction with civil rights protests during the early 
Cold War and if it impacted, either negatively or positively, its logistical 
motivation in the formulation of education policy for African Americans. This 
thesis seeks to further this scholarship by delineating the relevance which a well-
educated African American populace had to the Truman Administration’s 
understanding of a stronger USA, in order to satisfy both its pursuit of a greater 
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commitment to democracy and equality, and its intention to safeguard the nation 
in the Cold War. 
The most relevant discussions within this field are those of Derrick A. Bell 
Jr. and Mary L. Dudziak. The two similar frameworks developed by each scholar 
– Bell’s ‘Interest-Convergence’ theory and Dudziak’s ‘Cold War imperative’ 
theory – have existed side by side for over a decade, yet it has not yet been clearly 
established which theory is more relevant to the scholarship. In light of this new 
understanding of the complexity of the pressures at play in this situation, this 
chapter will establish the primacy of Derrick A. Bell Jr.’s 1979/1980 theory of 
Interest-Convergence over Mary L. Dudziak’s 1988 theory of the Cold War 
imperative as the most suitable framework through which to understand the 
progression of the Civil Rights movement in relation to the Cold War during its 
infancy. In addition, this chapter will offer an addendum to Bell’s theory which 
better allows it to account for the nuances of political policy making. 
Mary L. Dudziak published “Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative” in 
1988, and later published a book which furthered the theory posited in her article, 
Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (2000). 
Dudziak heavily rooted her article and the theory speculated within it on the lead 
up to and aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education. Despite this, however, 
Dudziak neither discussed the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations’ wider 
education policies, nor their general approach to the discussion of African 
American education where Brown was not concerned. Her discussion of 
education focused on the headline-grabbing Brown and the 1957 Little Rock 
crisis which it incited. Whilst of course Brown and the events which occurred at 
Little Rock represent the most important education policy decisions during this 
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period, when discussed in isolation from wider education policy, the strategic 
gains to the USA’s Cold War effort that were taken into consideration can appear 
to have undue importance.  
Dudziak asserted in “Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative” that “the 
effect of US race discrimination on international relations during the post war 
years was a critical motivating factor in the development of Federal government 
policy. Without attention to the degree to which desegregation served important 
foreign policy interests, the Federal government’s posture on civil rights issues in 
the post war years cannot be fully understood”.541 Dudziak is correct in her 
identification that foreign policy issues did indeed act as a motivating factor in 
the Federal government’s approach to the segregation debate in the early years of 
the Cold War. When consideration is given to the effect which the discrimination 
and segregation had on the US education system itself in addition to the effect 
which a discriminatory education system had on the USA’s Cold War effort, 
Dudziak’s straightforward narrative is complicated. This method highlights her 
over-valuation of the importance of the ‘strategic’ imperative and allows for 
consideration of the impact which the ‘logistical’ imperative had on both decision 
making, and the impact and outcomes of such policies.  
This chapter will firstly demonstrate the gaps in Dudziak’s Cold War 
imperative theory by delineating the relevance of the logistical imperative 
alongside the strategic imperative, thus further unpacking the concept of the Cold 
War imperative. Secondly, this chapter will also demonstrate the limitations of 
Dudziak’s theory by establishing that the Cold War imperative in both its 
manifestations was not the only imperative motivating the Federal government. 
By establishing the important contribution of the President’s own personal 
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imperatives for change during the Truman Administration, and highlighting the 
impact of their absence during the Eisenhower Administration, a clearer 
understanding of the complicated relationship between the Executive branch and 
the education system is drawn. Whilst Dudziak’s oft-discussed strategic 
imperative remains relevant to this dialogue, when all three imperatives for 
change are considered together, the centrality of the strategic imperative to the 
passage and implementation of Brown is noticeably reduced. As such, Bell’s 
theory of ‘Interest-Convergence’ is more suitable for understanding this topic as 
it accounts for more varying factors than Dudziak’s more linear framework. 
Although the relevance of the logistical imperative as a motivating factor 
continued into the Eisenhower Administration, his lack of a personal imperative 
for change, coupled with the obstacles created by the Massive Resistance 
movement, prevented Eisenhower from acknowledging the logistical Cold War 
imperative as a motivating factor. As a result, no progress was achieved despite 
Eisenhower’s prime position as an agent for change, and the benefits this change 
could have wrought. Dudziak’s theory does not account for the fact that this 
incarnation of the Cold War imperative was not strong enough to motivate the 
Federal government into supporting the Civil Rights movement.  
This discussion will also further Bell’s Interest-Convergence theory, as Bell 
did not acknowledge the importance of perception in his work. This thesis, 
however, will consider the importance of the acknowledgement of a convergence 
of interests between the Federal government and the Civil Rights movement in 
addition to the existence of a convergence of interests. When only the strategic 
Cold War imperative for change is considered, it is easy to assume that 
Eisenhower did not intervene because the Cold War imperative had already been 
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addressed; the USA’s overseas critics, as Dudziak notes, were mollified by the 
passage of Brown. Understanding of the logistical imperative, however, and its 
lack of impact upon the Eisenhower Administration, necessitates a caveat to Bell’s 
framework. That the white participants acknowledge there to be a convergence of 
interests is equally as important as the convergence itself.  
Dudziak claimed in Cold War Civil Rights that  
“the international perspective is not a substitute for the rich body of civil 
rights scholarship, but another dimension that sheds additional light on 
those important and well-told stories… It is only through the efforts of the 
[Civil Rights] movement that the nation and the world were moved to 
embrace the civil rights reform that emerged from this period of American 
history”.542  
Dudziak’s aim was to demonstrate merely that the Cold War played a role in the 
progression of the Civil Rights movement, not that the work of previous scholars 
in this field was incorrect, nor to diminish the work of the civil rights activists who 
fought for their rights during this period. Similarly, in focusing on a 
Federal/education perspective, this chapter does not seek to demonstrate that the 
Federal role in progressing civil rights in the US education system was more 
significant than the roles played by civil rights activists during this period, but 
instead seeks to build upon the work of other scholars in the field and 
demonstrate only that there is more to the story of the interaction between Cold 
War civil rights in education and the US Federal government than has currently 
been told. 
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The Cold War Imperatives 
The Strategic Imperative543 
During the Truman Administration, the Executive branch of the Federal 
government identified that the improvement of educational provision for African 
Americans would positively impact US foreign policy objectives. This benefit grew 
out of the impact which the increased global importance of human rights after the 
Second World War had upon the perception of the USA overseas.544 As Dudziak 
has noted, the USA’s image overseas suffered a negative swing after the Second 
World War. Worldwide perceptions of the need for both greater equality and 
better education altered dramatically, and US domestic policies which previously 
had been largely ignored – such as segregation – became major problems for the 
State Department.  
The international attention that was paid to American racism in the early 
years of the Cold War had the potential not merely to embarrass the USA, but also 
to injure the USA’s chances of success in the Cold War. The PCCR acknowledged 
this damage in 1947, and observed that “whenever stories of discrimination or 
mistreatment gain currency abroad... they are considered an affront to the dignity 
of a country or a continent, even a major portion of the world’s population. A 
relatively few individuals here may be identified with millions of people 
elsewhere, and the way in which they are treated may have worldwide 
repercussions”.545 This previously unheard of level of exposure of the USA’s 
treatment of African Americans as less than American citizens, in both unfriendly 
and neutral countries, threatened to undermine the belief overseas in a vital 
aspect of the USA’s ideology – the USA’s commitment to democracy.  
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The increased scrutiny of US schools in particular was caused in part by 
the worldwide focus on the importance of receiving a good education which took 
hold on a global scale after the Second World War. In The Attack on American 
Schools, Columbia Teachers College’s Annual Report to the Trustees, written by 
President Hollis S. Caswell in 1958, Caswell noted that “there is a widespread 
desire in many nations to increase the role of the common man – making 
available improved technology for advancing the general welfare, giving labor 
greater dignity, achieving better health for the mass of the people, improving 
community life”.546 This was especially true in the Third World, as so many Third 
World nations were former colonies who believed a well-educated citizenship was 
a vital component of independence and successful self-government. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that Clifford Manshardt, a cultural affairs officer stationed 
in India in the early 1950s, reported that one of the questions he was asked most 
frequently was “do Negros have equal opportunities for education in the US?”547   
This increased interest in education as a gateway to progress and 
development in the Third World meant that discrimination against blacks in the 
American education system was even more closely monitored overseas than other 
areas of the civil rights debate. A letter written to the Attorney General in 1952 
claimed that “school segregation, in particular, had been ‘singled out for hostile 
foreign comment in the United Nations and elsewhere. Other peoples cannot 
accept how such a practice can exist in a country which professes to be a staunch 
supporter of freedom, justice and democracy’ ”.548 In his book Brown v. Board of 
Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and its Troubled Legacy (2001), educator 
and civil rights activist James T. Patterson also recognised this fact, and asserted 
that “some blacks predicted that Brown would have consequences extending far 
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beyond schools. For one thing, it would bolster the American cause in the Cold 
War” .549  
Education was the most logical area to improve in order to impress 
overseas critics of US racism, as it demonstrated the USA’s commitment to 
improving race relations, its commitment to bettering the opportunities available 
to the African American community and its understanding of the emerging global 
consensus on the importance of education. As such, this strategic Cold War 
imperative also contributed to the convergence of interests which grew between 
the Executive branch of the Federal government and the Civil Rights movement 
during the early years of the Cold War.  
 
The Logistical Imperative 
The Executive branch of the Federal government further recognised, however, 
that the persistent educational under-achievement within the African American 
community also had the potential to significantly impact the USA’s success in the 
Cold War. As discussed at length in Chapter Three, the USA’s shortage of 
educated manpower presented a significant challenge to the Federal 
government’s Cold War effort during this period; education was vital to the USA’s 
success in the Cold War, and therefore the utilisation of schools’ talent pools was 
equally vital. The systematic exclusion of minority students from high 
educational achievement based on nothing more substantial than their minority 
status had the potential to undermine this effort. The persistent under-education 
of otherwise capable African American students created a situation in which a 
proportion of the nation’s talent was not made usable in the fight against 
Communism.   
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The Executive branch noted that this was a logistical issue which the 
nation could ill afford to perpetuate. George F. Zook and the Truman Commission 
acknowledged in Higher Education for American Democracy (1947) that the 
USA’s shortage of vital manpower was caused in part by “discriminatory practices 
[which] deprive the nation of a great variety of talent”.550 During the early years 
of the Cold War, the USA allowed a significant proportion of their future 
manpower resources to be side-lined not because of their inferior quality, but 
because of their inferior training. As the nation’s need for trained manpower, and 
especially highly trained scientific manpower, was both acute and directly 
impacted on the nation’s chances of success in the Cold War, this problem, the 
Truman Commission recognised, needed to be addressed.  
This disparity in the quality of education provision was quickly identified 
as stemming largely from the USA’s practice of segregation within education, 
which caused African American students to endure a fundamentally inferior 
education compared to their white counterparts. Education provided to African 
Americans in integrated institutions, however, was not spared the Commission’s 
scrutiny. Moreover, these practices were also identified as reducing the quality of 
white education as well, which further contributed to the USA’s struggle for well-
trained manpower at the time in which it could least afford to struggle. 
Through the work of Zook and others, the Executive branch came to 
understand that a significant percentage of the USA’s potential manpower pool 
was systematically undereducated as a result of the colour of their skin; capable 
and willing African American students were not able to contribute to the nation’s 
advancement in the many war-related disciplines simply because they could not 
get access to the relevant training; much needed graduate training was 
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particularly off-limits. This in turn adversely affected their availability to carry 
out useful war work, thereby threatening national security. Zook acknowledged 
that any improvements in access to schooling or to the quality of education for 
African American students would also positively affect the USA’s stock of trained 
manpower, thus creating a logistical Cold War imperative for change which 
contributed to the convergence of interests between the Executive branch and the 
Civil Rights movement during the Cold War’s infancy.  
 
Truman’s Personal Convergence of Interests 
The third important motivation for action on civil rights during the Truman 
Administration which must be considered was President Truman’s own personal 
commitment to the pursuit of equality of opportunity for African American 
citizens, an extension of his personal commitment to education as explored in 
Chapter One of this thesis. As Michael R. Gardner asserted in Harry Truman and 
Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risks, “in an environment relatively 
free of serious nationwide public pressure to act, Truman decided in 1946 to force 
a very reluctant and largely segregated Federal government to assume its rightful 
leadership role on civil rights”551 and hailed Truman’s civil rights record as one of 
“moral courage and political recklessness”.552 Moreover, when specifically 
commentating on Truman’s civil rights record, Judge William H. Hastie, former 
Dean of Howard University Law School and prominent civil rights lawyer, has 
also asserted that Truman was a man who had “very firm convictions” and that 
“he would not allow political considerations to cause him to disavow the position 
that he regarded as morally wrong”.553 
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Truman’s biographer, David McCulloch, takes a slightly more tempered 
view of Truman’s position on African Americans than Gardner, having noted in 
his celebrated biography that “privately, he could still speak of ‘niggers’, as if that 
were the way one naturally referred to blacks”, however, he also highlighted the 
fact that President Truman took his commitment to civil rights seriously.554 
McCulloch reprinted a letter written by Truman to several Southern delegates in 
which he rebuffed their attempts to appeal to his status as a Southern President 
and moderate his positon on civil rights. Truman asserted that “whatever my 
inclinations as a native of Missouri might have been, as President I know this 
[treatment of returning African American GIs] is bad. I shall fight to end evils like 
this”.555 
Truman’s personal commitment to civil rights reform must be viewed from 
two perspectives, that of his own moral position, and that of the impact such a 
platform had on his ability to garner the ‘black vote’, which was identified as being 
politically significant.556 Special Counsel to the President Clark M. Clifford 
highlighted in 1947 that “unless there are new and real efforts (as distinguished 
from mere political gestures which are today thoroughly understood and strongly 
resented by sophisticated Negro leaders), the Negro block… will go 
Republican”.557 The two pressures together created a President committed to the 
improvement of equality of opportunity for African Americans; as historian 
Harvard Sitkoff has recognised, “Clifford’s political advice harmonized with 
Truman’s need to do something for civil rights” [emphasis in original].558  
Truman’s position on civil rights may not seem particularly radical from 
the perspective of 2015 – Borstelmann shrewdly identified that Truman courted 
the black vote merely by treating African Americans as “a legitimate political 
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interest group” – however it must be noted that for a Missouri politician in the 
1940s and early 1950s, his position was unusual, progressive and divisive.559 
When writing to a friend in Missouri who had urged him to scale back his position 
on civil rights, Truman proclaimed that he would not do so, stating that “I am not 
asking for social equality, because no such thing exists, but I am asking for 
equality of opportunity for all human beings and, as long as I stay here, I am going 
to continue that fight”.560 Truman was not advocating for massive social 
upheaval, but he did believe in a level playing field.   
When he established his Committee on Civil Rights on 15th January 1947, 
Truman asserted that “I don’t want to see any race discrimination. I don’t want 
to see any religious bigotry break out in this country”.561 After the establishment 
of the Truman Commission in 1946, Truman personally responded to one letter 
of support, from Commission to the Chairman of the American Veterans 
Committee, Charles W. Bolte, stating that  
“I am keenly aware of the fundamental problem of discrimination in 
education to which you have called specific attention, and to the broader 
problem of intolerance which this discrimination symbolizes. Those who 
sincerely desire to see the fullest expression of our democracy can never 
rest until the opportunity for an education, at all levels, has been given to 
all qualified Americans”.562  
Truman continued by stating that “discrimination, like a disease, must be 
attacked wherever it appears. This applies to the opportunity to vote, to hold and 
retain a job, and to secure adequate shelter and medical care”. In this letter 
Truman also likened racism in the USA to Nazism in Germany – “that which we 
fought against in the war”.563 It should also be noted that Truman received 
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numerous letters congratulating him on the establishment of the Truman 
Commission, but the vast majority did not receive personal replies from the 
President, and instead received standardised ‘thank you’ responses from 
Assistants to the President John R. Steelman and William D. Hassett.  
Truman was personally committed to advocating for change within the 
black community in a way that his successor was not. Gardner noted that “though 
[in 1954] Truman’s civil rights crusade was not over, incoming President 
Eisenhower was happy to leave it that way. For States’ rights advocates in both 
houses of the Eighty-third Congress, as well as for some of the senior racist 
Southern Democrats in the Senate, it was comforting to realise that the man 
coming in to the White House … had a much more cautious view on civil rights 
than the outgoing president”.564 President Truman’s personal imperative to 
pursue equality of educational opportunity for the African American community 
gave civil rights a powerful and influential ally in Washington, even after 
Truman’s troubled relationship with Congress is taken into account.  
The significance of Truman’s influence is largely due to his personal 
commitment to the expansion of the education system. As discussed in Chapter 
One of this thesis, Truman’s own experiences of unsuccessfully pursuing higher 
education, alongside his willingness to attempt to extend the Federal 
government’s remit when he believed such a move was necessary (nor did he shy 
away from fully exploring the limits of his Executive power when possible), 
created ‘goldilocks’ conditions for an expanded Federal role in education. 
Importantly, Truman extended his definition of expanded access to include 
minority students. As Gardner has noted,  
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“President Truman’s own words in creating his committee [on Civil 
Rights] illuminate his emerging yet highly controversial philosophy about 
civil rights reform: that the Federal government was the only possible 
vehicle for correcting the significant yet only partially documented civil 
rights deficiencies in the United States in 1946… [he] told his newly 
appointed committee members that the Federal government has the duty 
to act when State or local authorities abridge or fail to protect the 
constitutional rights of all its citizens”.565 
In his own words, when recalling in his memoirs his decision to publicly act on 
behalf of the African American community in 1948, Truman re-iterated his 
viewpoint that  
“The constitutional guarantees of individual liberties and of equal 
protection under the law clearly place on the Federal government the duty 
to act when State or local authorities abridge or fail to uphold these 
guarantees. I felt that the Federal government was hampered, however, by 
inadequate civil rights statutes and that the Department of Justice lacked 
the tools to enforce such statutes as there were. This was a condition that 
I wanted to see corrected”.566 
Truman understood that, due to the entrenched nature of the opposition’s 
opinion on this matter, Federal influence would be necessary in order to affect 
change, and he boldly utilised the powers available to him in order to achieve this.  
Truman’s personal imperative trickled down to the remainder of the 
Executive branch and, largely through the work of the Truman Commission and 
the PCCR, influenced other departmental policies on civil rights reform. The 
Executive branch of the Federal government not only recognised both the 
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inequalities inherent in the education system and the problems they had begun 
to cause to the USA’s war effort, but also the fact that, despite its lack of 
constitutional authority over the education system, these problems were the 
Federal government’s responsibility to solve. The PCCR articulated this 
responsibility in its report, published in 1947, which highlighted that “the 
responsibility of this Commission can best be emphasized by the fact that 
approximately 4/5 of the Negro population is in the South, and that practically 
every Negro in the South looks to the Federal government for protection of basic 
civil rights”.567  
The Federal government experienced a triumvirate of motivating factors – 
logistical, strategic and personal – which created a convergence of interests 
between the Executive branch of the Federal government and the Civil Rights 
movement at the beginning of the Cold War. In 1948, the Federal government’s 
own USOE Bulletin highlighted the fact that “it is important, from the viewpoint 
of enlightened self-interest, as well as from the desire to implement the 
democratic principles upon which the Nation is founded, that the United States 
assure the Negro group equality of opportunity to contribute its share of potential 
leaders for the Nation”.568 The disparity between education for white students 
and education for African American students both adversely affected the USA’s 
Cold War effort and brought into question the Federal government’s own 
commitment to its primary goal of upholding democracy, and adversely affected 
the everyday lives of ordinary American citizens who lived each day under the 
shadow of inequality and limited opportunity. For President Truman, the need to 
solve this nationwide problem triumphed over the need for the direct authority 
to do so.  
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The Utilisation of the Cold War Imperatives 
The Truman Administration saw the education system as the key to solving a 
myriad of complicated foreign and domestic policy issues, and endeavoured to 
gain influence within this area, despite its remit as the responsibility of each 
individual State. The strategic foreign policy objectives, logistical considerations, 
and Truman’s own personal and political imperatives encouraged the Executive 
branch of the Truman Administration to adopt a new approach to the discussion 
of equality of opportunity within the US education system. As discussed in 
Chapter Two of this thesis, Truman was not averse to devising creative methods 
through which to exercise his power, and this extended to the cause of civil rights. 
Gardner has noted that “Truman [circumvented] Congress and advanced his 
Federal civil rights agenda in numerous creative and lawful ways”.569 Outside of 
education, he had utilised his executive authority to desegregate the armed forces 
and outlaw Federal pay discrepancies based on race. Within education, the 
Executive branch established a variety of ways in which to utilise the unique set 
of powers available to it in order to influence schools, colleges and universities to 
adopt less discriminatory policies towards African American students. 
 
The President’s Commission on Higher Education 
In 1947, discrimination against African Americans in education was discussed by 
the President’s Commission on Higher Education, and, radically, the 
desegregation of the education system was formally recommended as a viable 
option by a government body. Indeed, the Commission highlighted that it was in 
fact the only viable option if equality of educational opportunity was to be 
ensured. As highlighted in Chapter Two, the discussion of the US education 
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system by a presidential commission already represented a significant break from 
earlier Federal involvement with the education system. As John R. Thelin has 
identified in A History of American Higher Education (2011), before President 
Truman established his Commission, no other President had ever “deliberately 
extended Federal inquiry into national educational issues”.570 President Truman 
effectively utilised the powers available to the Executive branch in order to 
attempt to gain influence over the US education system.  
One of the Commission’s main focuses was the exploration of how access 
to higher education could become more inclusive, regardless of race, creed or 
economic background.571 Truman’s personal commitment to this goal was vital to 
its inclusion in the Truman Commission’s remit, as it was a topic he expressly 
requested the members to discuss. In his letter of appointment to each of the 
Commission’s members, Truman stated that “among the more specific questions 
with which I hope the Commission will concern itself are: ways and means of 
expanding educational opportunities for all able young people”.572 Whilst this is 
not specific to African American students, when combined with a further 
influence which the Truman Administration had on the work of the Commission 
– the selection of its members – its intentions become even clearer.  
The Executive branch was responsible for appointing the members of the 
Commission, and this power was exercised to ensure the ‘right’ result. George F. 
Zook was appointed as the head of the Commission, and his commitment to 
equalising opportunity for African American students was well documented. In 
the same year that he was appointed to the Commission, he published an article 
entitled “The Government and Negro Education” in which he categorically stated 
that “the inequality of [African American] educational opportunities in 
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comparison with the whites is too well known to need elaboration”.573 It must not 
be overlooked that in the same article, Zook also identifies a conflict between 
“one’s belief in State and local control of education on one hand, and a pitiful 
practical situation on the other”, and asserts his personal commitment to the 
belief that “the Federal government is now obligated to see to it that equal 
opportunities are open to children of the two races within the respective 
States”.574 Zook was undoubtedly committed to the improvement of African 
American education as a priority, and this commitment no doubt impacted both 
his appointment as head of the Commission in 1946 and the direction of the 
Commission’s report in 1948. 
Zook was not the only member whose views on African American citizens 
was clear prior to their appointment; a number of members with positive civil 
rights records were appointed. Among others was Eleanor Roosevelt; although 
she did not remain with the Truman Commission throughout its full term, 
Roosevelt was appointed to the Commission in 1946, and her commitment to civil 
rights was widely known. Also notable is Tuskegee President Frederick Douglass 
Patterson, who in 1943, just three years prior to his appointment, founded the 
United Negro College Fund (UNCF), a fund established with the precise goal of 
expanding educational attainment among African Americans. Had Truman 
expected the discussion of the Commission to come to a different conclusion on 
the importance of equality in education, it is likely that the selection of its 
members would have taken a different turn. 
As it was, the appointments were a success; the report of the Truman 
Commission openly acknowledged the inconsistencies between American 
ideology and practice. As Thelin has identified, the report “presaged… the 
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tensions of racial segregation in public schools that would play out in the 
landmark 1954 case”.575 It acknowledged that systematic discrimination denied 
“to millions of young people what the democratic creed assumes to be their birth 
right: an equal chance with all others to make the most of their native abilities” 
and highlighted that the separate-but-equal doctrine “contravenes the 
equalitarian spirit of the American heritage”. 576; 577 Segregation specifically was 
recognised by the Truman Commission to be a particularly serious problem in 
higher education; it highlighted that approximately 85% of the estimated 75,000 
African American students who were enrolled in higher education at the time 
were enrolled in segregated institutions.578 Moreover, in contrast to many 
discussions of the practice, it did not attempt to offer a defence of segregation on 
any level, nor did it suggest that in some cases separate could be equal. The report 
unfalteringly espoused the view that segregation was unequal, and inequality 
clashed with the American way of life. 
 The Truman Commission eventually chose to devote an entire volume of 
its report, Higher Education for American Democracy, to the need for greater 
equality in higher education. In this volume, the members firmly recommended 
that the Federal government pursue a course of desegregation for all education 
institutions. The Commission began its attack by demonstrating beyond doubt 
that African American education was inferior to mainstream education. It 
established that black schools were “financed at a pitifully low level, they are often 
housed in buildings wholly inadequate for the purpose, and many of the teachers 
are sorely in need of more education themselves. Library facilities are generally 
poor or lacking altogether, and professional supervision is more a name than a 
reality”.579 The Commission noted that the schools were not just underfunded, 
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but understaffed as well: “the District [of Columbia]’s Superintendent of Schools, 
in his 1946-47 report to the Board of Education, states that the student-teacher 
ratios in the schools for Negros were significantly and consistently higher than 
those for non-Negros – from the kindergartens through the Teachers 
Colleges”.580  
The Commission highlighted that the problem was rarely much improved 
outside of the South. It noted that “it must not be supposed that the Negro youths 
living in States in which segregation is not legalized are given the same 
opportunities as white youth”.581 The Truman Commission explained that “in 
these areas, economic and social discrimination of various sorts often operates to 
produce segregation in certain neighbourhoods, which are frequently 
characterized by poorer school buildings, less equipment and less able 
teachers”.582 The report also highlighted that in many Northern and Western 
school districts where segregation was not the law, de facto segregation was still 
in practice and brought with it all of the same problems and issues of sub-
standard schooling which de jure segregation suffered.  
The Truman Commission acknowledged that where segregation was not 
the custom – either de jure or de facto – institutions of higher education had 
instituted different methods of ensuring that the number of African American 
students who matriculated was still low. It singled out the popular ‘quota system’, 
practised widely in integrated colleges and universities across the USA, for 
condemnation. It demonstrated that “at the college level a different form of 
discrimination is commonly practiced. Many colleges and universities, especially 
in their professional schools, maintain a selective quota system for admission, 
under which the chance to learn, and thereby to become more useful citizens, is 
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denied to certain minorities, particularly to Negros and Jews”.583 Colleges and 
universities who subscribed to the quota system set a limit on the number of 
students from different ethnic minorities who could attend each year. There was 
usually a specific number of places for each ethnic minority, and they could often 
be very low; some colleges and universities allowed only one or two African 
American students to join their student body each year. The Commission also 
highlighted the fact that colleges and universities sometimes claimed that they 
had not had enough applications from suitable candidates, so even the small 
number of places that were allocated to African American students would not be 
filled.  
Although this information is neither new nor radical by current standards, 
in 1948 for a government appointed body to highlight these serious issues in a 
widely circulated government sponsored report represented a significant shift 
from earlier approaches to this problem. Racism was so entrenched in the South 
during the early years of the 20th century that, as civil rights historian Fass has 
noted, even the classification of such a thing as ‘Black education policy’ was not 
truly considered until the Federal government involved itself during the (FD) 
Roosevelt Administration, despite the fact that formal education for African 
Americans had existed for generations prior to this.584 By the late 1940s, Southern 
attitudes towards integration had not progressed much further. As Thurgood 
Marshall emphasised to the PCCR in 1947, “a great majority of the State Officials 
in the South have no regard for the rights of minority groups whether they be 
Negro, labor unions or other minority groups”.585 Yet the Truman Commission 
clearly and forcefully demonstrated both that African American students did not 
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receive separate-but-equal opportunities within the US education system – just 
separate – and that this was unquestionably a problem which needed to be fixed.  
The Truman Commission highlighted both the strategic Cold War foreign 
policy implications and the logistical Cold War complications that the unequal 
education provision for African Americans created. It highlighted the ways in 
which discriminatory education policies negatively influenced the USA’s Cold 
War effort, stating that “these various barriers to educational opportunity involve 
grave consequences both for the individual and for society”.586 The Commission 
emphasised the implications for the USA’s foreign policy objectives if 
discrimination in the education system was left to continue to affect the USA’s 
reputation overseas; it reminded the Federal government that “one of the gravest 
charges to which American society is subject is that of failing to provide a 
reasonable equality of educational opportunity for its youth”.587 The Truman 
Commission also stressed the humiliation which the USA was suffering abroad, 
and the potential impact of this situation on the nation: “in a world striving for 
international understanding and permanent peace”, the Commission 
demonstrated, “it is essential that this Nation achieve unity and intergroup co-
operation within its own borders”.588 It outlined that “our statesmen are 
sometimes embarrassed in their international dealings by racial discrimination 
within the United States. Its existence weakens our position in international 
affairs at the same time that its impact exacts economic, moral and political costs 
at home”.589  
The Truman Commission also demonstrated that modification of the 
education system was a prudent move to stem this flow of criticism from overseas, 
by emphasising the ways in which the education system was often at the heart of 
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this embarrassment. It highlighted the high number of overseas students who 
were forced to endure discrimination at the hands of the American education 
system, and explained that  
“many foreign students now coming to American colleges are from groups 
which we tend to regard as minority. If our domestic house is not in order, 
these visitors will be subjected to the same embarrassments, exclusions 
and social separations in our colleges and local communities as our 
domestic minorities now experience... Failure to accept these students 
fully, without discrimination, will interfere with amicable international 
relations”.590 
The Truman Commission established what it felt to be a vital, but basic, truth, 
and claimed that “if we cannot achieve a fuller realization of democracy in the 
United States, we are not likely to secure its adoption willingly outside the United 
States”.591 
Speaking logistically, the Truman Commission explained how 
discrimination in education damaged opportunities for African American 
students, which in turn damaged the USA’s manpower pool. The members 
observed that the practice “denies the basic American belief that intelligence and 
ability are present in all ethnic groups, that men of all racial and religious origins 
should have equal opportunity to fit themselves for contributing to the common 
life”.592 It emphasised that “the low educational attainments of Negro adults 
reflect the cumulative effects of a long period of unequal opportunity” – and this 
would inevitably lead to a loss of manpower for the war; “from the viewpoint of 
society”, it claimed, “the barriers mean that far too few of our young people are 
getting enough preparation for assuming the personal, social and civic 
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responsibilities of adults living in a democratic society”.593; 594 The report 
continued to highlight that “it is especially serious that not more of our most 
talented young people continue their schooling beyond high school in this day 
when the complexity of life and of our social problems means that we need 
desperately every bit of trained intelligence we can assemble”.595 The Commission 
concluded that the system of segregation was causing untold damage to the 
national stockpile of manpower, which it referred to as the “most precious natural 
resource in a democracy”.596 It recommended that “until such action [to repeal 
segregation] is taken, the opportunities for Negros to qualify as leaders in 
education, law, medicine, the church and other areas will be limited seriously. 
Our national life is made poorer by the lack of such leadership”.597  
The Truman Commission also took pains to demonstrate that the 
continuance of a segregated system was damaging to the American education 
system as a whole, not just to the African American community. The two tier 
system was more expensive to maintain than an integrated system, which in turn 
drew money away from white students. Zook explained that “to maintain two 
school systems side by side – duplicating, even inadequately, the buildings, 
equipment, and teaching personnel – means that neither can be of the quality 
that would be possible if all the available resources were devoted to one 
system”.598 In addition, the States which were attempting to maintain this two 
tier system were the States which could least afford to do so, which further 
damaged the provision of education to the white students enrolled in these 
areas.599 
The Truman Commission addressed its charge to find “ways and means 
of expanding educational opportunities for all able young people”, given to the 
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members by the President in their Letter of Appointment, as a logistical problem, 
not an ethical concern.600 Zook, the President of the Commission, did identify the 
“outstanding example of these barriers to equal opportunity, of course, is the 
disadvantages suffered by our Negro citizens”, but he then clarified his concern 
by reminding his readers that, after all, “America’s children are America’s most 
vital resources”.601; 602 By rebranding African American students as ‘vital 
resources’ Zook established that all schoolchildren were relevant, even crucial, to 
the USA’s Cold War effort, and to disadvantage a proportion of this group was to 
disadvantage America. 
 
The Need for Federal Involvement 
Once the problem had been fully established, and the implications of the problem, 
both at home and abroad, had been identified, the Truman Commission offered 
a solution, and this solution rested heavily upon the premise of Federal 
involvement in the education system. Importantly, the report did not only focus 
on the necessity for Federal involvement in the education system at this time, but 
also the Federal government’s right and responsibility to intervene in the 
education system. This ‘responsibility’ was largely attributed to the Cold War 
imperatives created by the logistical and strategic pressures on the government; 
these imperatives made education a national concern, and therefore it was no 
longer merely a State matter.  
The Truman Commission used a systematic approach to outline its 
position; firstly, it explained that racism in education must be stopped. The 
Commission played upon the increased interest in human rights and drew a 
startling comparison between discrimination in the USA and the discrimination 
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seen in Nazi Germany during the Second World War, a tragedy which was still 
unnervingly fresh in the minds of the American people. The members of the 
Truman Commission explained in its report that “we have all lately witnessed... 
the horrors to which, in its logical extension, [discrimination] can lead” and 
implied that unless action was taken, the USA could descend into tyranny as Nazi 
Germany had done.603 In likening segregation to the persecution of minorities in 
Europe, the Truman Commission cleverly established not only a motive for 
intervention, but also a precedent. It had been appropriate – unavoidable even – 
for the US Federal government to intervene in affairs which did not directly 
concern it then (after all, the war was in Europe) and, inferred the Commission, 
it was equally as vital and as ‘right’ that it be allowed to do so now. 
Next, the Truman Commission demonstrated that discrimination in the 
USA must be addressed through the schools in particular, and that no other form 
of assault would be successful if this flank remained unchanged. This further 
supported the Federal government’s right to intervene in the affairs of the 
education system, as it established the education system as the front line of the 
assault on inequality in the USA; education must lead the way in improving the 
overall condition of the nation. If civil rights could be achieved in schools, then 
the rest of society would soon follow as the change would inevitably travel up 
through society alongside the students.  
Using the schools was not only effective, the Commission argued, it was 
actually vital. If equality could not be demonstrated to students in their formative 
years in schools, any changes which did occur in society would not be sustained 
– firstly because inequality would remain ingrained in the average American’s 
psyche, and, secondly, because then even if barriers to social advancement were 
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successfully removed from society through other means, until their access to 
quality education was improved the African American community would not be 
in a position to take advantage of these newfound opportunities. The members of 
the Truman Commission observed that 
“We have proclaimed our faith in education as a means of equalizing the 
conditions of men. But there is a grave danger that our present policy will 
make it an instrument for creating the very inequalities it was designed to 
prevent. If the ladder of educational opportunity rises high at the doors of 
some youth, and scarcely rises at all at the doors of others, while at the 
same time formal education is made a pre-requisite to occupational and 
social advance, then education may become the means, not of eliminating 
race and class distinctions, but of deepening and solidifying them. It is 
obvious, then, that free and universal access to education, in terms of the 
interest, ability and need of the student, must be a major goal in American 
Education”.604 
The Truman Commission highlighted in its report that “education,... as all 
the leaders in the making of democracy have pointed out, again and again, is 
necessary to give effect to the equality prescribed by law”.605 It recommended that 
“each institution should conscientiously plan and prosecute a well organised 
program to reduce, and where possible promptly to eliminate discrimination, not 
only by correcting its policies and practices, but also by educating its students to 
seek the abolition of discriminatory practices in all their manifestations”.606 
Further to this, it asserted that “educational programs everywhere should be 
aimed at undermining and eventually eliminating the attitudes that are 
responsible for discrimination and segregation”.607 To merely force change upon 
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the society would have had little impact – education itself would be needed to 
sustain the change. The Truman Commission demonstrated, however, that the 
Federal government had power at its disposal which it could use to enforce these 
changes, if it was required.  
The Commission highlighted in its report that private institutions 
(universities and colleges over which, traditionally, no Federal, State or even local 
governments had much jurisdiction) also employed discriminatory policies and 
should not be exempt from the Federal government’s overhaul. The Truman 
Commission demonstrated that private educational institutions “are vitally 
affected with a public interest. Not only is this reflected in the privilege of tax 
exemption which they are accorded” – the Federal government could revoke this 
status to institutions which refused to integrate – “but also in the process of State 
accreditation in certain States” – this could also be revoked. As they were no less 
relevant to the Cold War imperatives than other schools were – “and in the 
recognition that they constitute part of a program of higher education dedicated 
to the Nation’s welfare” – the Commission established that “they are thus 
genuinely vested with a public interest, and as such are morally obligated to 
abandon restrictive policies”.608  
The Commission were able to establish in the report that unless the 
education system began to work together with the Federal government, the 
changes, which were so vital to the USA’s global standing and the progression of 
the Civil Rights movement, would be threatened. To discover that, if they did not 
work with the Federal government, the nation could lose the Cold War, was 
stirring reading for the staff of the colleges and universities who received this 
report. Discovering that they could lose their tax-exempt status, however, may 
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have had even more of an effect. The report’s carefully worded prose made it clear 
that the Federal government had power which could – and would – be utilised if 
necessary, and that it was a power which no other authority possessed. This 
passive-aggressive threat foreshadowed well the events which would take place at 
Little Rock a decade later.  
Throughout its report, the Truman Commission’s belief that Federal 
intervention into the US education system was the only way to improve equality 
of opportunity for African American students is glaringly clear. The Commission 
repeatedly discussed the global situation and the precarious position of US 
national security in order to demonstrate both the negative impact which 
discrimination in US education had had on the USA’s Cold War effort, and the 
positive impact fixing this situation could have. As it had demonstrated that the 
US education system was vital to the USA’s success in the Cold War, the 
Commission was able to invoke the Cold War imperative for change, thus adding 
weight both to Truman’s plan to desegregate the US education system, and to the 
argument that the Federal government needed to be the one to do it.  
 
The Impact of the Truman Commission 
The recommendations made by the Truman Commission in its six volume report, 
Higher Education for American Democracy, were revolutionary. Thelin has 
recognised that, although “almost all commission reports succumb to the 
blandness of compromise and generic discussion”, the Truman Commission 
suffered no such fate.609 Instead, the report recommended that radical and 
controversial changes be made to the education system, and nowhere were its 
recommendations more contentious than in this second volume of the report, 
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Equalizing and Expanding Educational Opportunity (1947). No other 
government body had renounced segregation in the education system so publicly 
or in such direct and forceful terms, nor had any Federal committee previously 
demanded such a direct and uncompromising end to discrimination in education. 
Not even the PCCR took so firm a position against segregation within the 
American education system, despite its stance against segregation generally. 
Despite this enviable pedigree, the Truman Commission had surprisingly 
little direct, immediate impact upon the education system specifically in the early 
years of the Cold War. There are many reasons for the fate of the Truman 
Commission’s recommendations. Firstly, the recommendations made by the 
Commission initially created debate rather than action. As Claire Gilbert and 
Donald Heller have asserted in their article “The Truman Commission and its 
Impact on Federal Higher Education Policy from 1947 to 2010”, “the sweeping 
recommendations the report made about higher education in its six volumes were 
both celebrated and reviled”.610 The report was divisive. Some of the 
Commission’s recommendations were simply too radical for the general 
educational community, especially those which addressed discrimination in 
education or desegregation. Thelin has identified that the recommendations in 
the report “moved too far, too fast”; the educational community was simply not 
ready to accept, let alone implement, many of the Commission’s forward thinking 
suggestions.611  
Secondly, as enthusiastic about education reform as President Truman 
was, when he established the Commission at the end of 1946, he did not establish 
a formal link between its findings and the pursuance of congressional legislation. 
Therefore, when the momentum created in 1948 by the publication of the first 
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volume of the report subsided due to the debates over the efficacy of the 
recommendations, there was no formal plan in place to return the Commission’s 
recommendations to the place where they could have the most impact – 
Congress. Without this formal relationship, Thelin has acknowledged, the report 
found itself without “either the precedent or the presidential clout to work its way 
into Congressional subcommittees”.612  
Even if the Truman Commission’s recommendations had been seriously 
discussed in Congress however, it is likely that they would not have been 
implemented anyway. The hostile relationship which existed between President 
Truman and the Republican-led 80th Congress (1947-1949) is legendary, and the 
Congress was dubbed the ‘do nothing’ Congress by Truman. Thelin suggests that 
the report suffered from bad timing as, at the time of its publication, “Truman 
was already facing a hostile Congress and an unsupportive press”.613 It is difficult, 
however, to pinpoint a moment throughout Truman’s career in the White House 
when he did not face a hostile Congress, thus making it unlikely that Truman 
could ever have been successful in convincing Congress to implement the 
recommendations made by his Commission. 
Although no direct Congressional action was taken with regards to the 
recommendations made by the Truman Commission immediately after the 
publication of Higher Education for American Democracy, there is no doubt that 
it had an impact upon the educational community. It had a large circulation and 
was discussed in detail after its publication – even prompting the publication of 
a volume of responses, both positive and negative, to the report. 614 It would be 
remiss to assume that its recommendations were merely forgotten after such 
deliberation. As Thelin has acknowledged, the Commission’s suggestions were 
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made in the wrong political climate but, as the subsequent success of many of the 
Commission’s ideas has demonstrated, they were not overlooked, just deferred.615 
As Gilbert and Heller have noted, 
 “the dialogue that the Commission created on higher education laid the 
groundwork for subsequent Federal involvement and spurred a great deal 
of debate and interest within the higher education community, and recent 
developments and interest at the Federal level point towards a potential 
realization of even more of the Commission’s aims”.616 
The recommendations for change made in the report of the Truman Commission, 
whilst underutilised in its own time, echoed through educational legislation for 
decades afterwards. 
On the matter of segregation, the Commission’s radical stance could not 
be side-lined. As Ravitch has recognised, “the Commission’s stern denunciation 
of segregation and discrimination helped to chip away at the legitimacy of such 
policies; in the eyes of leading educators, there could be no defense of 
discrimination”.617 Ravitch demonstrates that, due to the Commission’s vocal and 
widely heard condemnation of racism in the US education system, “In future 
discussions of education and social policy, the issue of racial inequality could no 
longer be ignored”.618 Although the Commission’s recommendations that the 
American education system be desegregated were not immediately acted upon, it 
brought the issue to the forefront of educational thought and policy, thereby 
ensuring that it would remain a ‘hot issue’ whenever education was discussed.  
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Other Federal Education Programmes  
The Truman Commission was not the only federally appointed body which 
discussed discrimination in the education system in the 1950s. Among others, the 
USOE and the PCCR also discussed the problem, as did the Commissioners of 
Education within the pages of School Life. Similarly to the Truman Commission, 
all involved recognised the need, due to the Cold War, for education for African 
American students to improve, and for the Federal government to involve itself 
in the debate. The USOE and the PCCR recommended several programmes which 
were designed to improve the educational level of the African American 
community during the Truman Administration, and both bodies utilised the Cold 
War imperatives in order to demonstrate an impetus for expending time and 
funds towards these projects beyond ‘merely’ the improvement of education for 
black students.  
 
The Education of ‘Negro’ Leaders 
In 1948, the USOE published a Bulletin entitled “Education of Negro Leaders: 
Influences Affecting Graduate and Professional Studies”. In it, the USOE 
acknowledged the logistical need to steadily increase the number of African 
Americans who had been educated to a high enough standard to be able to take 
on positions of power and responsibility within the African American community 
and to act as trailblazers and role models to younger generations. It also 
advocated for the improvement of African American education in order to enable 
well-trained African Americans to take on roles in mainstream American society, 
such as US ambassadors to overseas nations that were dubious about the USA’s 
civil rights record. The Bulletin recommended that Federal involvement would be 
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needed in order to solve this problem, as it identified the local and State 
governments in the South as both the controlling interest in Southern education 
and as the root cause of the lack of progress in this area. Only the Federal 
government, the USOE argued, could control the local, and often white 
supremacist, governments in the Southern bloc.619 
The Bulletin suggested that the main reason why the African American 
community had so few students progressing to excellence was because African 
American schools (elementary and secondary), colleges and universities received 
such a low proportion of the Federal funds set aside for education. The USOE 
Bulletin recognised that, especially in the Southern States, the equally 
proportioned funds for schools that the Federal government delivered to the State 
governments, which the State governments passed on in mostly equal 
proportions to the local governments, were then diverted by the local 
governments to the white schools, leaving the African American schools to fend 
for themselves.620 This was neither the Federal government’s fault, nor a 
misappropriation of the funds as, once the funds were delivered to the local 
governments, they were the property of the local governments to apportion as 
they saw fit. There were, of course, no caveats allowed on the apportionment of 
the Federal government’s funds as it had no direct right to interfere with the 
schools.  
The USOE believed, however, that the local government’s use of Federal 
funds did not reflect the Federal government’s intention, and claimed that 
“whatever the will of the Federal government has been in this matter of equitable 
distribution of its funds, that will has, by one means or another, been 
thwarted”.621 The Bulletin recommended that, in order to regain control, the 
260 
 
Federal government should include an equalisation clause in all Federal 
appropriation Acts, or request that all administrators of Federal educational 
funds “institute policies and practices in an effort to ensure more equitable 
distribution of such funds”, the like of which would be dictated by the Federal 
government.622; 623 This would indeed have prevented the local governments from 
overfunding white schools at the expense of the African American schools, but 
would have also encroached upon local government rights and would constitute 
a move towards a central or ‘big’ government.  
The Bulletin justified this overstep in Federal authority by demonstrating 
that, due to the Cold War imperatives, the Federal government in fact did have 
the right to institute such a policy. The USOE identified that “from the standpoint 
of both moral responsibility and national interest, the Federal government has 
concern in assuring the Negro's equal opportunity for the preparation of qualified 
leaders for their own group as well as for the nation generally”.624 The USOE 
noted the strategic benefit, and demonstrated that  
“providing larger opportunities for colored people in America may have 
two effects… first, it will give further evidence of our sincerity as a nation 
as we assume world leadership of democracy; and second it will ensure a 
source of supply of leaders that may be more understanding of the needs 
of certain groups of these colored peoples throughout the world and who 
also may be more acceptable to these groups and more effective than white 
leaders… No better proof could be given to the tens of millions of colored 
peoples, whose confidence we cherish, that our offer of leadership is 
sincere than by enlarging the opportunities of Negros in our own country 
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to prepare themselves, and to put their preparation to use, both in this 
country and abroad”.625 
The USOE’s Bulletin stated that “what an extension of the practice of preparing 
Negros in the field of public administration as well as technical and professional 
fields, would mean to our good neighbor policy, not only in South America, but 
in Asia, Africa and the South Pacific, is not difficult to imagine”.626 It recognised 
that the improvement of African American students’ access to education would 
serve to mollify overseas critics of the USA and to improve the USA’s standing in 
the Third World. In addition, as the Truman Commission had identified, racism 
in education was also more evident to foreign visitors than many other forms of 
discrimination as a significant number of non-white visitors to the USA came to 
study, and therefore experienced first-hand the discrimination non-white 
students faced in American education.627  
In addition to the strategic benefits these new ambassadors could bring, 
the Bulletin highlighted the logistical benefits. It reiterated the nation’s 
manpower shortage and asserted that “never before was the need so great for men 
and women who are trained in the scientific and technical fields, who have an 
understanding of the human and social implications of these fields and who are 
imbued with the spirit of service”.628 For the most part, argued the Bulletin, 
African Americans – especially in the South – were so undereducated that the 
nation could not hope to expect them to contribute to its progression, and this 
was an oversight that the USA could ill afford.  
Moreover, the USOE acknowledged a snow-ball effect, suggesting that a 
few well-trained, well-placed ‘Negro Leaders’ could inspire the remainder of the 
African American community to excel, thus greatly benefitting the USA’s 
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manpower shortage. The Bulletin demonstrated that an integrated and fair 
education system could prove vital to the USA's Cold War effort in a number of 
varied ways. No information exists as to the fate of this Executive 
recommendation. As it would have required the co-operation of Congress to 
implement, however, it is probable that it was abandoned as Truman’s 
relationship with the legislative branch made it unlikely to have been successful.  
 
Literacy Programmes 
Increasing the number of African Americans who occupied high level jobs by 
making Federal funding fairer was not the only plan which the USOE intended to 
implement in order to improve the educational level of the African American 
community during the Truman Administration. Whilst it was attempting to 
improve education at the very highest level, it was also working towards raising 
literacy levels among blacks at the very bottom of the educational spectrum. 
Spurred on by a combination of the shockingly low literacy levels which African 
American men attained on the Selective Service tests during the Second World 
War, and the results of the 1940 Census which revealed that roughly two out of 
every five adult African Americans were considered to be functionally illiterate, 
the USOE created, sponsored and promoted an adult education programme 
exclusively for African Americans to improve levels of literacy from the end of the 
Second World War onwards.629  
Commissioner Studebaker discussed the need for the programme at a 
USOE Conference, and invoked the logistical Cold War imperative by stating that 
“we have millions of adults who are now illiterate at a time when we need their 
intelligent understanding of our domestic and world problems more than this 
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country ever needed such understanding before”.630 He was supported in his 
efforts by General Arthur P. Trudeau, who acknowledged that “civilian society can 
determine to reap the benefits of the untapped capacities of many of our adult 
illiterates”.631 The USOE identified the nation’s need for a literate populace, 
especially during times of war, and noted that illiterate people were often more 
susceptible to low standards of living and to subversive messages, neither of 
which a Cold War USA could afford. The USOE demonstrated that “many of the 
ills which affect human beings – disease, poverty, crime and maladjustments – 
find their greatest incidence among the least educated. Moreover, so large a mass 
of undereducated people become a drag on the entire population. The lack of 
national wealth and strength resulting from this untapped reservoir of human 
resources is incalculable”.632  
The programme ran at a number of US higher education institutions, 
including both segregated and integrated schools; in particular, Atlanta 
University, Fort Valley State Teachers College, Tennessee Agricultural and 
Industrial State College, Fisk University, Hampton Institute and Virginia State 
College were especially active.633 The programme further corroborates the fact 
that the USOE, and by extension Truman’s Executive branch, understood that the 
nation desperately needed to improve basic education levels among African 
Americans as a matter of national security; as a man who attended one of these 
USOE workshops stated, “you got to have learnin’ before you can do most 
anything”; another highlighted the logistical benefits of the programme, and 
highlighted that “if only our foreparents [sic] had had this, I wouldn’t be in this 
fix today”.634  
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The President’s Committee on Civil Rights 
The PCCR, another commission created by Truman, viewed racism and its 
elimination as very much the Federal government’s problem, and listed several 
reasons why the government should lead the way in the fight for civil rights in its 
report. Firstly, the Committee demonstrated that “the extension of civil rights 
today means not protection of the people against the government, but protection 
of the people by the government” [emphasis in original], a statement which 
echoed the Executive branch’s own argument that it had a constitutional 
responsibility to protect the nation despite traditional understanding of 
educational authority or policy.635 The PCCR demonstrated that it is often 
“private persons or local public officers” who perpetuate racism, not the 
government, and that these people should be made answerable to the Federal 
government. Secondly, it identified that there were a host of localised issues of 
discrimination, but it believed that, in general, the American populace as a whole 
supported the call for improved civil rights for African Americans, therefore the 
Federal government must provide a strong central leadership in order to 
eliminate the local problems. Third, the PCCR reiterated the argument that these 
local issues had global implications, and the Federal government could not safely 
disregard an issue which posed such a threat to national security. Fourth, the 
PCCR argued that Americans, regardless of colour, looked to the Federal 
government to defend their rights, therefore the Federal government must do so.  
Finally, and most importantly, the PCCR argued that the Federal 
government was the only organisation which was in possession of the means 
necessary to affect change in the USA. The Federal government controlled federal 
taxes, statutes and a host of other measures, and therefore it was in a position to 
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impose strictures on State and local governments which would ensure that it 
acted in line with a federally sponsored plan for tackling racism in the USA. The 
PCCR believed that the government had a range of political tactics at its disposal 
which, if properly utilised, could ensure that civil rights were afforded where due. 
The PCCR clarified its radical plan by informing readers that it was not 
recommending that the Federal government use this method “beyond the point 
of necessity”, for fear that it would interfere with the nation’s freedom.636  
The PCCR took a firm stance against racism in schools, colleges and high 
schools, and recommended in its final report, which dealt with eliminating racism 
in all walks of American life, that the Federal government should actually legislate 
against racism by enacting a Fair Educational Practices Law. This law, it 
suggested, would apply to both public and private institutions (although not 
religious institutions) and prevent them from discriminating against students on 
the basis of “race, color or creed or national origin, and motivated by prejudice or 
bigotry” in admissions policies or educational practices.637 Religious institutions 
were excepted as discrimination on religious grounds was deemed to be central 
to their purpose. The Committee also recommended that, after a fair period of 
adjustment had taken place, the Federal government should enforce this law by 
withholding Federal grants-in-aid from any and all institutions which did not 
comply with the law.638  
Once again, the recommendations fell outside the government’s scope 
within the educational sphere. To counter this, the PCCR reiterated the Federal 
government’s Cold War imperatives, which the PCCR claimed gave it the right to 
take action. The Committee highlighted the USA’s declining reputation overseas, 
and included in the report several excerpts from newspapers which decried the 
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USA’s approach to civil rights. These included a clipping from the Washington 
Post from May 1947 that stated that “diplomatic circles said that the two instances 
of mob violence [in North Carolina] would provide excellent propaganda 
ammunition for Communist agents who have been decrying America’s brand of 
‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’”.639  
The PCCR successfully reminded its audience that the USA’s two most 
valued ideological values – democracy and freedom – were repeatedly called into 
question overseas, to the point where diplomats could predict the fallout before 
it happened. The PCCR also demonstrated that the Federal government must act 
with immediacy to tackle the entrenched racism in the USA. As overseas opinion 
of the USA declined, so did the stability of US imports and exports; the PCCR 
recognised that it is “more than a humanitarian ideal that is involved here; our 
economic wellbeing is at stake”, thus bestowing a tangible value upon the abstract 
concept of racism and its implications.640 It is clear from the report that all 
involved in the PCCR opposed institutional racism and viewed the moral 
implications of second class citizenry based on skin colour as reason enough to 
outlaw all racist practices, but Cold War imperatives were repeatedly utilised 
throughout the report in order to further justify its plans, and to validate Federal 
involvement within the education system.  
 
The Truman Administration and the Courts 
The final method through which the Executive branch of the Truman 
Administration attempted to gain influence over the developments occurring 
within education for African Americans was through the Justice Department’s 
submission of amicus curiae briefs to Supreme Court trials concerned with 
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discrimination in education, most notably, Brown v. Board of Education. 
Truman also exerted his Executive power to make several ‘crony’ appointments 
to the Justice Department, and also favoured loyalty over suitability in the four 
nominations he made to the Supreme Court during his Administration.641  
 Although there is no evidence to suggest beyond reasonable doubt that 
Truman’s Supreme Court appointments actually deferred to him during their 
tenure, it is reasonable to suggest that this was Truman’s original intention when 
he chose time and again to nominate his political confidantes over more qualified 
candidates. Indeed, Truman himself even lamented that “packing a Supreme 
Court simply can’t be done” which he knew for sure because “I’ve tried it and it 
won’t work… whenever you put a man on the Supreme Court, he ceases to be your 
friend, I’m sure of that”.642 Three of Truman’s four appointments were still 
serving on the bench during the Brown decision in 1954. One of these nominees, 
Attorney General Tom C. Clark, was a controversial appointment as he was widely 
recognised to be a ‘crony’ appointment at the time. Clark had headed up the 
Justice Department during the period in which it began submitting unsolicited 
amicus briefs in support of civil rights cases; however, despite the controversy, 
he was a popular choice with the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP), which defended his selection.643  
Truman’s fourth appointment, Sherman Minton, is also widely considered 
to be a ‘crony’ appointment; historian of the Supreme Court, Henry Julian 
Abraham, has noted that “it is clear that loyal personal and political dedication 
was once again rewarded” when Truman named Sherman to the Supreme Court 
in 1949.644 It must be noted that Minton’s position on civil rights was also well 
known before he was appointed; as historian John R. Hale has noted, “Minton 
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had already made his position clear on civil rights during his stint as a senator for 
Indiana”.645 Minton “regarded his most important vote on the bench to be a silent 
one: the one he cast with the unanimous justices in May 1954, joining Chief 
Justice Earl Warren’s historic ruling that, free from any either dissenting or 
concurring opinions, declared compulsory segregation of public schools 
unconstitutional”.646 More interestingly, it was Sherman that delivered an 
impassioned speech to the Supreme Court in the final days of the Truman 
Administration in an attempt to convince the Court to take on the Brown case.647 
Jeffrey D. Hockett has suggested that “the justices who proved most receptive” to 
the issues highlighted in the amicus briefs from the Justice Department “were 
those who had been appointed by the Administration that brought these matters 
to the Court’s attention – Harold Burton, Sherman Minton, and especially Harry 
Truman’s former Attorney General, Tom Clark”.648  
The final way in which the Truman Administration attempted to 
circumvent each State’s right to govern their own education system was through 
the submission of amicus curiae briefs which highlighted the strategic imperative 
for civil rights reform to court cases that dealt with discrimination in education.12 
In this instance it was Truman’s Justice Department, initially led by Attorney 
General Tom C. Clark and later J. Howard McGrath and James P. McGranery, 
and the State Department, led first by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, and 
later George C. Marshall and Dean Acheson, which attempted to influence the US 
education system by utilising the powers that were at their disposal, albeit in an 
                                                          
12 Truman’s Justice Department submitted amicus briefs in civil rights cases that focused on a 
variety of topics, but this thesis is concerned only with those that focused on discrimination in 
education.  
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innovative and highly unorthodox manner. The initial concerns were brought to 
the Justice Department by the State Department, which had experienced first-
hand the damage which discrimination in the USA could do to America’s overseas 
image.649 As Acting Secretary of State, Acheson wrote to the Fair Employment 
Practices Commission (FEPC) in May 1946 that it was "quite obvious" that race 
discrimination interfered with foreign relations, and noted that the State 
Department had "good reason to hope for the continued and increased 
effectiveness of public and private efforts to do away with these 
discriminations."650 The Justice Department first intervened in a case in which it 
was not a party in 1948 in Shelley v. Kraemer, a property rights case against 
African Americans that questioned States’ rights.651 
Although this was a power that was at the disposal of the Executive branch, 
just like the utilisation of the power to create presidential commissions, it had 
never been utilised in such a way before; the Justice Department had never before 
intervened in a case in which it was not a party. As Dudziak has noted,  
“the Truman Administration’s involvement in high profile desegregation 
cases was a new practice. The United States was not a plaintiff or a 
defendant in these cases. The Justice Department filed amicus curiae 
briefs to inform the court of important interests at stake beyond those 
presented by the parties to the cases. Previously, the Justice Department 
had filed amicus briefs only in cases where the United States had a 
concrete interest at stake. The cases leading up to Brown v. Board of 
Education did not involve a concrete federal interest”.652  
Clark later stated that the briefs submitted by the Justice Department during the 
Truman Administration “‘gave the [civil rights] case [the] emphasis necessary for 
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an expedited decision… I think our joining these cases were [sic] really more 
effective than if we had filed them ourselves”.653 The most important amicus brief 
filed in Brown was filed in December 1952, in the last weeks of the Truman 
Administration.654 This brief noted that school segregation had been “singled out 
for hostile foreign comment in the United Nations and elsewhere. Other peoples 
cannot understand how such a practice can exist in a country which professes to 
be a staunch supporter of freedom, justice and democracy”.655 A statement from 
President Truman at the end of the brief corroborated the earlier sentiments 
expressed, then stated that “we know the way, we only need the will”.656 President 
Truman clearly demonstrated the will to engender progress in education for 
African American students.  
 
From Truman to Eisenhower 
The PCCR highlighted in 1947 that “the American people have always mistrusted 
the American government and have feared the evils that flow from it. But we have 
never hesitated to entrust power and responsibility to the national government 
when a convincing need for a course of action has been demonstrated”.657 The 
Truman Commission were also clear in their understanding that, if tangible 
alterations were to be made in the extermination of discrimination in the 
education system, then the power and might of the Federal government would 
have to be committed to change. Each organisation’s belief that Federal 
involvement would add weight and legitimacy to its plans was strong. This belief, 
however, was misplaced, as this unquestioning support from the Federal 
government did not materialise at the time at which it was most needed.  
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 On 17th May 1954, the Supreme Court unanimously voted to declare 
segregated educational facilities to be unconstitutional as, it asserted, separate 
facilities could never be equal. The ruling was a landmark decision and 
overturned the earlier Supreme Court decision made in 1896 in the case of Plessy 
v. Ferguson, which has established that separate facilities for white and non-
white US citizens was constitutionally viable. Yet this historic case, which had 
begun, and was originally argued, during the Truman Administration, was 
decided a little over a year into the Eisenhower Administration. This could have 
been of benefit to the Civil Rights movement – a movement which gained a great 
deal of momentum from its success with the Brown decision; President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower had a far better relationship with Congress than President Truman 
had had, and therefore was far better placed to attempt to work with this branch 
of government in the pursuit of positive change for African Americans.658 
Ostensibly, the imperative for change had not altered; the Cold War was still 
happening, and an improved education system for African American students 
was still equally as worth pursuing. Eisenhower, however, did not share President 
Truman’s personal imperative for the pursuit of civil rights. He had opposed the 
desegregation of the armed forces in 1948, considering it to be ‘disruptive’, and 
never publicly declared his support for Brown.  
In addition, he was in a vastly different political situation to Truman; As a 
Democrat, Truman had been motivated by his pursuit of the traditionally 
Republican African American vote – as a Republican, Eisenhower courted the 
traditionally Democrat Southern white vote. As James T. Patterson noted in 
Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and its Troubled Legacy, 
“Eisenhower approached the issue of school desegregation very cautiously. Some 
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of his top advisors, noting the gains the Republican Party had made among white 
voters in the South during the 1952 election, urged him to move carefully, lest the 
party forfeit possible political advantage”.659 Truman demonstrated both a moral 
and political imperative for advancing civil rights during his Administration; due 
to his personal and political situation, Eisenhower could demonstrate neither.  
Although Patterson argued that Eisenhower did not support Brown at all, 
he gave no consideration to Dudziak’s research in his monograph;13 Dudziak’s 
acknowledgement of the strategic Cold War imperative adds a new light to 
Patterson’s straightforward interpretation of the situation. Dudziak has 
highlighted that Eisenhower clearly understood the implications which domestic 
policy had upon foreign policy, as he demonstrated as such during the Little Rock 
crisis. Eisenhower only recognised the strategic Cold War imperative for 
integrating America’s schools, however, and in 1954 this ‘strategic imperative’ did 
not call for any actual domestic change to the segregated US schools at which the 
Supreme Court decision was precisely targeted. The press coverage generated by 
the historic ruling was enough to mollify the USA’s critics overseas, reinforce the 
perception of the nation’s commitment to democracy and equality, and improve 
the country’s global image. With the passage of Brown, the strategic imperative 
for desegregation of the US education system was fulfilled, and Eisenhower’s 
support for its actual implementation – as called for by the logistical imperative 
– was not forthcoming.  
Historian Michael S. Meyer has noted that “Eisenhower dug in his heels 
and attempted to put a break on the accelerated rate and scope of change. He 
                                                          
13 As Dudziak’s Cold War Civil Rights was published only a year before Patterson’s book, it is 
possible that he was unable to take her research into account.  
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supported the Court’s ruling when necessary, but only to the minimum extent he 
believed the law required”.660 Eisenhower’s failure to acknowledge the logistical 
aspects of the Cold War imperative for change was impacted by a numbers of 
elements. Firstly, unlike Truman, he was lacking in motivating factors; there was 
no political imperative for improving civil rights in the education system as the 
Republican Party was not courting the black vote, as the Democratic Party had 
been, but was in fact courting the Southern Democrats, who were significantly 
more likely to be opposed to desegregation in schools. In addition, Eisenhower 
had no personal motivation to further pursue equality for African American 
students; his personal opinions were more closely aligned with Brown’s traducers 
than its supporters. Finally, in a major blow to the Civil Rights movement, the 
powerful Massive Resistance movement established itself in opposition to the 
integration of the schools.  
Those in favour of segregation even had their own ‘Cold War imperative’. 
An argument began to emerge that the ever expanding influence of the Federal 
government, as demonstrated by the overreach of power in the Brown decision, 
was turning the USA into a Communist-like State with an all-powerful central 
government. Historian George Lewis has identified that this argument  
“allowed [segregationists] to expand upon existing claims of nefarious 
communist involvement in the promotion of civil rights. Second, it handed 
southern resistors the ability to recast many of the region’s long-held, 
traditional arguments in a new light, thus renovating a number of 
defensive strategies that were in danger of looking increasingly tired and 
anachronistic. Finally, it offered at least the possibility of transforming 
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what was perceived, in essence, to be a southern sectional problem of race 
relations into an American problem of national security”.661 
One segregationist, speaking in 1956, demonstrated that central power 
represented a far greater threat to the nation than State power as, he claimed, “it 
is much easier to subvert a central government than it is to subvert forty-eight 
State governments”.662 This utilisation of the Cold War imperative on behalf of 
the cause of segregation had the potential to greatly undermine the efficacy of the 
argument when utilised to underline the Federal government’s own cause. 
Eisenhower’s lack of personal or political motivation to enforce Brown alongside 
the increased difficulty inherent in doing so meant that he did not openly enforce 
it until pro-segregationists undermined Federal authority and threatened to 
damage the USA’s reputation once again in Little Rock, AK, in 1957.  
Eisenhower’s lack of personal commitment to the Civil Rights movement, 
alongside the Republican Party’s political commitment to establishing a voter 
base in the Deep South and the powerful support for segregation created by the 
Massive Resistance movement, closed Eisenhower’s eyes to the existence of a 
logistical imperative, to the extent that African American education policy slipped 
out of consideration during the Eisenhower Administration. That Eisenhower did 
not comprehend the logistical benefits which an improvement in African 
American education provision could bring to the USA’s Cold War effort can be 
seen clearly in his own exploration into the state of the US education system. In 
1956, the fruits of these explorations were published. He received reports from 
both his White House Conference on Education (1955) and the President’s 
Committee on Education Beyond the High School (1956); these reports 
highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the US higher education system, and 
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both focused on two specific needs – the need to greatly expand the USA’s 
manpower pool in order to safeguard the nation in the Cold War, and the need 
for the Federal government to provide increased funding to higher education, 
despite not having a constitutional role to play.663  
Like Truman, the importance of Federal involvement within the education 
system in order to protect US national security despite traditionally not having a 
constitutional right to do so, and the increase of the manpower pool as the 
method through which national security should be protected, were goals to which 
Eisenhower was openly committed, but unlike Truman, he did not include 
African American students at all in his plans to do so. In the report of the 
President’s Committee on Education Beyond the High School, the manpower 
problem was discussed on three separate occasions, yet the contribution which 
the underutilised African American community could make is not mentioned at 
all. In fact, neither African Americans nor desegregation are mentioned at any 
point throughout the 108-page report. Segregation was discussed in the report of 
the White House Conference; it identified that “the relationship of the issue of 
segregation to the generally accepted goal of equal educational opportunity” was 
“an area of conflicting opinions not entirely resolved by Supreme Court action”.664  
Interestingly, minorities were included in both reports – the need to 
protect the nation was not so pressing that the needs of women and disabled 
children were forgotten by the President’s Committee and the White House 
Conference respectively; discussion of the under-utilisation of women in science 
was included, as was the need, in a democratic society, to take better care of 
children identified to have severe learning difficulties. Neither report was 
particularly ground-breaking, nor were they shocking. In fact, the majority of 
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what was recommended by each group had already been suggested before (and 
much of it by the Truman Commission itself).665 This places the discussion of 
African American students in the position of being all the more notorious by its 
absence. Eisenhower was willing to support Brown in order to meet the demands 
of the strategic Cold War imperative, but without recognition of how important 
the actual improvement of African American education provision could be to the 
USA’s Cold War effort, the logistical Cold War imperative was left unfulfilled. 
It is not the case that Brown had no impact without Eisenhower’s support. 
The most compelling case is of Arkansas’ school districts Hoxie, Fayetteville, 
Biggers-Reyno and Charleston, where the all-white school boards chose to 
comply with the ruling despite no demonstration of support from Eisenhower.666 
One member of the school board in Hoxie has subsequently stated that he and his 
fellows made this decision because “it was the law of the land” and “we thought it 
was the right thing to do”.667 It is the case, however, that Brown could have had 
far greater impact had the ruling had Eisenhower’s support. Judge Warren was 
clear in his belief that Eisenhower’s refusal to offer his support to the ruling 
directly contributed to its lack of effect.668  
After the ruling was handed down, Eisenhower offered no public show of 
support, and privately often voiced his disagreement with the ruling.669 Meyer 
has noted that this silence “gave encouragement to Southern States preparing to 
argue for the slowest possible implementation when the Supreme Court convened 
that fall”.670 When invited to participate in the oral arguments on 
implementation, the Southern States that agreed to participate advocated for 
slow processes. Meyer asserts that the Southern States’ position “can be summed 
up along the following lines: any attempt to desegregate school facilities would 
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encounter grave obstacles”.671 Indeed, in Arkansas, the positive movement 
towards integration did not last long after a Life magazine article drew attention 
to the school integration in Hoxie and prompted the arrival of segregationist 
organisations, bringing an end to the peaceful integration there.672  
Where the schools did not voluntarily take steps towards desegregation, 
Eisenhower steadfastly refused to get involved and repeatedly refused to endorse 
Brown publicly.673 He also attempted to distance the decision from the 
Administration under which it was made – when reporter Harry C. Dent noted 
on 19th May 1954 that the decision had been made under a Republican 
Administration, Eisenhower retorted that “The Supreme Court, as I understand 
it, is not under any administration”.674  Unlike Truman, he made few attempts to 
‘maximise’ his Executive power on behalf civil rights. Eisenhower believed that, 
as the Judicial branch had advocated for integration, it was this branch’s domain 
to enforce.675 Where he did invoke his Executive power, for example at Central 
High School in Little Rock in 1957, it was for a combination of strategic 
motivations and to uphold the sanctity of Federal power, rather than a 
committed, long-term involvement in domestic civil rights progress.   
Eisenhower deployed the National Guard to Arkansas, and the world’s 
press praised Eisenhower’s firm stance on the importance of desegregation. 
Shortly after the Little Rock crisis, however, their attention was drawn to another 
important event in the Cold War – the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite. This 
event overshadowed all that had come before it, and the events of Little Rock 
quickly dropped out of the papers.676 As desegregation was no longer on the 
world’s stage, the strategic Cold War imperative for change was gone once again, 
and by the time the school year began in 1959, only one of the ‘Little Rock nine’ 
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remained enrolled in Central High School.677 Without the impetus provided by 
the strategic imperative, tackling segregation in education once again dropped off 
the top of the Eisenhower’s to-do list. 
As the PCCR recognised in 1947, “in a world forever tottering on the brink 
of war, civil rights are at best in a precarious position. In a nation wracked by 
depression and widespread economic insecurity, the deadly inclination to 
consider civil rights a luxury will be more easily accepted”.678 During the 
Eisenhower Administration, this became increasingly true. The extra obstacles to 
progress provided by the Massive Resistance movement coupled with a perceived 
increase in the importance of the education system to national security after the 
launch of Sputnik meant that a commitment to improving civil rights in education 
was increasingly seen as a luxury which the USA could not afford to pursue. 
Indeed, when Eisenhower was given the opportunity to offer support to the 
African American community, he did not.  
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell attached an amendment to the 
majority of Federal school funding bills that were submitted to Congress during 
the Eisenhower Administration. This amendment was intended to ensure that no 
Federal funding was afforded to any school which had so far refused to 
integrate.679 Every bill failed whilst it had the Powell Amendment attached to it. 
Powell’s efforts provided President Eisenhower with a prime opportunity to 
demonstrate the support that Judge Warren had wanted him to. Moreover, 
Eisenhower’s support for the Powell Amendment would more than likely have 
allowed his own School Construction Bill, a cause to which he was committed, to 
pass.680 Not only did Eisenhower not demonstrate support for Powell’s 
Amendments, he even asked Powell not to attach it to the National Defense 
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Education Act (NDEA) in 1958, for fear it would derail it.681 In addition, 
Eisenhower’s support would have enabled him to uphold the law. Eisenhower did 
not perceive the logistical benefit, however, of improving educational provision 
for African Americans, nor did he harbour a personal imperative to do so. As such, 
for Eisenhower, the benefits of upholding the law did not outweigh the political 
fallout he would have incurred from supporting the Powell Amendment. 
Eisenhower could afford to side-line the battle over desegregation, especially 
after the USA’s overseas critics had been mollified, but he could not afford to side-
line the Cold War. 
 
The ‘Cold War Imperative’ Theory vs. the ‘Interest-Convergence’ 
Theory  
Derrick A. Bell Jr. established in his article “Brown v. Board of Education and 
the Interest-Convergence Dilemma” (1979/80) that “the interest of blacks in 
achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the 
interests of whites”.682 Bell asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment alone was 
not a strong enough motivator for white Americans to legislate for the progress 
of civil rights – progress had to benefit whites as well as blacks. He stated that 
“racial justice – or its appearance – may, from time to time, be counted among 
the interests deemed important by the courts and by society’s policymakers” but 
also that “racial remedies may instead be the outward manifestations of unspoken 
and perhaps subconscious judicial conclusions that the remedies, if granted, will 
secure, advance, or at least not harm social interests deemed important by middle 
and upper class whites”.683  
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This thesis has re-asserted the prominence of Bell’s theory of the 
importance of a convergence of interests between white and black players in 
furthering the Civil Rights movement during the mid-20th century over Mary L. 
Dudziak’s more recent theory of the Cold War imperative – that the Cold War 
specifically motivated the Federal government to act on behalf of the Civil Rights 
movement during this period. This is not to say that Dudziak’s theory is wrong, 
merely that it is limited, and that Bell’s theory is a more suitable framework 
through which to understand the interactions between the Federal government, 
the Civil Rights movement and the US education system after the Second World 
War.  
Dudziak’s framework grew out of the theory postulated by Bell, yet the 
benefit of her furtherance has never been fully explored. When closer attention is 
paid to the tenets of the theory of the Cold War imperative, it becomes clear that 
although it is useful to a certain extent in explaining the Federal government’s 
motivations as impacted by the Cold War, it is not useful as a stand-alone theory 
apart from the Interest-Convergence theory. Wherever the Federal government 
was influenced by the Cold War imperative, this influence coincided with a wider 
convergence of interests which relied on a more complex series of motivating 
factors; the Cold War alone was not enough to motivate the Federal government 
to take action on civil rights during the 1950s, and at times it actively prevented 
it.  
Dudziak has attempted to further Bell’s theory by demonstrating that the 
Cold War imperative acted as an addendum to his theory. She demonstrated in 
“Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative” (1988) that the “Cold War imperative 
was an important impetus for civil rights reform” and that it was central to “the 
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government’s posture on segregation”.684 It is difficult to pin down Dudziak’s 
exact argument; broadly speaking, she argues that the Federal government 
supported civil rights reform in order to fight the Cold War, and broadly speaking, 
she is correct. The many instances when the evidence does not support her theory, 
however, are glossed over by Dudziak, and she regularly uses speculation in order 
to re-inforce her theory.  
She is unable to offer a conclusive explanation for why Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson called for civil rights reform in his letter to the FEPC, as she 
acknowledges that there is no way to fully resolve the issue of cause and effect in 
this instance. Was Dean Acheson recommending civil rights reform in order to 
mollify overseas critics, or was he using the mollification of overseas critics in 
order to justify his recommendations concerning an issue of domestic policy?685 
Both outcomes are accounted for within Bell’s Interest-Convergence theory, and 
the impact – that Acheson influenced domestic policy from a foreign policy 
perspective – remains the same. The narrow strictures of Dudziak’s Cold War 
imperative theory, however, cause her to assert that it was “unlikely that Dean 
Acheson… was a closet civil rights activist crafting an argument” despite the lack 
of compelling evidence provided to support this assertion.686 The constricted, 
one-track outlook of the Cold War imperative theory has not allowed Dudziak to 
consider the possibility that both outcomes are true. 
Similarly, Dudziak acknowledges that her theory is not generalisable to the 
Eisenhower Administration, but offers only the fact that the needs of the Cold 
War imperative had been satisfied by Brown as an explanation: Dudziak notes 
that “once America’s image seemed secure, Cold War concerns dropped out as 
one of the factors encouraging civil rights reform”.687 This is not incorrect when 
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applied to the strategic motivations for the Cold War imperative, but Dudziak’s 
narrow interpretation of the role which the Cold War played in the Federal 
government’s interaction with the civil rights debate over education, alongside 
her side-lining of the relevance of each President’s personal commitment to civil 
rights, limits her understanding of her theory’s relationship to the Eisenhower 
Administration. Dudziak also does not identify how Truman’s consideration of 
African American education was not an isolated incident intended to mollify 
overseas critics, but was in fact part of a far larger consideration of education and 
the Cold War generally, with far more wide-ranging goals. The strategic 
imperative was only part of the story, and at this point quite a small part. The 
driving force of Federal concern over civil rights in education was as much voting 
strategy, manpower considerations and personal commitment as it was foreign 
policy considerations.  
Dudziak’s decision not to investigate Federal educational policy generally 
alongside her discussion of Federal education policy specifically for African 
Americans means that she has not identified the fact that from Truman to 
Eisenhower, general education policy barely altered, but the discussion of African 
American students’ place within in was radically different. She has not identified 
how the consideration of African American students could have benefitted 
Eisenhower’s wider policy, and therefore does not note how jarring its absence is. 
Dudziak is correct in her identification that the Cold War, and by extension the 
Cold War imperative, supported the movement towards getting Brown passed in 
1954 but her explanation can be developed to take account of the greater 
complexity of the pressures at play. Her strength lies in her discussion of the 
international context of this state of affairs, but it is limited by her lack of 
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interaction with the wider domestic context. Both are needed to fully understand 
the relevance, and the limits of the relevance, of the Cold War imperative. 
 Bell’s theory, however, is less reliant on the ebb and flow of policy and 
politics and the occupants of Executive branch; it is useful in explaining the 
interaction between the Federal government and the civil rights debate 
throughout the early years of the Cold War, and therefore is a far more useful 
framework through which to understand this period. Whilst Bell acknowledges 
the relevance of the strategic imperative, he also ascribes relevance to “those 
concerned about the immorality of racist inequality” and “those whites in 
policymaking positions able to see the economic and political advances at home 
and abroad”.688  
Although wider education policies are not considered by Bell, the logistical 
benefits of desegregation outside of the education system or the Cold War are 
highlighted; Bell identifies that “there were whites who realised that the South 
could make the transition from a rural, plantation society to the sunbelt with all 
its potential and profit only when it ended its struggle to remain divided by State-
sponsored segregation”.689 Bell’s article does not explore all of these contexts in 
detail, but they are identified as relevant to the complete narrative. Those he 
elaborates upon, such as the fact that “there were whites for whom recognition of 
the racial equality principle was sufficient motivation” are also mentioned in 
passing by Dudziak – most likely because they were elaborated on by Bell – 
however with the obvious exception of the strategic imperative, the motivations 
that are mentioned by Bell, but that require further exploration, are not 
mentioned by Dudziak.690   
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Bell’s theory does not rely on debateable outcomes or a specific view of 
events to be relevant; he merely asserts that where civil rights progress occurred 
in the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, the corresponding benefits to 
whites involved in the process can be identified, and where civil rights progress 
did not occur, it was often due to the lack of a corresponding benefit to whites. 
Bell does not allow for the idea that the convergence of interests must be 
recognised by the whites involved in the struggle for civil rights, but his theory is 
able to accommodate a more complex narrative which has allowed for further 
exploration of the topic without invalidating the framework. Dudziak’s Cold War 
imperative theory was intended to further Bell’s work, but is in fact less suited to 
fully explaining the nuances of the triangular interactions between the Federal 
government, the Civil Rights movement and the Cold War in the case of 
education. As such, Bell’s theory should be regarded as the dominant theoretical 
framework for the study of this area.  
Moreover, this thesis has furthered Bell’s theory by highlighting the need 
for the white players to acknowledge that a convergence of interests could be 
possible, in addition to the existence of such a convergence. The ‘convergence of 
interests’ which existed between the Eisenhower Administration and the Civil 
Rights movement had no impact upon Federal education policy during the 1950s. 
Importantly Eisenhower did not acknowledge the important role that African 
American students could have played in the logistical effort to improve the 
nation’s educated manpower pool, and had no personal or political commitment 
to civil rights in education. As such, although the Cold War was of course very 
much still occurring, and the contribution which African American students were 
capable of making to the manpower pool was no more or less useful to the nation 
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than it had been prior to the Brown decision, Eisenhower’s understanding of the 
needs of the USA’s Cold War effort did not tally with those identified by the Civil 
Rights movement. The benefits wrought by the ‘convergence of interests’, which 
had existed between the Civil Rights movement and the Truman Administration, 
disappeared with the inauguration of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Therefore, as Bell’s 
theory predicts, this aspect of the Civil Rights movement received no support 
from the Federal government. 
 
Conclusion 
Overcoming segregation in education was hindered greatly in the early years of 
the Cold War by the Federal government’s own Catch 22: Federal intervention 
was required in order to overcome the powerful opposition to integration and 
expanded opportunity, but Federal intervention was not legally possible. The 
Federal government did not have a constitutional right to intervene in the 
education system or in State matters. In framing its arguments for desegregation 
and equality of education for African Americans as national security issues rather 
than civil rights issues, the Federal government attempted to establish its right to 
intervene in these matters, as issues of national security superseded States’ rights 
issues. This seemingly gave the US Federal government not only the right, but the 
responsibility, to attempt to tackle desegregation and equality in education, as it 
had done in the matters of education for democracy and science education.  
The attempts of the Truman Commission and other official bodies to 
equalise access and opportunity within the American education system, though 
largely unsuccessful in achieving its aims immediately after the publication of its 
report in 1947, began a discourse which gained momentum over time. The 
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convergence of interests created by the Cold War imperative in both its strategic 
and logistical manifestations – first explored in the report of the Truman 
Commission – and President Truman’s personal and political imperatives for 
change, prompted the Executive branch of the Federal government to find ways 
in which to attempt to circumvent the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
This enabled it to support the improvement of educational provision for African 
Americans, which included advocating desegregation in educational institutions 
in the years after the Second World War.  
 President Truman’s establishment of the Truman Commission, alongside 
the remit he outlined for discussions and his careful selection of members, 
ensured that this unorthodox utilisation of Executive power was in a position to 
recommend an increased Federal role in the education system in order to improve 
attention to African American educational standards. The participants’ status as 
members of a Presidential Commission also ensured that they were ideally placed 
to recommend desegregation in a forum in which their recommendation was 
were sure to be heard. Although Truman’s difficulties with Congress coupled with 
the timing of the report’s publication stunted immediate action on the 
Commission’s recommendations, the ideas raised by the Truman Commission 
had a long-term impact upon the education system, and both benefitted African 
American students and began to normalise the idea of a permanent Federal role 
in the US education system.  
 In addition, the Truman Administration created a number of programmes 
intended to support and improve African American education, and pursued 
several innovative attempts to garner the power to do so during the years after 
the Second World War, with varying degrees of success. All of the programmes 
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and initiatives, however, included mention of how the programme could be of 
benefit to the USA’s Cold War effort in addition to the African American 
community, thus re-asserting the importance of Derrick A. Bell Jr.’s Interest-
Convergence theory as a framework for understanding the complicated 
interactions between the Federal government and the education system in the 
matter of civil rights during this period.  
The discussion of the wider education system and the separate 
Administrations alongside African American education policy has allowed for the 
unpacking of Mary L. Dudziak’s theory of the ‘Cold War imperative’, and has led 
to the understanding that there were in fact at least three ‘imperatives’ for change 
where civil rights in education was concerned – not all of which were related to 
the Cold War specifically – instead of Dudziak’s one, strategic, imperative. This 
in turn has also allowed for a deeper investigation of the limits of the usefulness 
of the Cold War imperative theory as a framework through which to understand 
the interaction between the Federal government and the Civil Rights movement 
in the matter of education during the 1950s. The understanding that general 
Federal education policy did not change drastically between the Truman and 
Eisenhower Administrations places a spotlight on the changes that occurred over 
African American education policy, and as such necessitates the provision of an 
explanation which goes beyond the discussion of the loss of the strategic Cold War 
imperative for change. This exploration also furthered Bell’s framework by 
highlighting the importance of perception to his theory.  
Eisenhower was not opposed to the expansion of Federal authority in the 
education system, as evidenced by his continuation of Truman’s wider education 
policy goals during his Administration. He perceived the logistical Cold War 
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benefits inherent within these policies, and as such also perceived the education 
system as relevant to the Federal responsibility to protect national security. He 
did not, however, acknowledge the relevance of the logistical Cold War imperative 
for progress in civil rights to his Administration’s Cold War effort due to a number 
of factors, none of which are directly related to Dudziak’s strategic imperative. He 
could boast no political imperative as his party was courting Southern Democrats 
rather than African American voters during the 1950s; his own personal 
considerations of civil rights in education were more closely, although not 
completely, aligned with the Massive Resistance movement over the Civil Rights 
movement; finally, the strength of the Massive Resistance movement 
significantly increased the ease with which he could intervene in the promotion 
of civil rights within the education system, and therefore the benefits to the nation 
of doing so.  
The Cold War cannot be claimed as having been ‘useful’ to the Civil Rights 
movement in the education system. Bell noted in 1979 that, 25 years after the 
passage of Brown, “most black children [still] attend public schools that are both 
racially isolated and inferior”.691 Bell blamed this on a combination of 
“demographic patterns, white flight and the inability of the courts to effect the 
necessary degree of social reform”.692 Moreover, it cannot be claimed that the 
Cold War, and by extension the Cold War imperative for change, improved civil 
rights in education in the early years of the Cold War as, cumulatively, the Cold 
War did far more damage to the cause of civil rights in the education system 
during the 1950s than it did good. This can largely be attributed to the fact that 
the Cold War imperative was not tied to one cause or mission other than the 
winning of the Cold War; where it supported the Civil Rights movement, it could 
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be used to do just that. Equally, however, when the needs of the Cold War effort 
were better supported by actively not supporting the Civil Rights movement, as 
they often were during the Eisenhower Administration, then the Cold War 
imperative in fact limited the progress of civil rights in the USA.  
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At the Conference on Higher Education in the National Service in 1950, the 
pledge read “we pledge to the President of the United States, Commander-in-
Chief of our Nation, the total strength of our colleges and universities – our 
faculties, our students, our administrative organizations, and our physical 
facilities”.693 The pledge continued by stating “we pledge the resources of higher 
education to define and promulgate the principles of American Democracy, both 
among our own people and to the other peoples of the world”.694 Commissioner 
of Education Earl J. McGrath publicly stated in 1951 that Federal involvement in 
education had increased in order to achieve federally desired outcomes. McGrath 
claimed that “the people of the Nation, without in any way modifying the State 
and local control, have increasingly employed the Federal government to achieve 
educational objectives not otherwise attainable”.695 By 1950, the Federal 
government’s pattern of utilising the education system in times of national 
emergencies had taken hold, and the shift had garnered little opposition. 
The goldilocks conditions created after the close of the Second World War 
both encouraged and enabled the US Federal government - in particular the 
Executive branch and, more briefly, the Judicial branch - to expand its role in the 
US education system. The first step towards this change was the increase in the 
perceived importance of education to national security. This began after the 
Second World War and was intensified by the outbreak of the Cold War. 
Moreover, the post war expansion of centralised government programmes both 
within and without the USA and the success of the education provisions included 
within the GI Bill contributed to the provocation of a burgeoning union between 
education and politics. This coupled with Truman’s particular concern for the 
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education system to initiate the Executive branch’s amplified participation in the 
structure and direction of the US education system. Within the context of race, 
the escalating post war racial tension and protest, particularly present in the 
South, also converged with both an increased need for a better educated populace 
(a populace which included black students) and a greater focus on US racial 
politics due to the increased perception of the relationship between education and 
societal progress. When combined with Truman’s penchant for expanded 
educational opportunity, and the Democratic Party’s desire to garner black votes, 
the USA briefly encountered the right social conditions for educational change. 
These changes manifested particularly in the field of science education and 
research,  the development of education for democratic citizenship, and the 
equalisation of opportunity and access for African American students. Within 
these fields the Executive branch conceived of a number of innovative methods 
through which it could increase its involvement in the administration and 
direction of the US education system. President Truman established a 
presidential commission focused on education, which represented a significant 
departure from the earlier mandate of presidential commissions. The Executive 
branch then worked within the confines of the commission structure, however, to 
ensure that the carefully selected members presented a report which answered 
the cleverly outlined mandate conferred upon them at their appointment. The 
report supported the Executive branch’s intentions in all three areas of concern – 
education for democracy, the increase of scientific manpower and the need for 
desegregation. The use of the commission as a method for intervention was 
unorthodox, however its unorthodox usage did not prevent it from being subject 
to the usual problems inherent in presidential commissions; specifically, it was 
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thwarted in its attempts to catch the attention of Congress, and thus its impact 
upon the education system was, in part, delayed.  
The Executive also utilised what little power it already wielded in the 
education system, and expanded the powers of the United States Office of 
Education. The programmes recommended, funded and administered by this 
Office often directly supported the Truman Administration’s wider goals for the 
education system. In particular, programmes designed to increase the curriculum 
focus on teaching democracy over communism, and those intended to reduce the 
achievement gap between African American students and white students were 
particularly successful. Funding for scientific research was also carefully 
administered in order to ensure that research was carried out in a more 
streamlined manner than previously, in order to increase the flow of basic 
research from the universities into the wider US industry. Finally, the 
government utilised the powers that were already available to it in order to 
circumvent the need to interfere directly in the education system. It made use of 
its power to control and administer the draft during the Korean War to both 
increase the focus upon science as a discipline, and to protect and bolster the 
USA’s stock of scientifically trained manpower.  
The Executive branch was not successful in every endeavour it pursued 
during this period. In particular, Truman’s relationship with Congress, and the 
propensity of wider national issues to take precedence over the administration of 
the education system were common roadblocks. The Cold War and the threats it 
brought to national security did not alter the separation of powers in the US 
Federal government, and therefore President Truman was limited in his 
influence. Moreover, his brief attempts to reduce the separation between the 
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Executive and Judicial branches by ‘stacking the court’ were unsuccessful, and 
many programmes or initiatives which required support from outside the 
Executive branch were stunted or delayed. It is the case, however, that many of 
the Executive initiatives that were pursued encountered surprisingly little 
opposition from outside the Federal government.  
 Many endeavours, such as the government’s administration of the draft 
and the programmes created by the USOE, enjoyed greater success and had a 
significant impact upon the day to day learning experiences of US students. The 
‘Zeal for American Democracy’ programme altered social studies education; the 
governmental scientific research grants simultaneously increased basic research 
in universities and the dependence of US universities on the US government; the 
literacy programmes enabled illiterate African Americans to begin to progress in 
their education. Certain initiatives also had long-term impacts, despite not 
making an immediate impression in the classroom. The report of the President’s 
Commission on Higher Education predicted the direction of the US education 
system for decades afterwards even though early critics dismissed its 
recommendations as too radical and wide-ranging to be possible.  
 This was not the first period in which the US Federal government had 
gained some influence over the US education system – such influence had been a 
common feature of the relationship between the Federal government and the US 
education system throughout US history. Similarly to the situation after the 
Second World War, this influence was usually pursued during times of national 
crisis, such as war or economic downturns; it focused upon ensuring that the 
education system was serving the needs of the nation during the period of crisis. 
Each administration was innovative in its methods and despite opposition, they 
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were repeatedly successful in their aims. The innovative methods which the 
Executive branch conceived of in order to increase its involvement after the 
Second World War mirrored these earlier examples, as did the reasoning behind 
its efforts – the perceived need for the US education system to serve the nation in 
the post war/ Cold War climate. These actions fundamentally altered the 
structure of the American education system by significantly increasing the level 
of influence which the Federal government wielded, and this influence has never 
subsided.  
Unlike the Federal government’s earlier forays into the education system, 
the long-term nature of the Cold War left the encroachment with no natural end-
date and thus engendered a shift to long-term fiscal and policy involvement on a 
scale not seen before in the USA.  After the passage of the NDEA, the question 
was no longer ‘should the Federal government play a formal role within the 
education system’, but instead, ‘what should the Federal government’s role be?’ 
This easy shift was no doubt accomplished by the normalisation of Federal 
involvement in the education system which had occurred throughout the 1950s. 
Following the passage of the NDEA, the Federal government’s role in higher 
education was confirmed and, in the subsequent decades, a plethora of federally 
sponsored programmes and acts were enacted. Greater steps were taken in 
legitimising the Brown decision, as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 called 
for the withholding of Federal funds from any school district where segregation 
was still present. As the education system became increasingly dependent on 
Federal funds, this legislation became ever more powerful.696 The NDEA directly 
influenced the Higher Education Act (HEA), which was approved by Congress in 
1965. This Act, passed as a part of Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society programme, 
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appropriated all of the legislation in the NDEA, including scholarship provision 
and financial support for scientific and foreign language education.697 Foreign 
language provision was further improved by the International Education Act of 
1966.698  
1965 also saw the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA). The ESEA provided Federal funds to every district in the country with 
the express intention of closing the achievement gap between high income and 
low income students. The ESEA was created and passed in only 87 days. This 
speed is undoubtedly due, in part, to the impetus for change provided by the 
death of President Kennedy and the subsequent Democratic landslide won in the 
election of 1964. It is also due, however, to the fact that there was little if any 
serious opposition to the Bill from within Congress or without. This is surprising, 
as political historian Norman C. Thomas has referred to the ESEA and the HEA 
as “the greatest expansion of that role [of the Federal government in education] 
which has ever occurred”.699 Although the Bill was well received, it included 
several Federal strictures, such as the requirement that each district submit 
yearly reports detailing the “educational effectiveness” of their programmes to 
ensure that the Federal money was not wasted on unsuccessful initiatives.700 That 
it passed almost unopposed, and in such a short period of time, is testament to 
how desensitised the USA had become to the presence of the Federal government 
in education, despite the fact that no change had been made to Article 10 of the 
Constitution.  
By the 1970s, even the Executive branch found it difficult to stem the flow 
of Federal funding for the education system. President Nixon vocalised his 
disapproval of the level of Federal funding which the government allocated for 
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educational programmes and institutions. He declared during his Presidential 
campaign that “it is very easy for politicians to call for new millions of dollars to 
be allocated for every new educational spending proposal that spins out of an 
ivory tower…but there are times when… [the President] must have the strength 
to say ‘no’ for the sake of the American taxpayer”.701 Despite this clear position on 
Federal involvement in the education system, however, Nixon was unable to 
prevent not only its continuation, but also its expansion. In 1972, several 
amendments were made to the HEA (1965), and these amendments called for a 
vast increase in both Federal aid to and Federal influence over the education 
system.  
Title XI of these amendments represented the largest encroachment upon 
academic institutions’ freedom to govern their students’ day-to-day experiences. 
Title XI outlawed discrimination on the basis of sex in any and all educational 
institutions which received Federal funds, including schools, two and four year 
colleges and universities, and graduate schools. By 1972, this was the majority of 
the American education system. The legislation did not only refer to hiring and 
firing policies and women’s salary equity, it also included measures which 
ensured equal treatment for female and male students in almost all aspects of 
academic life.  
This Federal mandate meant that female students could no longer be 
denied enrolment onto a traditionally male major, could not be discriminated 
against in the distribution of academic scholarships, or even athletic scholarships, 
and high schools could not prioritise male sporting programmes over female 
sporting programmes.702 It also established that students could not be 
marginalised from campus activities after they were married, and that pregnancy 
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must be treated the same as any other medical condition. No educational 
institution in receipt of Federal funds could exclude or discriminate against a 
female student on the grounds that they had fallen pregnant, regardless of 
whether or not they were married.703 Title XI greatly impacted the day-to-day 
running of educational institutions, especially where high school and collegiate 
sports were concerned, yet despite opposition from many and varied quarters, 
including the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), Title XI has never 
been overturned.  
From the Federal government’s perspective, the increased Federal 
presence within the higher education sector had the desired effect in the first few 
decades following the passage of the NDEA. The number of graduate students 
receiving higher degree qualifications – something which had been of great 
concern in the early years of the Cold War – increased from 120,000 graduates 
in 1946 to 900,000 graduates in 1970.704 Undergraduate enrolment figures 
continued to rise dramatically; by 1970, 52% of high school seniors were accepted 
into college, although the Truman Commission’s target figure of 60% was not 
reached until 1991.705 Throughout the late Cold War, Federal funds supported 
scientific research on a vast scale, helped to construct bigger and better libraries, 
trained students in nationally useful foreign languages and served to continually 
tighten the bond between the Federal government and American higher 
education.  
The immediate impact of the increased Federal presence within higher 
education was just as its many critics had feared; Federal funding was funnelled 
into specific programmes with no contingency plan for the decline of other fields. 
As Thelin has noted, “not surprisingly, sponsored research projects were 
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concentrated in a few fields, particularly physical and biological sciences, health 
sciences and engineering”.706 In addition to this increased focus on just a few 
academic fields, only a few academic institutions actually received support. This 
favouritism emerged shortly after the passage of the NDEA. In 1960, six 
universities received 57% of the funds, and twenty universities received 79%.707 
As Thelin has recognised, “not only did this external funding set twenty 
universities apart, it also changed the internal dynamics of rewards and priorities. 
It fractured a research university into “ ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ ”.708 This system 
set the higher education sector down a path which, within a generation, would 
create a damaging hierarchical system within post-secondary education. 
Moreover, the Federal government’s system of funding focused only on research 
and allocated no provision for subsidising undergraduate tuition fees or the day-
to-day running costs of the buildings and administration. Therefore, even the 
universities which were lucky enough to be recipients of Federal funding were 
disadvantaged by it.709 
By 1970, institutions had become reliant on increasing external funding 
and an ever expanding undergraduate student body. Thelin delineates well the 
impact which Federal involvement in the education system had upon the higher 
education sector during the decades following the NDEA in A History of 
American Higher Education (2011). He notes that between 1974 and 1979, the 
Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education published a series of 
commissioned reports on the state of higher education in the USA. Thelin 
highlights that “the studies were good, but the news in their findings was not”.710 
Rather than depicting higher education as a ‘growth industry’ – a moniker the 
sector had become used to over the previous twenty years – the report instead 
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predicted a ‘new depression’ for the finances of higher education institutions.711 
Their expansion had been too fast, and the Federal funding had created an 
atmosphere which encouraged competition for both money and prestige, but 
which neglected the sector’s ‘bread and butter’: teaching and undergraduate 
tuition fees. As Ravitch has outlined, as outstanding professors became sought 
after by many universities, it gave them the power to “negotiate arrangements 
permitting them to concentrate on their research and writing, and to teach 
advanced courses in their speciality, leaving them little time for undergraduates 
or for general education”.712  
The competition for Federal funding, Thelin recognises, also created a 
hierarchy within higher education, which in turn caused an homogenisation of 
the institutions, as each one competed to be considered as prestigious as the next. 
In an attempt to differentiate between each institution, the Carnegie Council 
divided each university or college into one of five categories: ‘research university’; 
‘doctoral-granting university’; ‘comprehensive university’; ‘liberal arts college’; 
and ‘two year college’.713 Due to the cachet which Federal funding had bestowed 
upon research institutions and graduate-focused institutions, Thelin 
demonstrates, these categories were immediately perceived as ‘rankings’, which 
came to define higher education for the next twenty years. As the ‘research 
institution’ and the ‘doctoral-granting institution’ were perceived to be at the top 
of the rankings, the Carnegie Council’s categories only served to increase the 
focus on Federal funding and graduate school programmes at the expense of 
teaching and undergraduates, as institutions competed to ‘move up’ a category.714  
This neglect of students proved catastrophic to higher education during 
the 1980s. Nationwide economic troubles coupled with changes in foreign policy 
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and US demographics reduced the proportion of American youths who saw a 
college education as a viable prospect. The end of the military draft meant that 
fewer youths felt the need to attend college, and a declining birth rate lowered 
this number even further. The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) oil embargo, which had drastically raised oil prices, and 
therefore operational costs, meant that many universities had put off undertaking 
much needed repairs to campuses. As competition for undergraduates became 
stiffer, institutions which had not kept their campuses in a good state of repair 
suffered, as they were less appealing. Stagflation – high inflation coupled with 
low productivity – in the 1980s also meant that such repairs were far more costly 
than they had been a few years earlier.715  
Federal intervention in education, however, had become normalised by 
this point in US history, and the sector once again turned to the Federal 
government to support it in this difficult time. The result was, as Thelin describes 
it, “a belated fulfilment of the 1947 Truman Commission Report’s 
recommendations”.716 In 1972, Congress passed an amendment to the 1965 HEA 
and established the Basic Educational Opportunities Grants (BEOG). This 
programme established widespread tuition support for any and all American 
undergraduate students who met the – relatively low – criteria.717 The 
programme was renamed ‘Pell Grants’, in honour of Senator Claiborne Pell of 
Rhode Island, and helped both to re-popularise the appeal of earning a college 
degree and improve affordability just when the sector needed it most.  
By the late 1970s, education had firmly established itself as a central issue 
in Federal politics. The Democratic Primaries for the election of 1976 saw the first 
endorsements by major educational institutions; the National Education 
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Association (NEA) endorsed Jimmy Carter, and its rival, the American 
Federation of Teachers (AFT) endorsed Ted Kennedy.718 Jimmy Carter won the 
nomination, and the NEA, and its 1.5 million members, supported the Democratic 
candidate in return for Carter’s promise that, when in office, he would establish 
a Department of Education.719 The NEA hoped that a Department of Education 
would centralise, co-ordinate and streamline all of the Federal government’s now 
many and varied educational programmes.  
Although it took him two years, Carter did eventually honour his 
commitment to the NEA, and Congress’ 13th Department was established on 27th 
October 1979. The political wrangling involved in its establishment had 
significantly reduced the Department’s scope and power, but it nonetheless 
represented a massive shift in the administration of Federal educational 
programmes. Carter’s creation of a Department of Education also signified the 
Federal government’s intentions to continue and expand their involvement with 
the US education system, as Carter’s controversial appointment as his first 
Secretary of Education was Shirley Hufstedler, a Federal judge from California 
with few contacts in the education sector.720 Ravitch has suggested that this was 
“an implicit signal from Washington” that a “network of regulations and 
mandates would be administered by an experienced hand”.721  
Ronald Reagan pledged to dismantle Carter’s Department of Education 
during his time as President, but the Federal grip on the education system once 
again proved too strong even for an Executive to direct.722 His first Secretary of 
Education, Terrell Bell, in fact supported the continuation of the Department, and 
waged a behind-the-scenes war to ensure that the Department was not 
disbanded. Bell resigned after four years, and was replaced by William Bennett, a 
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candidate who better appealed to the religious right and extreme conservatives. 
Bennett firmly supported the abolition of his own Department. Despite this, 
however, Congressional support for its continuation remained far too strong to 
overcome.723  
This battle characterises the Reagan Administration’s entire education 
agenda. Reagan was an outspoken critic of Federal involvement in education, and 
the White House worked hard both to significantly reduce Federal spending in 
education and to return the majority of power over education to the States. 
During his time in office, Reagan proposed the reduction of Pell Grants and 
guaranteed student loans; he recommended a broader interpretation of Title XI 
whereby it would only apply to those institutions in direct receipt of Federal aid; 
he asked for a ‘simplification’ of the Federal government’s approach to vocational 
education, and asked that the majority of the power to develop new programmes 
be returned to the States; and he advocated major cuts to Federal appropriations 
for higher education.724  
On all fronts, Reagan was thwarted by Congress. Pell Grants and 
guaranteed student loan provision were maintained, and the maximum amount 
a student could receive from a Pell Grant was increased; whilst the President’s 
recommendations on Title XI were upheld by the Supreme Court in Grove City 
College v. Bell (1984), the ruling was overturned in 1988; Congress authorised 
28% more money for vocational education than Reagan had asked for, and did 
not set spending limits for vocational education for the following years.725 Finally, 
Congress rejected Reagan’s recommendations for major cuts to higher education 
and instead made available the sums for higher education including more money 
for loans and grants, and a wider interpretation of student eligibility for Federal 
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subsidies.726 Most interestingly, many of Reagan’s proposals were rejected with 
bipartisan support.727 It became clear to the White House that Federal 
administration of, and aid to, education was popular with both parties and the 
general American public, and in 1988, in order to garner support for a Republican 
successor, Reagan changed his position on Federal aid to education. In 1988, 
Reagan asked Congress to increase appropriations for Pell Grants, loans and 
research; all in all he requested a 30% increase in governmental spending on 
education on the previous year.728 
By the end of the Reagan Era, education was so established as a Federal 
concern that George Bush Sr. felt comfortable giving himself the moniker ‘the 
Education President’.729 Under George Bush Sr., the Federal government made 
Federal grants available to academic libraries, increased aid to historically black 
colleges, and financed a range of teacher training programmes. Bush was 
succeeded by Bill Clinton who, it was well known, saw education as a priority; 
whilst Governor of Arkansas, he had drastically overhauled the education system 
and improved Arkansas’s national education ranking. The election of these two 
education-focused men demonstrates how much the American nation had come 
to accept the role which the Federal government played in the education system 
since the beginning of the Cold War. Indeed, in 1990, Henry Rosovsky, former 
Dean of Harvard’s Faculty of Arts and Sciences, stated in The University, an 
Owner’s Manual (1990) that, at least in part, the Federal government had come 
to “own” the university; with the Clinton Administration’s Goals 2000: Educate 
America Act (1994), which mandated, among other things, national standards for 
schoolchildren, curriculum focus and continuing education for teachers, they had 
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come to ‘own’, again at least in part, the elementary and high school system as 
well.730;731  
The two most recent US Presidents have both placed great importance on 
the Federal government’s role in maintaining and improving the American 
education system; George Bush Jr. reformed Johnson’s ESEA and passed the No 
Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2001. NCLB called for standardised testing of 
American schoolchildren, and required any school which received some form of 
Federal funding to report their results to the government. Schools which did not 
meet targets were subject to certain strictures, and although NCLB enabled each 
individual State to set its own standards, each school was ultimately answerable 
to the Federal government.732 Most recently, President Obama created “Race to 
the Top”, an initiative which seeks to improve US schools through the means of a 
competition for Federal funding. The White House website describes the 
programme as one which “offers bold incentives to States willing to spur systemic 
reform to improve teaching and learning in America’s schools”.733 Without ever 
directly challenging the Tenth Amendment, the Federal government have become 
indispensable to the education sector. The suggestions that had begun with the 
Truman Commission in 1947 have, in a little over fifty years, completely changed 
the make-up of education in the USA. 
 
 The many and varied ways in which the actions of the Federal government 
impacted the relationship between the government and the US education system 
during the early years of the Cold War offer many options for further study in this 
field. Many other official bodies concerned with Cold War politics intersected 
with the education system in the early years of the conflict, and it would be 
306 
 
interesting to explore the extent to which they also attempted to influence the 
workings of the education system, if at all. It would be of particular value to 
further investigate the work of the Educational Policies Commission (EPC). As 
education was a State concern, the recommendations made by the EPC were the 
closest thing that the USA had to a national curriculum during the early Cold War. 
By studying the discussions, committees and recommendations of the EPC, it 
may be possible to track the development of the Federal government’s influence 
upon the education system from the other side of the fence.  
Another area in which further study would be beneficial to the wider field 
is the work of organisations not directly connected with the education system. 
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was established shortly after the end of 
the Second World War in order to monitor and support the development of the 
field of Atomic Energy research in the wake of the bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.734 The AEC has no formal connection to the US education system, but 
atomic research was a vital component of the Federal government’s plan to stay 
ahead of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the Cold War. The extent to which 
the AEC’s work intersected with the Federal government’s drive to increase the 
number of US students who majored in STEM fields is as yet unmapped, and 
would contribute to building a greater picture of the development of scientific 
education before the passage of the NDEA.  
The role which female students played in this dynamic also requires more 
attention. There has been a significant increase in research in recent years which 
has examined several aspects of the female experience during the first years of 
the Cold War; Higher Education for Women in Postwar America, 1945 – 1965 
(2006) by Linda Eisenmann expertly examines the college experience of women 
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during the Cold War. The juxtaposition between the ‘happy housewife heroine’, 
as defined by Betty Friedan in The Feminine Mystique – the idea that women 
were only encouraged to pursue tertiary education in order to meet a ‘better class 
of man’, and that they were expected to return to the home once successfully 
married – and the recruitment drive to both higher education and post-college 
work which was set in motion in order to assuage the worst effects of the post-
war manpower struggle, however, is yet to be studied in detail.  
The manpower struggle, coupled with the fear of Soviet advancement, 
certainly opened up greater opportunities for African American students during 
the Cold War even whilst other forces were simultaneously trying to limit them. 
It is likely, therefore, that the Cold War climate also positively impacted female 
students’ workplace prospects in some ways. There was certainly an increase in 
the number of women who attended college or university and the number of 
women who entered the workforce during the 1950s. As yet, however, the extent 
to which the manpower struggle affected opportunities for women during this 
period, and whether the government’s drive to encourage students to study STEM 
fields directly expanded opportunities for women during the early years of the 
Cold War, is unexplored. This is an emerging field of study, but it requires closer 
attention.  
The Federal government’s intervention in the education system during the 
early years of the Cold War was neither wholly positive nor wholly negative, nor 
was it wholly supported nor wholly opposed. As with anything, there were 
beneficial aspects of the programmes they put in place, and there were aspects 
which damaged the US education system. The Federal government’s focus on 
STEM education in the early 1950s came just at the right moment in American 
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history; without this extra emphasis at both the secondary and tertiary level, it is 
possible that the USA would have lagged further behind the Soviet Union than 
even the media claimed they were. Due to the Federal government’s intervention 
in and redirection of the curriculum, however, the USA was able to compete in, 
and win, a global scientific competition. The Federal government’s persistence 
also led to vast increases in Federal funding for the education system, from which 
it has benefitted greatly over the decades.  
The Federal government’s insistence on redirecting the education system 
to promote education for democracy, however, removed many of the barriers 
which traditionally separated the Federal government from the education system 
and, with it, removed the safeguards which protected the education system from 
being made subject to political quirks or fads. The US education system has never 
since been as independent as it was before the Cold War began, nor has it been 
able to free itself from the stranglehold of political consideration. The Federal 
government has also never before played a greater role in the education system 
than it does today; education is now a major factor in Federal politics, and its ups 
and downs directly impact political successes or failures. The need to 
demonstrate constant improvement in the education system has created a system 
in which the measurement of success is as important as success itself.735  
The Federal government’s intervention in the desegregation of the schools, 
however, is a far more complicated subject. The desegregation of American 
schools is a positive, and praiseworthy, goal for any government. The Federal 
government’s support of the Brown decision remains a positive action for both 
the Truman Administration, which oversaw much of the preparation of the case, 
and for the Eisenhower Administration, which was in power when it was passed. 
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That the Federal government did not follow up on its promises, however, remains 
as a blot on the landscape. Despite the fact that the Federal government briefly 
strove to wipe out school segregation by incentivising integration in the HEA, 
today, the American education system is quickly backsliding into a segregated 
system once more.736    
Consideration of the US education system has formed a central part of the 
four most recent Administrations, and is now an obligatory aspect of the US 
Federal government’s agenda regardless of whether the Executive desires it to be. 
Of all the post-war presidents, only Nixon and Reagan have openly claimed to be 
specifically uninterested in directing national education policy, and both were not 
only forced to recant their positions by the tide of public opinion, but both also 
enacted wide-reaching education programmes and legislation during their 
administrations. Regardless of whether or not the Federal government’s 
increasing power over the education system represents a positive change or not, 
it is clear from recent government initiatives such as NCLB and ‘Race to the Top’, 
that offering a plan to improve the education system is now an essential aspect of 
re-election. Since President Truman ascended to the Presidency in 1944, the 
relationship between the US Federal government and the US education system 
has been greatly altered, and the change appears to be permanent.  
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